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0. INTRODUCTION. OBJECTIVES AND HYPOTHESES 
The words by Herman Melville and Henri Charrière summarize two perspectives 
about the limits and the vulnerability of natural and marine environments and allow us 
to introduce some ideas about the sustainability of the human exploitation of natural 
resources discussed in the present work.  
 The roles of the natural environment and, especially, of marine systems do not 
need to be argued here. They may be related to the exploitation of their renewable and 
non renewable resources, their function as regulator of earths physical and chemical 
conditions and as biodiversity depository. Advising on the conservation of the oceans 
conditions to guarantee these roles is one of the tasks that natural scientists are involved 
in (ROYCE 1996) and is one of the motivations of this work. The role of the marine 
environment as a climate regulator, red-ox system, ecological reserve and human 
economic resource is seen in danger in the last decades as a consequence of natural 
climate fluctuations and a non-responsible use of its resources for anthropogenic 
exploitation (LAEVASTU 1993; 
PAULY et al. 2002).  
 One of the anthropogenic 
uses of the ocean is fishing, an 
ancient activity based on the 
extraction of aquatic living 
resources that became an 
economic activity, at present 
threatening most of the marine 
exploited populations throughout 
the world.  
How I spurned that turnpike earth! - that 
common highway all over dented with the 
marks of slavish heels and hoofs; and 
turned me to admire the magnanimity of 
the sea which will permit no records 
          Herman Melville, Moby Dick
Un seul ennemi compte en brousse: la 
bête des bêtes, la plus intelligente, la plus 
cruelle, la plus mauvaise, la plus cupide, la 
plus odieuse et la plus merveilleuse aussi: 
l'homme  
           Henri Charrière, Banco 
Figure 0.1. An ancient Mediterranean trawler. 
Source: Merino, 1997. 
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Fishing is the catching of aquatic wildlife (PAULY et al. 2002). A fishery is 
defined as the act, process, occupation, or season of taking fish or other sea products 
(MERRIAM-WEBSTER 1993). 
 The harm produced by the incorrect fisheries exploitation is related to the 
depletion of the living resources but also to the loss of biodiversity (PAULY et al. 2002) 
and the economic crises produced on fishing communities (BEVERTON and HOLT 1957; 
HILBORN and WALTERS 1992).  
 Fishery science has two meanings following Royce (1996): First, it is a body of 
scientific knowledge pertaining to the fisheries and their environment. Second, it is a 
profession that expands and uses the body of scientific fishery knowledge to obtain 
optimal benefits from the living resources of the waters.  
 Fishery science is involved in improving the current knowledge about the 
behaviour of fishing systems. The fishing activity is based on the extraction of some 
living resources but its economic motivation must be addressed in order to understand 
its evolution. A powerful tool that scientific community uses for this purpose is the 
bioeconomic modelling (GORDON 1954; SMITH 1969).  
Figure 0.2. Global capture production historical trend. Source: www.FAO.org.  
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 Fisheries jointly with aquaculture production provided in 2002 direct 
employment and revenue to 38 million people worldwide and marine capture fisheries 
production in 2004 was 96.4 million tonnes (FAO 2004).  
 The global catch trends (Figure 0.2) show an increase of worlds landings 
between the 1950s decade and 1985, basically due to technological improvements and 
the discovery of new fishing grounds. The production has been maintained near the 90 
million tonnes, in spite of the continuous increase in technology and economic 
investments (FAO 2004; PAULY et al. 2002). This stagnation in fisheries production is 
caused by the depletion of the traditional fishing grounds (mainly on the North 
Atlantic). FAO reports estimate that 70% of the stocks throughout the world are fully 
exploited, overexploited or depleted (FAO 2004).  
 The Sea resources were considered non exhaustible in the XIX century. The 
mechanisation of the fishing fleets at the end of the XIX century and beginning of the 
XX century alerted the scientific community about the state of fish resources, especially 
in the North Sea. The development of simple biological models in the first decades of 
the XX century (BARANOV 1918; BERTALANFFY 1938; THOMPSON et al. 1931) 
established the grounds for changing concepts towards the need of managing renewable 
resources, such as fisheries. Further methodological advances and more solid theoretical 
foundations of fisheries science were laid in the 1950s with the seminal works of 
Ricker (1954), Gordon (1954), Schaefer (1954, 1957), Beverton and Holt (1957), 
among others  with the development of the first conceptual fisheries models of the 
1950s decade.  
 The first big collapse in worlds fisheries was the Peruvian anchoveta fishery of 
Peru (LAEVASTU 1993; SHANNON et al. 1984). It was the first, but not the last, crisis in 
worlds fisheries (e.g. collapse of cod in Canada in the 1990s) and was accompanied by 
an increase of knowledge about the fisheries systems that confirmed the idea that oceans 
resources are exhaustible and need to be managed. 
 The Mediterranean Sea is not an exception in worlds fisheries (see Figure 0.3) 
but it has its own particularities (LLEONART and MAYNOU 2003). FAOs The State of 
Worlds Fisheries and Aquaculture 2004 report states that among the stocks considered 
depleted, the Mediterranean jointly with the Black Sea and Northeast Atlantic is one of 
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the areas where stocks have the greatest need for recovery. The Mediterranean Sea is a 
closed sea (see Figure 0.4), with insufficient exchange with worlds oceans. Pollutants 
can be found at concentrations that exceed the natural load, suggesting that not only 
overfishing is the cause of the crisis of Mediterranean fisheries, but also pollutants from 
industrial sources, agricultural runoff, tourism or others (FAO 2004).   
 Mediterranean and Black Sea fisheries production was 1.5 million tonnes, 1.6 % 
of the worlds production in 2004 (www.FAO.org). The main target species are tuna, 
red shrimp, red mullet, hake, anchovy and sardine. The fishing gears found in 
Mediterranean are many but the fleets that operate the most important fisheries can be 
divided in trawlers, purse seines and longliners, among some other artisanal gears, such 
as gillnet (FARRUGIO et al. 1993; LLEONART and MAYNOU 2003).  
 Mediterranean countries are gathered for the scientific analysis of their fisheries 
through different organisms, such as the Subgroup on the Mediterranean Sea (SGMED) 
of the European Commission, the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean 
Figure 0.3. Mediterranean capture production historical trend. Source: www.FAO.org.  
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(GFCM) with its Scientific Advisory Committee (SAC). The reports of the last years of 
these organisms alert (ESRI 2004)bout the necessity of reducing fishing pressure in 
most of the stocks in the Mediterranean. Overall, the results of scientific advice based 
on management measures, such as effort reduction or selectivity measures, point 
towards the biological and economic positive effects in the mid and long term (EU 
2004). 
 In the report of its 18th plenary session, the STECF (Scientific, Technical and 
Economic Committee for Fisheries of the European Commission) defined some terms 
of reference highlighting the importance of reporting, evaluating and commenting as 
appropriate the relationships between fishing effort, fishing mortality and catch rates for 
the most important fisheries. The need of evaluating the alternative options (Alternative 
Management Strategies, AMS) to fishing effort reduction to achieve equivalent 
reduction of fishing mortality to keep the stocks at healthy (profitable) conditions is also 
mentioned (EU 2004). The fishing effort and its relation with fishing mortality are thus 
emphasized. In this work these concepts are approached with the construction of a 
bioeconomic model for Mediterranean fisheries. 
As the fishing activity in Mediterranean fisheries is supposed to be 
motivated by economic income, some economic perspective must be addressed to 
understand the observed trends in fishing effort and mortalities. Once the 
mechanisms directing effort and mortality trends are understood, the effects of some 
proposed management measures can be forecast. 
Figure 0.4. The Mediterranean Sea (source: ArcGIS (ESRI 2004) and Toni Cruz).  
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 The economic and biological objectives of the mentioned organizations suggest 
the need of a bioeconomic perspective of Mediterranean fisheries. The bioeconomic 
approach followed here is based on bioeconomic models dating back to Gordon and 
Schaefers model (1954-57). Mathematical bioeconomic modelling implies some 
description of population dynamics and economic dynamics. The equations that are the 
basis of the current modelling are introduced in chapter I. Some remarks about the 
problematic with these classical equations are made. Mediterranean particularities and 
recent advances justify the improvements to the simulation techniques presented here. 
 Bioeconomic simulation models have recently been used to investigate the 
effects of different management measures in fisheries throughout the world (GRANT et 
al. 1981; GRIFFIN 2003; ISAKSON et al. 1982; SPARRE 2001; ULRICH et al. 2002a). 
Bioeconomic simulation tools have been demonstrated to be a very useful tool for the 
analysis of fisheries throughout the world including the Mediterranean (LAEVASTU
1993; LLEONART et al. 2003; PLACENTI et al. 1995). On the contrary, there are some 
aspects such as the dynamics of individual vessels that the current simulation models do 
not approach and that are investigated in this work. The GAMEFISTO simulation 
model is presented in chapter IV with the objective of improving the current simulation 
techniques of the Mediterranean fisheries. 
 Mediterranean fisheries have the main particularity of being managed through an 
input management scheme (except for large pelagics, which are managed through quota 
or output system) that regulates the fishing effort and the technical improvements of the 
vessels. Many of the worlds fisheries are regulated with an output management 
scheme, with quotas (Total Allowable Catch, TAC). The Mediterranean management 
system motivates discussing fishermens behaviour, what in this work are named 
fishing strategies. For a Mediterranean fisherman his strategy is related to the decisions 
to make under the rules of the Mediterranean regulation that limits the time spent 
fishing and the technological investments. As it is extensively explained later, this is a 
determinant point for the construction of the GAMEFISTO simulation model.    
 Any simulation model for the Mediterranean fisheries must also address the 
economic characteristics and costs structure affecting fishermen (FRANQUESA 2001). 
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 Mediterranean fisheries are composed by vessels that usually do not exceed 25 
of length and that can be considered small scale compared to those in the North 
Atlantic. Mediterranean fishing fleets are usually composed of very heterogeneous 
vessels, i.e., some old wooden vessels share the same fishery with some modern and 
powerful polyester vessels. This heterogeneity has suggested that the bioeconomic 
analysis of a Mediterranean fishery should be approached at vessel level (LLEONART et 
al. 1999; LLEONART et al. 2003). As it is introduced in the next paragraph, the word 
shared is the quid of a new perspective of Mediterranean fisheries and the 
GAMEFISTO simulation model.  
 A property of fisheries systems that motivated in part the present work was 
intuited after the lecture of the Tragedy of the Commons by Garret Hardin (1968). 
This work introduces the idea of ruin as the destiny of any shared system whose 
decision agents strive to maximize their own benefits. The philosophical thoughts by 
Hardin around the strategic interaction between agents sharing a common good were 
explained in terms of ethical arguments but had some mathematical formulation since 
von Neumans Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele in 1928 and much more 
systematically with Nashs Non Cooperative Games in 1951. The main idea behind 
these works is that any strategic interaction may be modelled through a game theoretic 
analysis. Following Mesterton-Gibbons (1993) A game in mathematical sense is a 
model of strategic interaction, which arises whenever the outcome of an individuals 
actions depends on actions to be taken by other individuals. As a consequence, the 
main idea or hypothesis presented in the present work was suggested: modelling a 
Mediterranean fishery as a non cooperative game. Following this idea, the observed 
overcapitalization and effort trends in Mediterranean fisheries may be calculated or 
even discussed in game theoretic terms. 
 Mediterranean fisheries can easily be observed as a shared good. Many countries 
share stocks inhabiting neighbour territories, different gears share the same population 
with different fishing patterns or vessels of a fleet sharing a single exploited population. 
The effect of those interactions may be described through game theoretic analysis. 
 As it will be shown in chapter II, the ruin predicted by Hardin is easily deduced 
with a game theoretic analysis when agents sharing a fishery are symmetric. Vessels 
heterogeneity introduces some hypothesis about the outcome of a fishing system. Can 
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vessels heterogeneity avoid the tragedy predicted by Hardin? This hypothesis is 
conveniently explained in chapter II and discussed for the case study in chapters V and 
VI. 
 Another particularity of Mediterranean fisheries is the multispecies characteristic 
of its landings (see Figure 0.5). The single species models may indicate that a fishery is 
non profitable due to overexploitation. In contrast, it may ignore that the same gear 
fishing on the same ground may fish a high variety of species, some that may be 
overexploited and some that may not. As a consequence, a multispecific model needs 
to be performed adequate to Mediterranean fisheries. 
 Relating models to data is not only a matter of the chosen models. Parameter 
estimation is a necessary step for a bioeconomic simulation. The scarcity of reliable data 
series in the Mediterranean highlights the need of some modern parameter estimation 
techniques (CADDY 1993; FARRUGIO et al. 1993; LLEONART and MAYNOU 2003; 
Figure 0.5. Multispecific landings in a Mediterranean vessel. 
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LLEONART et al. 2003). Mediterranean fisheries information is usually related to 
commercial data series with a large amount of flaws. Parameter estimation with short 
and non reliable data series has become a very complicated issue with the available 
methodologies (HILBORN and WALTERS 1992; SCHNUTE and RICHARDS 2004). Chapter 
III is dedicated to review the current parameter estimation techniques and to introduce 
some modern methodology. As it will be conveniently discussed, the only modern 
techniques that improved the current quality of parameter estimation process 
were genetic algorithms. 
The Mediterranean fisheries are being observed as declining by the scientific 
community and by the fishing sector (personal communication by Mr. Eusebi Esgleas, 
president of Blanes fishermen association and skipper). The increase of the fishing costs 
derived by the overcapitalization of the fleets and the collapse of some exploited 
populations are transforming the Mediterranean fisheries into non attractive activities 
with an uncertain future. The increase in the costs of fishing is caused by an exogenous 
variable such as the fuel price derived from international bargains. It has been reported 
by the fishing sector as the main threat to the profitability of its activity and the 
simulation model constructed here is used to test these perceptions. The influence of 
the fuel price on fishermen fishing strategy will also be investigated.
 The future perspectives, the bioeconomic effects of some management actions 
and the validity of the proposed methodology are investigated in chapter V through a 
particular fishery located on the north-western Mediterranean: Blanes trawling fleets 
red shrimp fishery.  
Another aspect of Mediterranean fisheries is the fresh consumption of the 
product and its impact in price formation. The markets in Mediterranean can be 
considered local and offer-demand functions are supposed to control the price of the 
landings (GUILLEN et al. 2004). As it will be conveniently discussed, in a globalization 
background any local market is affected by general economic and market rules.  
 Catalonia, located in the North of Spanish Mediterranean, landed 33 thousand 
tons in 2005, producing an income of 116 million . The main species caught by the 
regional fleets are red shrimp, sardine, anchovy, hake and red mullet. The most 
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profitable species is red shrimp, caught by the trawling fleet and that in 2005 brought 
the 7 % of the total income of Catalan fisheries.  
The Blanes port is the matter of the analysis performed in the last part of this 
work. The Blanes port landed the 6.5 % of the total landings and the 7.2 % of the 
fisheries income in Catalonia. For the Blanes fleet, 23 % of the incomes came in 2005 
from red shrimp landings. For the Blanes trawling fleet, the income from red shrimp 
represents the 50% of the total. These arguments, jointly with the available data 
motivated the election of the Blanes trawling fleet targeting red shrimp as the case study 
to test the methodologies investigated in the present work. 
 The objectives and hypothesis introduced and that will be conveniently 
discussed throughout the work and explicitly in chapter VI are listed here:
General Objectives 
I. Description of the fishing activity by means of the strategic interactions derived 
from being a shared resource. 
II. Introduce game theory as a valid method to explain the observed temporal trends 
of fishing effort in Mediterranean fisheries. 
III. Investigation of modern techniques to improve the parameter estimation process 
in Mediterranean fisheries. Genetic algorithms, Bayesian techniques and other 
mathematical tools. 
IV. Development of a bioeconomic simulation model adequate to Mediterranean 
fisheries including the new methodologies proposed. 
V. Simulation of the effects of some management decisions on the exploited 
populations and the fishing fleets. 
VI. Testing some hypotheses about the methodology and the case study with the 
proposed methodology. 
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Hypotheses 
I. Are the effort dynamics a result of net profits (Smith, 1969)?  
Working hypothesis: Profits as a valid evaluation function. 
II. Can a game theoretic model explain and predict the dynamics of fishing effort? 
Working hypothesis: Fishermen as non cooperative players. 
III. Can the overcapitalization of the fleets be explained and discussed through game 
theoretic analysis?  
Working hypothesis: Fishing power vs. economic efficiency. 
IV. Can the Mediterranean fleets heterogeneity avoid the Tragedy of the 
Commons? Does the system tend to the ruin predicted by Hardin (1968) or as a 
consequence of vessels differences the fishing mortality tends to reduction and 
self management with no regulation?  
Working hypothesis: Heterogeneity as a key aspect of self-regulation. 
V. Is the fishing intensity of the Mediterranean fleets determined by variable costs 
(fuel price)?  
Working hypothesis: Engine horsepower and fuel price as key factors. 
VI. Effects of the multi-specificity of Mediterranean fisheries. The overexploitation 
of some species is sustained with the reasonable exploitation level of others? 
Working hypothesis: Red shrimp (Aristeus antennatus) as a paradigmatic 
example. 
VII. Is the GAMEFISTO model a valid tool to describe a Mediterranean fishery and 
to test some management measures in a European context? 
Working hypothesis: GAMEFISTO as a valid bioeconomic simulation tool for 
 Mediterranean fisheries. 
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I. STATE OF THE ART
The Management of renewable living resources implies both the objectives of 
the conservation of a population and the maximization of the benefits coming from its 
exploitation. These two objectives are not necessarily opposed, especially on the long 
term, although the transition from an overexploited system to an optimal exploitation 
regime implies some controversy (TOUZEAU and GOUZÉ 2001). The biological models 
presented in the following chapters aim to explain the implications of the interaction 
between fishing and populations, with the main objective of achieving a stable 
equilibrium where the sustainable extraction of a fraction of the population is 
maximum, i.e. the maximum sustainable yield (MSY). On the other hand, the 
bioeconomic models analyse the implications of the exploitation also from an economic 
point of view, where the maximum profits from the activity are searched, the maximum 
economic yield (MEY). The catches described by the biomass models supply fish for 
markets for human consumption (or other) and this supply is transformed into revenues 
through some economic rules. These revenues are balanced with the costs generated by 
the activity such as fuel consumption, license and salaries. One of the hypothesis 
presented in the present work states that the economic balance (profits) determines 
the exploitation strategy of a fishery under different assumptions, and therefore it is 
necessary to explain some principles of bioeconomic modelling. 
 The bioeconomic simulation models describe the transformation of landings into 
net profits through some dynamic variables such as fishing effort, catchability, price of 
the products and available biomass. Each of these components can be described with 
different submodels. In this chapter, the classic Gordon-Schaefer (1954) model is 
presented for general introduction. Later on, some alternative models are described and 
the assumptions made on the simulation procedure are conveniently argued (GORDON
1954).  
BASIC MODELS 
 The simulation procedure is based on the same formulation used for 
bioeconomic analysis and fisheries assessment, and implies the construction of a model 
with different levels. The population dynamics of the species studied are controlled by 
the fishing mortality that translates a part of the living biomass from the ecosystem into 
landings (MURRAY 2002).  
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 These landings are converted into revenues under a set of market functions, and 
at last, these revenues become profits (or fisheries rent) once the costs incurred by the 
activity are deducted. 
 The population dynamics are described by two types of models. The surplus 
production or biomass dynamic models assume that a fish stock has been adapted to 
mortality causes such as the pressure produced by a fishing fleet, and responds to this 
mortality with an increase of productivity, that is named surplus production (SCHNUTE
and RICHARDS 2004). On the other hand, the age structured population models include 
explicitly the age structure of a population and the processes that alter it. In these 
models age is associated to individual growth, recruitment, fecundity and vulnerability 
(HILBORN and WALTERS 1992; SEIJO et al. 1997).
The economic part of the simulation model presented in chapter IV starts with 
the sale of the landings that brings revenues to fishermen, as it happens in other 
bioeconomic models (LLEONART et al. 2003; SPARRE 2001; ULRICH et al. 1999; ULRICH
et al. 2002a). These revenues can vary as a result of some price dynamics defined by 
supply-demand, size, import-export functions and some seasonal variability. The 
balance between gross revenues and the cost structure results in the net profits and their 
maximisation is considered to be the motivation for the decision of an effort 
strategy throughout the work.  
The bioeconomic simulation is related to a specific case study in chapter V 
where the equations described in this section are applied in an appropriate manner. The 
details of the assumptions and other considerations to the equations presented here are 
explained in the following chapters. 
A. Population dynamics 
The basis of any population model relies on four primary factors, such as 
recruitment, growth, natural and fishing mortality, ignoring the immigration and 
emigration factors.  
Stock: The group of individuals of the same species whose gains by immigration 
and losses by emigration are negligible compared to the gains by recruitment and 
growth and losses by natural mortality (GUERRA and SANCHEZ-LIZASO 1998). An 
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alternative definition: A group of organisms of one species, having the same growth and 
mortality parameters, and inhabiting a particular geographical area. Stocks are discrete 
groups of animals which show little mixing with adjacent groups (SPARRE and 
WILLMAN 1993a). Cushing defines a fish stock as one that has a single spawning ground 
to which the adults return year after year (CUSHING 1968). Larkin (1972), defines a 
stock as a population of organisms which, sharing a common gene pool, is sufficiently 
discrete to warrant consideration as a self-perpetuating system which can be managed 
(LARKIN 1972).  
Combining recruitment and growth into a single term, we describe production, 
used for the first formulation of a production model. 
1) Biomass dynamic models 
The simplest stock biological models are commonly called biomass production 
models, production or surplus production models. These models represent an attempt to 
assess directly the relationship between the sustainable yield of a stock and the stock 
size and its use requires the definition of some terms. 
Biomass at time t = Biomass at time t-1 + production  natural mortality  catch 
The difference between production and natural mortality is commonly known as 
surplus production and can also be defined as the increase of productivity by the stock 
in order to compensate the fishing mortality (HILBORN and WALTERS 1992; SCHNUTE
and RICHARDS 2004). 
Biomass at time t = Biomass at time t-1 + surplus production  catch 
The first surplus production model was presented by Schaefer in 1954 and 
extended in 1957, based on the logistic growth of a stock and a catch term. It is usually 
formulated as: 
C
K
BrB
dt
dB −⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −= 1                            {eq.1.1}         
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where r represents intrinsic growth of the exploited population, K is carrying 
capacity, while B and C are biomass and catch, measured as a rate (eg. tons/year). 
The model assumes that the catch rate is proportional to the stock size through 
the fishing mortality (F) composed by the fishing effort (E), and a catchability 
parameter (q). Dividing catch by effort we obtain the catch per unit of effort (cpue). 
qBECcpueqEBFBC ==→== /                         {eq.1.2} 
Four implicit assumptions limit the model (SCHAEFER 1957):  
1) The rate of natural increase responds immediately to changes in population density. 
Delay effects are ignored. 
2) The rate of natural increase and fishing mortality are independent of the age 
composition of the population.  
3) Environmental variations are ignored, as carrying capacity K is assumed constant.  
4) Catchability parameter is considered constant, or independent of effort changes.  
5) The model ignores spatial distribution and seasonal effects on the stock. 
 Later studies showed that the catchability parameter actually depends on many 
factors, including biological and socio-economic factors. For instance, in the 
Mediterranean catchability is presumed to be increasing due to subsidies to engine 
changes or modernization, which results in efficiency increase. This assumption will be 
revised for simulation purposes.
A more general model was formulated as (PELLA and TOMLINSON 1969): 
qEBB
K
rrB
dt
dB m −−=                {eq.1.3}           
Note that when m=2, the Pella and Tomlinson model is identical to Schaefers 
model. The latter model describes the surplus production perfectly symmetric to stock 
size, while the former allows production to be skewed to the left (m<2) or to the right 
(m>2), see Figure I.1. The assumptions considered by Schaefer are the same used by 
Pella and Tomlinson. 
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Equilibrium solutions
The Pella and Tomlinson model presents some stable situations for a given level 
of exploitation (fishing effort) and a constant catchability parameter. Catch is assumed 
to be the same to the surplus production of the population, so that equilibrium biomass 
and catches are obtained (Figure I.1). 
( ) 1/10 −⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −=→=
m
eq r
KqErB
dt
dB
            {eq.1.4.a} 
( ) 1/1 −⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −=
m
eq r
KqErqEC                                    {eq.1.4.b} 
The equilibrium solutions show different catches obtained for each effort level. 
The influence of the m parameter of the Pella and Tomlinson model can also be 
observed, note that for m=2, we obtain the Schaefers model. The equilibrium solutions 
presented here introduce the first Reference Point: we define Maximum sustainable 
yield (MSY) as the maximum catch at equilibrium. 
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Figure I.1. Equilibrium catch at effort for different m parameter of Pella and Tomlinsons model. 
MSY 
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Equations 1.4.a.1 and 1.4.b.1 are the equilibrium solutions for Schaefers model: 
( ) ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −=→=
r
KqErB
dt
dB
eq0          {eq.1.4.a.1} 
( ) ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −=
r
KqErqECeq                                      {eq.1.4.b.1} 
The two models presented have been extended and transformed by many authors 
(FOX 1970; JENSEN 1984; LLEONART and SALAT 1989; PRAGER 1994; WALTER 1973). 
Extensions to biomass dynamic models
1) Observations of catch per unit of effort (cpue) at equilibrium suggested Fox 
(1970) that this variable decreased exponentially as effort increased, and proposed a 
new model, a special case of Pella and Tomlinsons model, when m=1. 
bEecpuecpue
E
C −
∞== {eq.1.5} 
2) The delay of the effects of a change in effort on a population has been studied by 
many authors in order to make biomass dynamic models more realistic. The first one 
was proposed by Walter (1973), followed by Marchesseault et al. (1976) and by 
Lleonart and Salat (1989) including a new term named inertia to describe the time 
needed by the population to react after an effort variation. 
3) Explicit terms of recruitment and natural mortality were added to a biomass 
production model, under the assumption that recruitment and mortality on early life 
stages were the main factors affecting the dynamics of a population. Walter (1978) 
developed a surplus production model incorporating a recruitment function, and Jensen 
(1984), incorporated Rickers recruitment relationship with a parabolic approximation. 
Application of biomass dynamic models to simulation procedures
 For simulation purposes two different approaches were used with the Schaefers 
model. First, a difference equation with annual time steps was performed following 
Walters and Hilborn (1976), and second, the solution to the differential equation for a 
given time, as was introduced by Pella (1967) and Prager (1994). As it will be explained 
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later, for parameter estimation purposes, the procedure proposed by Prager (1994) was 
followed.
Difference equations of the Schaefers model
Walters and Hilborn used a simple difference equation of the Schaefers model : 
t
t
ttt CK
BrBBB −⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+=+ 11                                      {eq.1.6} 
where Bt  is biomass at time t, and Ct is the catch during the time t, which is 
defined as: 
ttttt BqEBFC ==                 {eq.1.7} 
q is assumed to be constant for this initial models but it is not a necessary 
condition as will be explained later. The difference equation will only be used for the 
solution of Nashs non cooperative equilibria (see chapters II and IV). 
Pellas solution (1967)
Pella transforms the three parameter equation by Schaefer into a two parameter 
differential equation.  
 Starting from the differential equation by Schaefer, the notation is simplified 
defining =r-F and =r/K. Adding temporal indices to fishing effort and biomass, and 
assuming constant catchability, we obtain (PRAGER 1994): 
2
ttt
t BB
dt
dB βα −=                 {eq.1.8} 
The solution to this differential equation, after a given interval (t, t+) starting 
with a Bt biomass level at time t is: 
)1( −+=+ δα
δα
δ βα
α
t
t
eB
eBB
tt
tt
t                {eq.1.9} 
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Modelling catch during the time interval (t, t+) involves the following integral, 
where Ft is the constant fishing mortality rate during the time period: 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−== ∫+
t
tt
t
t
ttt
teBLnFdtBFC α
β
β
δαδ )1(1            {eq.1.10} 
This equation was firstly presented by Pella (1967) and a similar one by Schnute 
(1977) (PRAGER 1994) and was used both for parameter estimation, optimization and 
simulation purposes in the present work.  
 For simulation purposes and in order to minimise the discretization error, we 
tested the results obtained for (1/10000) years time intervals with the simulations made 
with Pellas solution to the differential equation (PELLA 1967; PRAGER 1994). Note that 
this approach allows us to avoid the use of average biomass and catch in a time interval 
(Table I.1).  
Simulated catch (kg) 
Difference equation Pellas solution 
55536.84 55536.84 
52818.13 52818.13 
50271.93 50271.93 
47883.68 47883.68 
45640.37 45640.38 
43530.40 43530.40 
41543.32 41543.32 
39669.77 39669.77 
37901.28 37901.28 
36230.19 36230.20 
 The simulation works with Pellas solution except for Nashs non cooperative 
solution of the decision box (see chapters II and IV). 
Table I.1. Simulated landings (kg) of a virtual fishery simulated with the two solution concepts. 
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Production functions
 Another approach to modelling fish production (or catch), followed by classical 
economists, is to use production functions. These functions relate the physical quantity 
of output of goods (Y) and specific combinations of physical quantity of inputs (X) used 
in a production process. In the fishery context, the outputs (landings: in weight or value) 
are considered to be determined by the level of the stock and the use of inputs such as 
capacity and labour (GAMBINO 2003). The models present the variables in logarithmic 
form and deal with economic arguments to explain catches through different factors, not 
only effort and catchability coefficient. The production functions presented are based on 
the Schaefer static and dynamic models in logarithmic formulation and the Cobb-
Douglas production function (COBB and DOUGLAS 1928). 
 Static Schaefers model: 
∑∑
==
++=
k
i
ii
k
i
ii XcXccY
1
2
,2
1
,10 lnln)ln(                {eq.1.6.a} 
 Schaefers dynamic model: 
∑ ∑∑
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 Cobb Douglas model: 
∑
=
+=
k
i
ii XccY
1
,10 ln)ln(              {eq.1.6.c}  
 The parameters defining the production functions (ci) implicitly contain 
information of the stock and gear, such as growth parameters and catchability. These 
models are a good tool for choosing adequate effort variables determining production, 
through a statistical procedure, which can be very useful for fisheries management and 
effort control. 
 Production functions are the models most frequently used by economists but 
their formulation is not commonly used in biomass dynamic modelling. Their current 
implementation is problematic due to multicollinearity issues (GAMBINO 2003). 
 The parameters and variables for biomass dynamic models introduced and the 
equations where they are firstly presented are shown in Table I.2. 
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Symbol Equation Meaning 
B 1.1 Biomass 
C 1.1 Catch 
r 1.1 Inrinsic growth parameter 
K 1.1 Carrying capacity 
t 1.1 Time 
F 1.2 Fishing mortality 
cpue 1.2 Catch per unit of effort 
E 1.2 Effort 
q 1.2 Catchability parameter 
m 1.3 Parameter defining the shape of the production curve 
cpue 1.5 Catch per unit of effort at pristine levels 
b 1.5 Parameter relating effort level to decrease of cpue in Foxs model 
 1.8 r-F, for Pellas solution 
 1.8 r/K, for Pellas solution 
 1.8 Time step for Pellas solution 
ci 1.6 Production function parameters 
2) Age-structured models 
Recruitment, growth and survival
 Stock dynamics as stated previously rely on four terms, ignoring migration 
processes: Population increases through individual growth and recruitment and 
decreases as a consequence of natural and fishing mortalities. Biomass dynamic models 
include recruitment, growth and natural mortality factors into growth and environmental 
parameters and the models explained in this section focus the attention on the different 
factors affecting the population as a function of the age of the individuals. Starting from 
survival equations a complete population is described through the formulation described 
in this section based on Schnute (1985). Later on, a comparison between the Schnute 
(1985) and Schaefer (1954) models is presented. 
Table I.2. Variables and parameters of the surplus production models. 
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Formulation
The number of individuals of a year-class (cohort) a+1 at time t+1, Na+1,t+1, will 
be a function of the number of individuals of the previous year-class before a time step 
(Na,t) and the survival rate of the individuals of the previous year-class at the previous 
time (a,t). This is known as a survival equation. 
tatata NN ,,1,1 τ=++               {eq.1.11} 
 This assumption introduces the concepts of mortality and survival rates. The 
survival rate is composed by the product of two terms, the survival to natural mortality 
( ta,σ ) and to fishing ( ta,φ ).  
tatata ,,, φστ =                 {eq.1.12}  
 As survival to fishing is defined, immediately the concept of number of 
individuals of a year class (a) caught at a time t is obtained (Ca,t).  
tatata NC ,,, )1( φ−=               {eq.1.13} 
 Many methods have been employed to approach this equation: the survival rates 
are chosen under different assumptions about the moment when fishing mortality is 
applied. Although Beverton and Holt (1957), and Ricker (1975) assume that fishing and 
natural mortalities take place simultaneously, the two most frequently used models will 
be presented here. First, assuming that fishing occurs immediately after recruitment, 
fishing and natural survival rates are described as a function of the instantaneous natural 
mortality rate (Ma,t), age dependent catchability parameter (qa,t) and fishing effort (Et). 
⎭⎬
⎫
−=
−=
)exp(
)exp(
,,
,,
ttata
tata
Eq
M
φ
σ
                          {eq.1.14.a and 1.14.b} 
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 The survival equation 1.11, describes the number of individuals as a result of the 
survival of the individuals of the previous year class. This assumption presents an easily 
deducted limit: At the age of recruitment, some input of individuals is needed.  
 This is approximated by the stock recruitment relationships, which define the 
number of individuals recruited to a population at time t, as a function of the spawning 
stock biomass (S) present in the population at time t-k. The age of recruitment of a fish 
to a population is k.
( ) γγβα /1)1( ktkttktt SSSfR −−− −==             {eq.1.15} 
 The parameters of the equations are: t is the recruitment productivity parameter, 
 is the recruitment optimality parameter and  is the recruitment limitation parameter 
(SCHNUTE 1985). The general function that relates the number of recruits at time t to the 
spawning stock biomass at time t-k, was proposed by Schnute (1985), and contains 
some classic stock-recruitment models as special cases: 
Figure I.2. Stock-Recruitment models. Schnutes (=-), Berverton and Holts (=-1), Rickers (=0) 
and Schaefers (=1) models. 
spawning stock biomass
nu
m
be
r o
f r
ec
ru
its
Schnute
Beverton-Holt
Ricker
Schaefer
Chapter I    State of the art
31 
ktt StR −=→−∞= αγ }{             {eq.1.15.a} 
 )1/(}{1 ktktt SStR −− −=→−= βαγ          {eq.1.15.b}
 )exp(}{0 ktktt SStR −−=→= βαγ           {eq.1.15.c}
 )1(}{1 ktktt SStR −− −=→= βαγ          {eq.1.15.d} 
 The models presented are the constant productivity model (eq.1.15.a, (SCHNUTE
1985), Beverton and Holts model (eq.1.15.b, 1957), Rickers model (eq.1.15.c, 1954) 
and Schaefers model (eq.1.15.d, 1954) (see Figure I.2).  
 The number of individuals is transformed into biomass through growth models 
that assign a weight to each age class. The general form of a discrete growth model is: 
ρ
ρ
−
−−+=
−+
−−− 1
1)(
1
,
ka
atatatta vVvw             {eq.1.16} 
 where wa,t is the weight of a fish of age a, vt-a is the pre-recruitment weight, Vt-a
is the recruitment weight of a fish born in year t,  is the Fords growth coefficient, and 
k again is the recruitment age of a fish.  
 The most used solution of the general equation 1.16 is the von Bertalanffy 
(1938) growth model that describes the weight of an individual of age a as a function of 
its age and some species parameters, such as Brodys growth coefficient (K=-log()), 
the extrapolated asymptotic weight (Wt-a= (Vt-a   vt-a) / (1- )) and the extrapolated age 
when a fish born in year t-a has weight 0 (a0), (SCHNUTE 1985).  
( ))(exp(1 ,0, atatta aaKWw −− −−−=            {eq.1.16.a} 
 Schnute prefers a simpler form of the general equation 1.16 with some 
constraints proposed by Deriso (1980) assuming the prerecruitment weight vt-a=0, that 
adopts the following form: 
( )
ρ
ρ
−
−=
−+
+− 1
1 1
,,
ka
katkta ww           {eq.1.16.b} 
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 The biomass of an age class of a population (Ba,t) comes immediately: 
tatata NwB ,,, = {eq.1.17} 
 The total biomass (B,t) of a population in a given time t: 
∑
=
=
max
,
a
ka
tat BB                {eq.1.18} 
 Schnute (1985) proposed a two age-class model for catch and effort data 
analysis with a stock recruitment relationship that can be compared with a biomass 
dynamic model such as Schaefers (Figure I.3). The data used are total catch and effort 
annual data from the Barcelonas red shrimp (Aristeus antennatus) fishery from 1992 to 
2002.  
Figure I.3. Schnutes and Schaefers models approaching an observed catch data series. 
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 The parameters and variables for age structured models introduced and the 
equations where they are firstly presented are shown in Table I.3. 
Symbol Equation Meaning 
a 1.11 Age class, cohort 
Na 1.11 Number of individuals of a cohort 
a 1.12 Survival rate of a cohort 
a 1.12 Survival to natural mortality of a cohort 
aφ 1.12 Survival to fishing mortality of a cohort 
Ma 1.14.a Natural mortality of a cohort 
R 1.15 Number of recruits 
S 1.15 Spawning stock biomass 
 1.15 Recruitment productivity parameter 
 1.15 Recruitment optimality parameter 
 1.15 Recruitment limitation parameter 
wa 1.16 Weight of an individual of age a 
v 1.16 Prerecruitment weight 
V 1.16 Recruitment weight 
 1.16 Fords growth coefficient 
k 1.16. Recruitment age of a fish 
K 1.16.a Brodys growth coefficient 
W 1.16.a Extrapolated asymptotic weight 
Ba 1.17 Biomass of the individuals of a cohort 
B. Gordon-Schaefer bioeconomic model 
A derivation into economics of the Schaefer (1954) model was presented by 
Gordon in 1954. The model explains the equilibrium profits () coming from a fishery 
as the balance between revenues (Y) coming from the sale of the catch at equilibrium 
(surplus production=C) at constant price (p) and some activity costs (c2), related to 
effort (E). The model ignores any price dynamics and costs independent of effort, such 
as licenses or taxes. The first formulation of the model is: 
Table I.3. Variables and parameters of the age structured models. 
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cECpcEY −=−=π               {eq.1.19} 
 Introducing catch at equilibrium from Schaefers model (eq.1.4.a for m=2): 
EcpqBeq )( −=π                {eq.1.20} 
 Equilibrium conditions are assumed for the achievement of sustainable profits at 
long term. The model considers economic equilibrium as the point where revenues 
equal total costs, and moreover assuming biomass at equilibrium, conditions of 
bioeconomic equilibrium (BEE) are defined. The biomass related to a fishery at BEE is 
easily described by: 
qpcBEcpqB EBEeq /0)( =→=−=π            {eq.1.20} 
 The model states that overexploitation is identified when the total costs line 
crosses the revenues curve with an effort level higher to the needed for maximum 
sustainable yield. On the other hand, it suggests that the resource will never become 
extinct, because before it is completely depleted, fishing becomes non profitable and the 
effort applied to the resource will be reduced. 
 The equilibrium profits of a fishery as a function of the sustained effort level 
applied are shown in Figure I.4. The bioeconomic equilibrium is achieved with a 
maintained effort level (EBEE) and it is defined combining equation 1.4.a with m=2 and 
the assumption of economic equilibrium of eq.1.20. 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=→=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−=−=
pqK
c
q
rEcE
r
KqErpqEEcpqB EBEeq 10
)()(π
                 {eq.1.21} 
 Representing total equilibrium profits and total costs as a function of the effort 
level (Figure I.4) the identification of the maximum sustainable yield, the maximum 
economic yield where net profits are maximized and the bioeconomic equilibrium points 
is straightforward.  
Chapter I    State of the art
35 
 As it was stated in the introduction of the chapter, one of the objectives of a 
manager of a renewable resource is the maximization of the total profits coming from its 
exploitation, through the control of effort. The effort level that maximizes the profits 
from the activity is obtained after the following derivation: 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=→=−−=∂∂
pqK
c
q
rEcE
r
KpqqpKE MEY 12
02/
2
π        {eq.1.22.a} 
 Biomass at equilibrium at the MEY point: 
)(
2
1
, qp
cKB MSYeq +=            {eq.1.22.b} 
 The Gordon-Schaefers model assumes that the resource immediately responds 
to effort changes, that total costs increase linearly with effort increase and ignores 
biological cycles such as the ones caused by variability in recruitment, as seen in 
Schaefers model.  
Figure I.4. Gordon-Schaefers model at equilibrium
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Extensions to Gordons model
 The optimal harvest policy (CLARK 1976) introduces the maximisation of a 
fishery in a time interval, so equilibrium conditions are avoided. For forecasting 
simulation purposes profit is not the concept to maximize but the net present value
(NPV) of a fishery. The formulation chosen by Clark includes the discount rate () into 
the economic balance through time. This parameter is used to discount net benefits that 
will accrue in the future compared with net benefits that can be achieved today (HEAL
1997; KOOPMANS 1960; SUMAILA 2004). The first approach was to maximize the net 
present value into a non limited time interval but here it will be referred to a finite time 
interval , equation 1.23. 
dtCxcpeNPV
tt
tt
t ⋅⋅−= ∫
=
−
τ
δ
0
))((maxmax                       {eq.1.23} 
where c(xt) is the harvesting cost as a function of the available biomass, Ct is the 
catch rate, price (p) is assumed constant.  
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EXTERNALITIES
Clark (1976) defines an externality as a cost or benefit that is imposed on 
others as a result of a particular activity. The models explained in earlier sections deal 
with closed systems with no conflicts of interest among fishermen, no market dynamics 
and no inter-specific interactions, neither in ecological nor in economic sense.  
 The fundamental externality of a common property, that is considered a fishery, 
was introduced by Hardin in 1968 in the document The Tragedy of the Commons 
(HARDIN 1968). The article deals with a definitely pessimistic view of the common pool 
resources use and argues the benefit for a single exploiter of increasing the exploitation 
rate applied to a common good even if the system will be directed towards the ruin. One 
of the ideas presented by Hardin was explained by Oakerson (1992): what one user 
appropriates is unavailable for other users and that is known as the stock or dynamic 
externality. In other words one exploiters reduction of the stock increases unit 
harvesting costs for other exploiters (MESTERTON-GIBBONS 1993). The landings that 
one fisherman obtains depend on the mortality rate applied by him and by on the 
available biomass which depends on the total exploitation rate. The mortality rate 
applied by a fisherman depends both on its catchability and on the effort applied. The 
effort strategy decided by each fisherman will be analyzed by means of a game theoretic 
analysis in chapter II and the technological improvement of a vessel is explained below 
as a technological externality (technological creep). 
 In recent years the increase in technology has transformed many fisheries 
improving the efficiency of the vessels and attaining an increase in their costs of fishing. 
The investment in technology is related to a catchability increase through higher engine 
powers and improvement of fishing gears. These technologic improvements introduce 
another externality: The increase of the mortality generated by an effort unit of each 
vessel. It can be named a technological externality. The present factor is discussed in 
terms of competitiveness, i.e. comparing the profits of vessels with highest catchability 
coefficients (the most improved vessels) with the ones obtained by the economically 
most efficient vessels through a new parameter that relates catchability to costs and that 
will be explained for the case study in chapter V. On the other hand, the catchability 
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coefficient depends on many factors that need to be explained in detail, which will be 
done on the next paragraphs. 
 Fishermen do not share only a resource but a market and an ecosystem. The 
market externality is introduced at the moment that price is related to an offer-demand 
function where an increase of the landings by the whole fleet will determine the sale 
price of the product sold by each single fisherman. The fishermen that are able to fish 
more will be the ones that determine the market price of the product while the fishermen 
with smaller catchability will not be determinant for the final price. An increase on 
biomass will be positive for increasing landings but will make the price decrease and it 
should also be computed for the design of an effort strategy. 
Multi-specificity of fisheries incorporates a new handicap for modelling natural 
resources exploitation. Here we present a case study where the activity of a 
Mediterranean trawl fleet is analyzed. The fleet operates with red shrimp (Aristeus 
antennatus) as target species and it includes a pool of secondary species with a high 
economic value. Red shrimp is the most profitable fishery in the western Mediterranean 
(IRAZOLA et al. 1996). A possible hypothesis is that red shrimp profitability pays the 
extreme overexploitation of some species included on the landings when red shrimp is 
searched.  
Ecosystem considerations deal with the effects of increasing or decreasing a 
fishing mortality rate of a target species on the species cohabiting in the ecosystem. 
These species could be objective species for other fleets. This interaction could also be 
important for conservationist purposes of non exploited populations. Ecological models 
such as Ecopath With Ecosim (CHRISTENSEN and WALTERS 2004; PAULY et al. 2000) 
deal with these inter-specific relationships but are ignored here. The ecosystem 
approach is not tackled in this work as it may introduce a large amount of complexity, 
while not improving the predictability of the model. Some discussion about models 
complexity is done in chapter VI. The environmental variability and its effects on the 
exploited populations and fishing conditions will not be analysed here for the same 
reason. 
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A. Dynamics of fishing mortality: effort and catchability 
nothing except a high cost of catching the last viable animal protects wild 
animal stocks that are hunted freely from being hunted to the extinction (HANNESSON
2004). 
1) Fishing effort: 
Fishing effort is one of the easiest concepts to understand and most difficult to 
define and quantify in fishery science. Fishing effort depends on the fishing systems 
used for fishing, on their amount and the manner that they are applied on time and space 
(GUERRA and SANCHEZ-LIZASO 1998). Effort converts fishing activity into fishing 
mortality and costs of fishing (SPARRE 2001).  
 As stated earlier we hypothesize that fishing effort behaves as a function of 
profits, either recent profits or profit expectation. This dependency has been focused 
firstly with the extension of the Gordon-Schaefers model proposed by Smith (1969). 
Smith describes a parameter  that relates profits to effort (eq.1.24), through a constant 
catchability parameter q, a constant price of the product and a cost exclusively related to 
fishing effort. Smith hypothesizes that the effort applied in fishing is done not with the 
aim of maintaining a tradition or a social function but exclusively in order to obtain 
Figure I.5. Smiths (1969) model for effort dynamics.  
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profits. If the profits are positive an increase in fishing effort will be observed; if 
negative, effort will decrease (see Figure I.5). Smith initially considers effort as the 
number of vessels, and as a consequence, the increase or decrease of effort means 
vessels entering or leaving the fishery.  
ttt EcpqBtE )()(/ −==∂∂ ϕπϕ                           {eq.1.24} 
 In conditions of free access fisheries, where there are no limitations to entry of 
vessels to the fishery, the system tends to the bioeconomic equilibrium where revenues 
are balanced with costs of effort (HANNESSON 1993).  
 Real fisheries present some differences with the conceptual approach of free 
access and the particular regulations and management procedures of the system studied 
should be detailed. The entry and exit of vessels in a fishery are not instantaneous: there 
is some delay from profits to effort, which is not reflected in Smiths model.  
 The fleet dynamics parameter () may be derived under different considerations, 
such as the recent year profit variation, the profit expectation in short or long run and 
some dynamics included such as temporal increase in catchability and some price 
dynamics. 
 Fisheries management can be focused on the control of the output from the 
system, as it happens in many Atlantic and Pacific fisheries, or on the input to the 
system, as happens in Mediterranean fisheries (with the exception of the large migratory 
pelagic fishes). Output control means the regulation of the product extracted, viz.
catches, from the system and is commonly made by defining catch quotas, or TAC 
(Total Allowable Catch). On the other hand input control implies the regulation of 
effort, viz. the number of boats, days at the sea, size of gears and power of engines 
operating a fishery.  
Mediterranean fisheries have some particularities that justify the analysis of such 
fisheries at vessel level (LLEONART et al. 1999). Spanish Mediterranean fisheries are 
closed to new vessels until some vessels that sum the same horsepower of the one to 
enter are dismissed. The decision variable of the agents on the system is effort in terms 
of activity, translated as the number of days fishing within the limits imposed by the 
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management agents. Each fisherman decides its effort strategy as a function of its profit 
expectation. The decision of fishermen is a function of the effort strategies adopted by 
the other fishermen and the interactions of such elections (externalities) are approached 
here by means of game theory (LUCE and RAIFFA 1989; VON NEUMANN and 
MORGENSTERN 1944; VON NEUMANN and MORGENSTERN 1947). Some realistic and 
some theoretical considerations that are proposed for the solution of such a system as 
well as an optimization procedure will be explained in chapter II.  
2) Catchability: 
We define catchability as the fraction of fishing mortality produced by unit of 
effort. This parameter links resource abundance and gear and reflects some measure of 
efficiency of the fishing gear. There are some associated concepts that need to be 
explained to understand the significance of this parameter, such as selection, selectivity, 
accessibility, vulnerability and fishing power (ARREGUÍN-SÁNCHEZ 1996).  
Selection (s): Retention probability of individuals of a given age class of a given 
species by a specific gear. This parameter reflects the specific efficiency of a given gear 
for the exploitation of an age class of a population.  
Selectivity (S=qs): Property of relative retention capacity that fishing gears 
present in relation to the size of the individuals. For a selection parameter equal to 1, 
catchability and selectivity have the same significance, which is the case for biomass 
dynamic models (equation 1.25.a). For age structured models, an age specific selectivity 
parameter is considered, so that captures of a given age class (a) are defined by equation 
1.25.b. 
ttttt BEqsC ⋅⋅⋅= {eq.1.25.a} 
tatttata BEqsC ,,, ⋅⋅⋅= {eq.1.25.b} 
 where B is the average biomass in the time interval t+dt.  
 The Catchability coefficient q includes some sources of variability derived both 
from factors related to the exploited population (availability) and to the technological 
efficiency (fishing power) . 
Availability depends on the interaction between the resource and the fishing 
gear. This term is independent of the behaviour of fishermen and includes two new 
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concepts (accessibility and vulnerability). Accessibility is related to the geographical 
distribution of the fishing effort and to the spatial behaviour of the population such as 
migrations and seasonal displacements. Vulnerability is referred to the encounter 
probability of the gear and an individual of the exploited population. It depends on some 
specific behaviour of the stocks, such as aggregation (ARREGUÍN-SÁNCHEZ 1996).  
 The measure of the efficiency of capture of individuals of a given population 
depends also on technological efficiency (fishing power), that depends on factors such 
as fishing strategies and gears employed. This concept includes also the knowledge of 
the fisherman and the experience in a given fishery (MAYNOU et al. 2003).  
Empirical models
The influence of the factors in explaining catches or catch rates in different 
fisheries has been a matter of many studies in recent years. Empirical models relate an 
increase in abundance with an exponential decrease of the catchability parameter 
(CSIRKE 1989; MACCALL 1990). The influence of environmental conditions on 
catchability was investigated in Peruvian and western African coastal fisheries (PAULY
and TSUKAYAMA 1987). Density dependent factors were investigated by Gordoa and 
Pereira (1987) and catchability differences due to different human and technical factors 
were investigated by General Linear Models in the Mediterranean by Maynou et al. 
(2003), among others (VIGNAUX 1996).  
 Here we consider a closed spatial distribution of the populations analyzed 
(defined by the concept of stock) and a homogeneous distribution that ignores fishing 
behaviour such as aggregation. Changes on catchability are assumed to be exclusively 
related to technical efficiency for modelling purposes. 
 The simulation analysis at the vessel level proposed here suggests the 
importance of accounting for differences in technical efficiency between the vessels, 
that was demonstrated an important factor for Aristeus antennatus (MAYNOU et al.
2003). The average catchability coefficient was estimated with parameter estimation 
techniques explained in chapter III and it includes all the biological specific factors 
related to a population. The vessels catchability parameter is calculated with the average 
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catchability parameter and individual catch per unit of effort (cpue) data (ARREGUÍN-
SÁNCHEZ 1996). 
 Lleonart et al. (1999) proposed a catchability dynamic model depending on 
changes in vessels capital (Kv,t, as a proxy for investment) and on time (t) through some 
parameters ( 0,0 ,,, KhQ v τ ), equation 1.25.c.  
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 The model was tested for the case studies, but the difficulties in the 
parameterization suggested a simplification, including only a time dependent increase in 
catchability model, equation 1.25.d. 
t
vvt Qq τ,0, =             {eq. 1.25.d} 
 Under this assumption, catchability is supposed to increase constantly and 
continuously in time (HADDON 2001), which is a strong assumption arising from the 
difficulties to allocate in time possible investments in technology. For simulation 
purposes different temporal increases were tested based on empirical analysis (LINDEBO
1999; PHILLIPS and MELVILLE-SMITH 2005). 
B. Price dynamics (Market externality)
The Gordon-Schaefers model describes a system with a constant price of the 
fish, which seems not realistic. The price of the first sale of the product depends on 
many factors and in a different manner in each country or fishery, such as the date of 
sale, the supply and demand function, size of the fish or imports and exports. The 
market externality will be treated with two price dynamic models that reflect some 
particular conditions of the studied fisheries. 
One of the Mediterranean fisheries particularities is price formation. The price 
dynamics chosen for the simulations depend exclusively on the offer. It means that the 
annual average price will decrease as the yearly landings of the fleet increase.  
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 The supply at the local market is assumed to be exclusively the total catch of the 
studied species by the local fleet and the manner that it influences the price is described 
with two alternative models (see Figure I.6): 
1) Linear model (eq.1.26.a) allows the simulation of the price of a weight unit of the 
species of interest (p) depending on the total offer through two parameters:  is the 
extrapolation of the linear regression fit to market data and  is the slope of the change 
in price as offer increases. Usually price decreases with the offer (<0).  
CCp ωλ +=)(                   {eq.1.26.a}  
2) Power model (eq.1.26.b) describes price dynamics as a power function where  is 
considered as a shadow price or the value of the last living biomass unit on the sea, and 
 is the named price elasticity (LLEONART et al. 1999; LLEONART et al. 2003).  
ωλCCp =)(               {eq.1.26.b} 
Figure I.6. Linear and power models fitted to observed landings and prices of red shrimp. 
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 The two models present some advantages and disadvantages to the simulation 
process. As it is easily deduced, linear model tends to negative prices as supply 
increases, something that can not happen with the power model. On the other hand, the 
power model describes a high shadow price that will balance the loss of the decrease in 
catches, i.e., even if the population is extremely overexploited, the shadow price is able 
to make its exploitation profitable. As an example of fit of both models, different 
average annual prices are plotted as a function of the total annual landings of red shrimp 
Aristeus antenatus in Blanes (Figure I.6).  
For the simulation analysis power model was chosen and the bioeconomic 
discussion of the results is made acknowledging its limitations.   
C. Secondary species 
 The income from by-catch species (Ysec) needs to be computed for the 
economic balance in Mediterranean fisheries (IRAZOLA et al. 1996; LLEONART et al.
1999; LLEONART et al. 2003). The catch of secondary species (Csec, which may include 
a pool of such species) is determined by empirical relationships with each main species. 
A linear function is used to relate secondary species landings to target species 
(LLEONART et al. 1999; LLEONART et al. 2003): 
CC ⋅+= υμsec               {eq.1.27} 
 represent the constant landings of secondary species when no target species 
has been caught and  the landed units of secondary per unit of target species. These 
two parameters are estimated by simple linear regression. 
 The price of the secondary species (ps) is derived from the available data series 
and multiplied to their catch, which allows the estimation of the income from secondary 
species (Ysec). 
secsec CpsY ⋅=               {eq.1.28} 
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WHAT CAN GO WRONG? INTRODUCING STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS
A fishery can be observed as the result of the interactions between the different 
entities that are involved in it (Figure I.7). These entities may be classified in three 
levels: Exploiters, managers and scientists. 
1) Exploiters: Fishermen and fishing corporations: Their motivations may 
be different depending on their characteristics. Corporations investing large 
amount of capital in fisheries may intend to maximize their own benefits without 
attending to any other social or traditional factor. Single fishermen will try to 
maximize their own profits but will probably be interested in the maintenance of 
the activity with tradition and employment purposes. In a Mediterranean context, 
without big corporations and with small scale vessels some interaction between 
fishermen can be observed. They share a finite resource and the fish caught by 
one will affect the fishing strategies of the others. Fishermen are not 
homogeneous in Mediterranean fisheries and as a consequence their behaviours 
are expected to differ. On the other hand, they will also interact with the two 
other levels of agents involved in a fishery. 
2) Managers: International, national or regional administrators. The 
willingness of politicians will not be discussed in the present document but apart 
from the classical intention of maximizing the profits they will perceive the 
interaction with the two other levels of the fishery. They will probably try to 
avoid any confrontation with the exploiters, which may complicate their re-
election, but on the contrary they will (should) try to incorporate scientists 
warnings and advice as management actions. Moreover, managers have their 
own interactions according to their single characteristics: a young politician in 
the national government will avoid any controversial decision in a fishery 
affecting the sectors in the region where he will try to be voted for the next 
election and an old politician may be interested to be known as the man who 
made a radical change in fisheries economic situation with no worries about the 
unpopularity it may bring. Controversies between international, national and 
regional administrations are observed day by day in the newspapers but are not 
tackled in the present document. Managers need the interaction with scientists 
(advice) and their decisions affect exploiters.
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3) Scientists: Initially they work as single descriptors of the systems but 
actually they interact with the two other agent levels. Politicians want from 
scientists certain predictions about the outcome of a management action. On the 
other hand, fishermen want certainty about what they are observing in the 
fishing systems; why they are catching less and less and they want to know what 
kind of solution exists for their objectives. Scientists receive information from 
exploiters and translate it to managers. Scientists also interact between them 
attending to their differences; young theoretical scientists may be more 
interested in publishing as much as possible to improve their position, while an 
experimental biologist that worked for many years in situ data collection distrust 
about that young ones that may use their knowledge. Moreover, they may avoid 
any advice that damages his relationship with the exploiters. 
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Figure I.7. Strategic interactions in a fishery. 
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The classification above is nothing but a simplification of the amount of 
interactions that take place in a fishery and that need to be taken into account to 
understand some events such as the crisis of Newfoundlands Northern Cod in the early 
1990s. The book by A.C. Finlayson, Fishing for truth (1994), analyzes from a 
sociological perspective such interactions to explain the pool of wrong decisions that 
directed the Northern Cod fishery into the collapse. Following his arguments, the 
collapse was not produced by a wrong assessment made by scientists, nor by a single 
decision by a manager but as a result of the multiple interactions between the agents that 
needed to be understood from a sociological perspective. The manner in which the 
uncertainty of the scientific predictions was used by each agent according to its own 
objectives was determinant for the crisis.  
The battle for the uncertainty 
Every agent involved in the fishery (players) manipulated the uncertainty in a 
self rewarding manner. After the introduction of the 200 mile regulation for inshore 
countries, scientists were asked for certainty and they could only provide assessments 
with some uncertainty from 1976 to 1989. Companies made pressure to increase and 
maintain TACs (Total Allowable Catch), inshore and offshore fishermen invested in 
new technology based on their own vision of the uncertainty in the Northern cod 
stocks projections and the administrations used the most optimistic view of that 
uncertainty for a socially well received management. 
Were all those warnings just formalities, or did the scientists really believe 
there was significant uncertainty about the future trajectory of the stock? If they really 
did believe in the uncertainty, how loud a warning should they have issued? I guess the 
later question is the key one. J. Rice in Fishing for truth (FINLAYSON 1994). 
To sum up, it was the subject of a game, a finite number of players or agents 
involved played a role and interacted. To understand the crisis of the Northern cod in 
the 1990s it is necessary to understand their strategic interactions.  
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Micro-scale observations for the construction of a macro-reality 
A good understanding of a fishing system needs the understanding of the 
objectives of each single agent involved in, so that their actions may be described as 
rational and predictable. The macro-reality observed needs to be explained 
through a micro-level analysis, i.e. through a sum of observed micro-realities 
(FINLAYSON 1994). 
One of the aims of the present work is to introduce that sociological perspective 
to one part of fisheries analysis. We are not interested in the interactions between 
managers, between scientists or among them, but we propose that the strategic 
interactions between the single fishermen and their response to management 
actions by legislators will direct the evolution of the bioeconomic indicators of a 
fishery.
Three different types of fleets are observed in the Mediterranean: artisanal, 
industrial and semi-industrial. In the European side, there are 45 different gear types and 
at least 100 target species (LLEONART and MAYNOU 2003). As a conclusion we can state 
that Mediterranean fleets are very heterogeneous and attending to that heterogeneity, 
fishermen will act in a different manner. The methodologies proposed in the next 
sections assume that they all want to maximize their own profits. As stated, we are 
concerned to the strategic interactions between fishermen and a game theoretic 
approach is proposed for the analysis of such interactions. 

Chapter II 
Effort dynamics 
A game theoretic approach 
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II. EFFORT DYNAMICS. A GAME THEORETIC APPROACH 
The fishing mortality applied to a population is composed by a catchability 
coefficient and a fishing effort term. The first has been defined as the mortality 
generated by a unit of fishing effort and its dynamics have already been explained 
(chapter I). The total fishing mortality suffered by an exploited population (FT) is the 
sum of the mortalities generated by each fisherman (Fi) and each of them is the product 
of the individual catchability (qi) and the individual activity or effort (Ei).  
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 The effort applied by each exploiter is considered its fishing strategy. The 
election of an exploitation strategy implies some decision and the present chapter deals 
with such a decision. The concept of effort will be treated here in terms of activity (e.g. 
number of days at sea) for convenience. 
 The decision of an effort strategy adopted by each fisherman implies the 
evaluation of the payoff obtained with each of the possible strategies and the analysis of 
the motivations that fishermen have for fishing. The analysis of these motivations 
means the construction of an evaluation function, that is, a function that makes it 
possible to quantify the consequences of the effort strategy adopted. The main 
hypothesis since Smith (1969) assumes that the motivation of the fishing activity is the 
profit obtained from its exploitation. Some simulation models as MEFISTO (LLEONART
et al. 1999; LLEONART et al. 2003) assume that the effort applied by a fisherman is a 
consequence of its past profits; on the contrary, the main assumption made here is that 
profit expectation directs the fishing activity. The GBFSM simulation model (GRANT
and GRIFFIN 1979; ISAKSON et al. 1982)  constraints the effort applied to a population 
with some Total Allowable Catch (TAC). The BECHAMEL simulation model (ULRICH
The main objective of the present chapter is the development of a model that allows 
the simulation of the fishing mortality applied to a population through the dynamics 
of one of its components, the fishing effort. As a result, a completely autonomous 
bioeconomic simulation system may be performed.  
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et al. 1999; ULRICH et al. 2002a) uses observed data as input variable of effort and 
BEAM (SPARRE 2001) also does it for different scenarios design with spatial allocation 
of effort. EMMFID introduces effort reductions as management actions to be tested 
(FROST and KJÆRSGAARD 2003). 
 The profit expectation was modelled in equilibrium firstly with the Gordon-
Schaefers model in 1969 (eq.1.20) and out of the equilibrium in an infinite time 
interval by Clark in 1976 (eq.1.23). The mentioned models are useful tools for the 
optimization of a fishery where a named centralized agent may control the total effort 
applied to a population. The Mediterranean fisheries present some particularities that 
need to be considered for a correct understanding of its bioeconomic dynamics. One of 
these particularities is the heterogeneity of the fleets where very modern vessels share 
the same stock and market with older boats; big vessels fish the same as smaller ones. 
As a result of such heterogeneity, it is not strange that fishermen choose different effort 
strategies based on their own characteristics. The objective of all fishermen is supposed 
to be the same, i.e. profit maximization. Each fisherman strives to maximize its 
profits choosing an effort strategy.
 As a result of the previously described stock and market externalities, the 
strategy adopted by a fisherman has its effects not only on its profits but also in the 
strategy and the profits of the others. We can say that theres some strategic interaction
and this justifies the performance of a game theoretic analysis.  
Game theory in a fishery system
 Game theory is a formal tool for analysing the strategic interaction between a 
finite number of agents (SUMAILA 1997; SUMAILA 1999). Strategic interaction in 
fisheries is interpreted as the way in which the harvest by one agent highly affects the 
fishing strategy of other agents (GRØNBÆK 2000; POURTALLIER and MERINO 2003). 
Game theory models have been applied to different cases in fisheries, such as 
equilibrium global models with symmetrical agents (HANNESSON 1997), dynamic age 
A game in mathematical sense is a model of strategic interaction, which arises 
whenever the outcome of an individuals actions depends on actions to be taken by 
other individuals (MESTERTON-GIBBONS 1993).  
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structured models in different fleet conflicts (SUMAILA 1997) conflicts between 
countries sharing migratory species (ARNASON et al. 1999), international policy making 
(MUNRO 2006), economic implications of the conflicts between countries about fishing 
rights (LEVHARI and MIRMAN 1980), high sea fisheries (KAITALA and LINDROOS 1998), 
or suitability of cooperative or non cooperative behaviours in the management of shared 
fisheries (HANNESSON 1995). 
 The construction of a game requires the definition of a common property good, 
the description of the agents that share the rights of its exploitation, a set of possible 
strategies and rewards or expected payoffs to each agent from each potential 
combination of strategies.  
 The decision agents in a fishery system are the exploiters that share the resource. 
Typically, in Mediterranean fisheries, each vessel is the property of one owner and each 
owner has only one vessel, hence the owners are the ones to decide an effort strategy in 
terms of activity, i.e each owner decides the number of days at the sea. As a 
consequence, fishermen or more exactly, vessel owners are considered the decision 
agents for the rest of the present work. It is evident that fishermen are not the sole 
owners of a resource, and that administrations have some decision responsibility on the 
activity. This responsibility or decision making in Mediterranean fisheries consists in 
placing some limits to the activity, such as the number of vessels and the maximum 
days at the sea, which are fixed by the administration. The possible game performed 
between fishermen and managers is not tackled here. The action of the managers is 
reduced to what we can call the design of the field where the game is played. The effect 
of the possible measures, such as the increase of the maximum days at sea and the 
increase of costs derived from the removal of subsidies or the increase of fuel price on 
fishermens behaviour, are also tested on the case study. 
 As stated before, the common good is supposed to be a pool of population or 
stocks to be exploited by the finite and controlled number of fishermen. The possible 
strategies that fishermen can choose are related to the number of fishing days, which are 
positive and constrain the range of effort. The payoff or reward expected is the 
quantification of the effects of each of the possible strategies that will be considered the 
evaluation or payoff function. As the hypothesis presented earlier states, the motivation 
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of the activity is the expected profits. As a consequence, the payoff function evaluates 
the expected profit return of every possible strategy to choose.  
 The objective of each agent is individual profit maximization, as stated 
previously. Faced with this assumption the results obtained if fishermen act 
cooperatively are tested and compared with the more realistic non cooperative 
behaviour. All the assumptions made allow the performance of a game and different 
solution concepts.  
 The game theoretic analysis is explained focusing 
different considerations related to fishermen behaviour, 
effect of price elasticity, increase of agents sharing a 
resource and solution concepts developed by John F. Nash 
(photo). Moreover, the construction of a realistic game is 
performed starting from the easiest case, two symmetric 
players sharing a resource with a constant price model in an 
equilibrium population towards a stylized model of N non 
symmetrical agents with a price dynamic function sharing a 
dynamic population. 
THEORETICAL INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY IN FISHERIES 
A. Game types 
1) The number of players 
Game of two symmetric players in equilibrium conditions 
For the first formulation of a game we consider that a renewable resource is 
shared by two symmetrical agents (POURTALLIER and MERINO 2003). The symmetry is 
related to their costs of activity (ci) and to their catchability parameter (qi). The 
population dynamics (dB/dt) are represented with the Schaefers model and are 
considered to be in equilibrium conditions (eq.1.4.a), where r is the intrinsic growth rate 
of the population and K is the carrying capacity: 
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eq0              {eq.1.4.a} 
 and for two agents: 
John F. Nash (1928-) 
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 The production functions for each agent: 
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 And the profits for each of the agents: 
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 Equations 2.3 represent the payoff function of each fisherman, i.e. the profits 
they expect for each of the possible effort strategies adopted. Note that the price of the 
product is expressed with an offer function, p(Ceq), that is simplified to a constant price 
model for easier solution p(Ceq)=. The payoff function when price is constant as it is 
observed is a second order function on the control variable (individual effort, Ei), and as 
a consequence it has only one maximum or minimum. The system can easily be solved 
based on some possible behaviour. If fishermen consider that their own profits are the 
variable to maximize, we will say that they behave non cooperatively and if their 
objective is the maximization of the total profits from the activity, we will consider that 
we are faced with a cooperative game. The two possible behaviours have a pool of 
possible solutions. 
 Non-Cooperation in a two symmetrical agent game 
 The solution concept that we search for a non cooperative game is Nash 
equilibrium (NASH 1951): A pair of strategies satisfying that each players strategy is a 
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best response to the others strategy, that is, a strategy combination from which no 
player has a unilateral incentive to depart. The profile of efforts ( *2
*
1 , EE ) will be said a 
Nash equilibrium if the following holds true (FUDENBERG and TIROLE 1984; LUCE and 
RAIFFA 1989; POURTALLIER and MERINO 2003): 
* * *
1 1 2 1 1 2
* * *
2 1 2 2 1 2
( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , )
E E E E
E E E E
π π
π π
⎧ ≥⎪⎨ ≥⎪⎩
 , for every E1 and E2                      {eq.2.4} 
 To compute this equilibrium, the following system of equations must be solved: 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
=∂∂
=∂∂
0/),(
0/),(
),(2212
),(1211
*
2
*
1
*
2
*
1
EE
EE
EEE
EEE
π
π
               {eq.2.5} 
 This system can be solved for unconstrained effort values, and for the special 
cases where the solutions are inside the effort bounds. Second derivatives should be 
checked to be negative, in order to confirm that fishermen are maximizers. As stated 
earlier the first approach is made with a constant price of the product, p(Ceq)=. 
 The solution of the system proposed on eq.2.5 with a constant price is the 
following: 
2
**
2
*
1 33 i
i
i
i Kq
rc
q
rEEE λ−===                {eq.2.6} 
 Nash equilibrium for 2 symmetric players with a constant price leads the 
biomass to a new equilibrium, (note that qi=q and ci=c) substituting eq.2.6 on eq.2.1: 
)2(
3
1)(),(
*
2
*
1*
2
*
1 λq
cK
r
KqEqErEEBeq +=−−=              {eq.2.7} 
 The equilibrium catches obtained by each agent are obtained substituting 2.1 and 
2.7 on 2.2: 
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q
cr
Kq
rcKrEEC eqi λλ 99
2
9
),( 22
2
*
2
*
1, +−=               {eq.2.8} 
 And finally, profits at equilibrium for each player are the following: 
q
cr
Kq
rcKrEEieq 9
2
99
),( 2
2
*
2
*
1, ++= λ
λπ               {eq.2.9} 
 The solution presented here, with no price elasticity and a population in 
equilibrium is unique. 
 Non cooperation behaviour can be tackled with some solution concepts different 
from Nashs. Stackelberg (1934) describes a non cooperative solution concept with 
different roles for each player, named the leader and follower behaviours. This solution 
concept is rarely used in Game Theory applied to Natural Resources and will be ignored 
here.  
Cooperation in a two symmetric agent game 
 Two solution concepts will be explored for cooperative cases. First is Nashs 
bargaining solution (NASH 1950) and second is the maximization of the global profits 
coming from the activity. In cooperative strategies, agents are supposed to act as a 
single agent maximizing the total income from the activity. Bargain comes from the 
conditions of such agreement. Sumaila in 1997 proposed different solutions to the 
cooperative strategy as dependent on the proportional share of the profits for each agent. 
In our case the share of the profits are not the quid. The conditions of Nashs bargaining 
solution are related to a homogeneous effort strategy, i.e., maximizing the total activity 
under the condition that all the agents will fish the same number of days. As it is 
straightforward, fishing the same number of days for symmetrical agents will have the 
same payoff for all the agents but it does not happen when players are non symmetric.  
 The second cooperative solution investigated is what could be considered a 
centralized decision agents strategy, which means the maximization of the global 
activity ignoring if the strategy vector proposed brings negative or positive profits to 
some vessels. 
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 For the first solution concept of Nashs bargaining in the presented two 
symmetrical players game in equilibrium conditions, and a non elastic price model, the 
system to solve is:  
º º
1 2 1 2
º º
1 2 1 2
( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , )
T T
T T
E E E E
E E E E
π π
π π
⎧ ≥⎪⎨ ≥⎪⎩
 , for every E1 and E2           {eq.2.10} 
 To compute this equilibrium, the following system of equations must be solved: 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
=∂∂
=∂∂
0/),(
0/),(
),(221
),(121
º
2
º
1
º
2
º
1
EET
EET
EEE
EEE
π
π
            {eq.2.11}  
 with the condition that 21 EE = . 
 The unique solution of such a system is:  
2
ºº
2
º
1 44 Kq
cr
q
rEEE i λ−===              {eq.2.12} 
 For symmetric players, Nashs bargaining solution proposed is a particular case 
of the solution for global maximization, what we name a centralized decision. The 
formulation of the problem is equation 2.11 without the constraint that 21 EE = . 
 Effort solution for this problem +iE is not unique but a relationship of the form: 
iji EKq
rc
q
rE ≠
+ −−= 222 λ               {eq.2.13} 
 For the condition º2
º
1 EE =  we obtain solution 2.12.  
 For the case where we consider games with symmetrical agents, cooperation will 
be explained with Nashs bargaining solution. The effort solutions for a two symmetric 
cooperative game can be observed in Figure II.1. 
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 Using the effort solution in equation 2.12 we can obtain biomass, catch and 
expected equilibrium profits for each agent: 
)(
2
1),( º2
º
1 λq
cKEEBeq +=               {eq.2.14} 
 And the catch for each player: 
22
2
º
2
º
1, 88
),(
Kq
rcKrEEC eqi λ−=                      {eq.2.15} 
 And profits: 
q
cr
Kq
rcKrEEieq 488
),( 2
2
º
2
º
1, −+= λ
λπ              {eq.2.16} 
 After the description of the concepts of cooperative Nashs bargaining and non 
cooperative solutions is introduced, some conclusions are presented in the following 
table for two symmetrical agents (see Table II.1).  
Figure II.1.  Cooperation solutions for a two symmetric 
player game. The red dot is Nashs bargaining solution. 
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Non Cooperation 
Nash (1951) 
Cooperation 
Nashs bargaining (1950) 
Effortplayer 2
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q
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Kq
rcKr
Teq 244 2
2
º
, −+= λ
λπ
Biomasseq
)2(
3
1*
λq
cKBeq += )(2
1º
λq
cKBeq +=
 Some conclusion can be extracted from the presented table. The first is that the 
effort under cooperation behaviour will always be lower than that reached with no 
cooperation. As a consequence, biomass levels will be always higher for cooperative 
systems. Looking to the profitability, both individual and collective profits are increased 
under cooperation behaviour. To sum up, we can say that for a two symmetric player 
game with no elasticity function under biological equilibrium, cooperation appears to 
be more convenient both for conservationist and economic purposes. 
 The following paragraphs describe the effects of increasing the number of 
players, of including a price elasticity function and asymmetry of the agents. 
Game with N symmetric players under biologic equilibrium conditions 
In order to test the consequences of the increase in the decision agents involved 
in the exploitation of a living resource the formulation of N-symmetrical agents is 
performed. Symmetry assumptions and biomass dynamics are the same used for the 
two-symmetric game, which are derived from equations 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3. 
r
KEqr
B
N
i
ii
eq
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −
=
∑
=1               {eq.2.17} 
Table II.1. Biological and economic variables at biologic equilibrium in a two symmetric players game for 
its Cooperation and Non Cooperation solutions. 
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 The production functions for each agent: 
r
KEqr
EqBEqC
N
i
ii
iieqiieqi
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −
==
∑
=1
,            {eq.2.18} 
 And the profits for each of the agents: 
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N
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iieqi Ecr
KEqr
Eq −
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⎛ −
=
∑
= λπ 1,                        {eq.2.19} 
Non-Cooperation in an N symmetrical agent game 
The problem again is reduced to the system proposed in equations 2.4 and 2.5 
for N agents. The price is also considered constant in this case. 
 The concept of Nash equilibrium (1951) is also used for the non cooperative 
solution and is represented by a set of N effort levels ),...,...( ***1 Ni EEE  that satisfy:
* * * * *
1 1 1 1 1
* * * * *
1 2 1 2
( ,.., ,.., ) ( ,.., ,.., ),  for every 
................................................
( ,.., ,.., ) ( ,.., ,.., ),  for every 
........................................
i N i N
i i N i N
E E E E E E E
E E E E E E E
π π
π π
≥
≥
* * * * *
1 1
........
( ,.., ,.., ) ( ,.., ,.., ), for every N i N N i N NE E E E E E Eπ π
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪ ≥⎩
         {eq.2.20} 
 To compute this equilibrium, the following system of equations must be solved: 
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 Introducing the symmetry property that qi=q and ci=c. For the general case of N 
symmetric players the unique Nash equilibrium solution obtained is: 
2
*
)1()1( KqN
cr
qN
rEi λ+−+=              {eq.2.21} 
 And corresponding biomass level, individual catch and profits are: 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ++= λq
cNK
N
Beq )1(
1*               {eq.2.22} 
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22
2
*
, )1(
)(
NKq
qKcr
eqi +
−= λ
λπ               {eq.2.24} 
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 The effect of increasing the number of players on the individual and total efforts, 
biomass at equilibrium and individual and total profits can be observed in Figure II.2.
As it is observed the increase of symmetrical decision agents in a non 
cooperative game does not bring any positive effect both for the sustainability of the 
population and for the profitability of the activity as it was described by Hardin (1968) 
as the Tragedy of the Commons. 
Figure II.2: Bioeconomic effects of increasing the number of agents sharing a fishery in a Non 
Cooperative scheme at equilibrium conditions. 
Number of players
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Cooperation in a N symmetrical agent game
 The maximization of the profits from the fishery is obtained solving equation 
2.25:   
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 That is solved with a general expression: 
∑
=
≠
+ −−=
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q
rE
1
222 λ              {eq.2.26} 
 This solution is equivalent to 2.13 for the centralized agent. As stated earlier for 
symmetrical players we are interested in Nashs bargaining solution that means some 
constraint to the centralized decision. This constraint again is that all the agents apply 
the same effort Ei=Ej. Solving the system with this constraint, the effort applied by each 
fisherman is: 
2
º
)2()2( KqN
cr
qN
rEi λ−=                 {eq.2.27}
while the stock biomass at equilibrium, the individual catch and individual profits are: 
⎟⎟⎠
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cKBeq 2
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 For N symmetrical players Table II.2 show the effort equilibria, the individual 
and total profits and the biomass reached under non cooperation and cooperation. 
Non Cooperation 
Nash (1951) 
Cooperation 
Nashs bargaining (1950) 
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1º
 In spite of the more complex formulation of the analytical results, it can easily 
be deduced that as *º ii EE << for N>1, biomass levels remain higher for Nashs 
bargaining solution º* eqeq BB <<  and regarding the profits, individual profits are always 
larger than in non cooperation solution (Figure II.3). 
 Note that for cooperation solution exploitation is situated in the Maximum 
Economic Yield point (Equations, 1.22.a and b) where profits from the activity are 
maximized. The only effect of increasing players is related to the amount of agents to 
share these maximum profits. As a consequence, biomass and total profits are constant 
independently of the number of agents, but individual profits decrease as the number of 
agents increases. 
Table II.2. Biological and economic variables at biologic equilibrium in a N symmetric players 
game for its Cooperation and Non Cooperation solutions. 
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 The analytical solutions developed previously had the objective to describe the 
effects of cooperative and non cooperative solutions and the influence of the number of 
agents sharing a resource as a consequence of the named stock externality. This has 
been done with the simplest models and some useful analytical solutions. Some realism 
will be introduced to such an idealized model. 
 As a conclusion, we can state that the increase of the number of 
symmetrical decision agents never brings positive results neither from a 
conservationist nor from an economic perspective. This conclusion was 
described by Hardin in 1968 as The Tragedy of the Commons.  
Figure II. 3. The effect of increasing the number of agents in a Cooperative and in a Non 
Cooperative game at equilibrium conditions in individual profits. 
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 Agents exploiting the same resource do not share only a population but a market, 
i.e. the production of each agent will influence the price for the others and this will be 
evaluated by each player at the time of designing an effort strategy. 
 On the other hand, as Mediterranean fisheries have been demonstrated to be very 
heterogeneous, that is, fishermen are nothing but asymmetric, results expected for the 
system may change and some consideration should be added. 
 Finally, as stated by Hilborn and Walters () constancy is an exception rather 
than a rule, and we should expect that fish populations will change in abundance with 
or without fishing (HILBORN and WALTERS 1992), considering this idea, a dynamic 
population is introduced with a non equilibrium population model. 
2) Effect of price dynamics on a game theoretic analysis
 For a constant price model, the evaluation function of each fisherman was a 
quadratic expression with respect to its optimization variable, its effort. Adding some 
price dynamics profits change to a different function. The Gordon-Schaffer model will 
be analyzed with a price dynamic for a single exploiter. Starting from the biomass at 
equilibrium described in equation 1.4.a and equilibrium catch from equation 1.4.b. The 
price dynamics for analytical description is a linear model, equation 1.26.a that included 
in equation 1.20 results in: 
( )
r
KqErBeq
−=               {eq.1.4.a} 
( ) ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −=
r
KqErqECeq              {eq.1.4.b} 
eqeq CCp ωλ −=)(              {eq.1.26.a} 
EcqBCp eqeq ))(( −=π               {eq.2.31} 
 is the elasticity of price due to offer and  is the price of the last biomass unit 
of the product. Substituting 1.4.a and b, and 1.26.a in 2.31, we get the new evaluation 
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function for a single agent that is a polynomial of 4th degree with respect to effort. Its 
derivative is of third degree, i.e. it presents three critical points.  
2222222323424 )(2 rqKECrErKqrKqErKqEKq λλωωωπ +−+−+−=
                 {eq.2.32} 
22222223324 )(264/ CrErKqrKqErKqEKqE −+−+−=∂∂ λωωωπ
                 {eq.2.33} 
 The effect of elasticity in a single agents evaluation function is observed in 
Figure II.4. For values of =0 constant price model is observed, (GORDON 1954). 
 The effect of increasing elasticity and the change from one maximum to two 
maxima and one minimum profit function can be observed in Figure II. 4. For some 
values of elasticity, the evaluation function has three real solutions (a global maximum, 
a local maximum and a local minimum), while for others it has one real solution and 
Effort
, elasticity 
revenues 
Figure II.4. Revenues as a function of fishing effort and the influence of price elasticity. 
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two imaginary solutions. Mathematical properties of the equations are ignored here but 
their effect on the cooperation and non cooperation equilibria are investigated. 
Two symmetrical players with price elasticity       
 The payoff functions for each agent from eq.2.3 are: 
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 Adding the linear price dynamics of equation 1.26.a the equations are formulated 
as: 
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Non Cooperation 
 The system to solve is: 
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               {eq.2.5} 
 Noting the symmetry of the agents, it becomes a third order equation: 
 0)(31620 22*22*233*24 =−++−+− crrqKErKKrqErKqEKq λλωωω
                 {eq.2.35} 
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 Equation 2.35 may have either one real solution and two imaginary solutions, or 
three real solutions, two for each corresponding local maxima. The correct solution will 
be conveniently chosen for the case study. However, some conclusions may be 
extracted comparing equation 2.35 to the case of cooperation.  
Cooperation 
Nashs bargaining solution will be considered again.   
 The equation to solve is: 
⎪⎩
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=∂∂
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º
2
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º
2
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1
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             {eq.2.11} 
 With the bargaining constraint that 21 EE = . This implies: 
 0)(44 22º22º233º24 =−++−+− crrqKErKKrqErKqEKq λλωωω   {eq.2.36} 
 The equation may have again one real solution (and two imaginary solutions), or 
three real solutions, two for each corresponding local maximum.  
 Analytical solving of equations 2.35 and 2.36 is not useful for the purpose of this 
chapter and the effect of price dynamics will be related to the idea that price elasticity 
will make possible some phenomena, such as the increase of the profits with lower 
catches, due to the increase in price and the reduction of activity costs. On the other 
side, an overexploited resource where production decreases may maintain the profits 
due to the increase of price. These two aspects are evaluated by each agent for its 
decision making. 
 On the other side, *º ii EE << can be observed after studying equations 2.35 and 
2.36. As a consequence, again º* eqeq BB <<  and oii ππ <<* .  
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3) Effect of asymmetry on game theoretic analysis 
Game of two asymmetric players in equilibrium conditions 
The tendency of a common property resource to the so-called Tragedy of the 
Commons (HARDIN 1968) is more persistent and most transparent for a symmetric 
agents game (MESTERTON-GIBBONS 1993). The Gordon model (GORDON 1954) is 
among the first models of fishery economics illustrating how an unregulated or open 
access fishery is expected to lead to economic in-efficiency (GRØNBÆK 2000). 
Asymmetry can be understood as competitive conditions, i.e. individual catchability (qi) 
and costs of effort (ci), and their differences with the other players will determine 
individual profits and effort decision. Analytical solution of a two non symmetrical 
agent game with no price dynamics in a biomass equilibrium situation enable us to 
make hypotheses on the effects of asymmetry on games solutions. 
Non Cooperation in a non symmetrical agent game 
 The effects of a two player game and a more general solution for N players are 
investigated in the following paragraphs: 
 Taking equation 2.3: 
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and solving equation 2.5: 
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 Two non symmetrical players Nash equilibrium results in: 
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 That can be written in a general form:  
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 It is important to note that the effort equilibria will be determined by the 
catchability coefficients and the costs of fishing of the individuals. It allows us to 
discuss the trends of individual fishing effort in terms of competitiveness.
 The corresponding solution for a N non symmetrical players game is the 
following: 
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 As stated earlier, the individual effort of player i is a function of its catchability 
(qi) and costs (ci) and the differences with the others (qj and cj). For some 
competitiveness values Nash equilibrium solution for a particular player may be to leave 
the activity and as the number of players decreases, the resource should tend to higher 
biomass equilibrium and to a more profitable situation. 
 For the case study it will be noted that for some vessels non cooperation will be 
more profitable than cooperation. 
As a consequence, it may be hypothesized that asymmetry between 
players (see Figure II.5) may avoid the Tragedy of the Commons (HARDIN 1968)
and bring positive effects both for conservationist and economic purposes in a 
Non Cooperative system.  
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 The introduction of a N>2 game with price dynamics and a dynamic biomass 
will enable us to test such a controversial hypothesis on the case study. 
Cooperation in a two non symmetrical agent game 
Asymmetry on the agents introduces some consequences on the resolution of 
cooperative games. Two solution concepts will be analyzed: Global maximization and 
Nashs bargaining solution. With the objective of maximizing total profits, it seems 
understandable that the agents that fish more with lower costs will be the ones to apply 
more effort. Again some solution depending on competitiveness of both players is 
reached. 
 Global maximization: 
 For a two player scheme the system to be solved is equation 2.11.  
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             {eq.2.11} 
For two non symmetrical players there is not a unique solution but a relationship 
of the form: 
Figure II.5. Two very different vessels that share Blanes red shrimp fishery.  
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 And for N players it is the following relationship: 
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 Adding Nashs bargaining constraint that ºº ji EE = , a unique solution is 
obtained ºiE , for every i player. Nashs bargaining solution: 
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 Observing the two solutions obtained, some considerations are suggested, as 
follows: 
 Competitiveness of the players is the determinant factor for the design of a 
cooperative strategy. Players catchability coefficient and costs relationships are the 
terms that quantify this competitiveness.  
 For global maximization the effort that leads the system to the maximum 
economic yield will be computed and the agents chosen to apply such an effort will be 
those with higher catchability coefficient and lower costs, as will be seen with some 
realistic results in the case study. 
4) Effect of dynamic biomass on a game theoretic analysis (Static, dynamic and 
quasi-static games) 
The previous sections explained the effects of sharing a resource and a market of 
a population under equilibrium conditions (eq.1.4.a). 
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 A more realistic approach is performed here modelling profits in a time interval. 
Biomass, catchability and effort are related to time. The dynamics of catchability have 
already been explained and biomass and effort dynamics in time are discussed here.  
 The games described in the first part of this chapter are named static, the stock 
does not evolve in time, and strategies remain constant (MESTERTON-GIBBONS 1993).  
Dynamic game is considered when stock evolves and effort strategies change as 
a result of such an evolution.  
 First, modelling biomass dynamics with the Schaefers model and temporal 
reference to the mentioned variables: 
ttttt BEqKBrBtB −−=∂∂ )/1(/               {eq.2.43} 
 Profits are assumed to be evaluated each year, and as a consequence time 
references (t) are related to years. Using the difference equation described by Walters 
and Hilborn (1976, 1992) (see eq.1.6 and 1.7 with a dynamic catchability coefficient qt): 
tttt CKBrBB −−=+ )/1(1                 {eq.1.6} 
tttt BEqC =                {eq.1.7.b} 
 Biomass dynamic equation 1.6 needs to reflect the dependency not of a single 
effort maker, but as shared resource. From the two equations above we obtain for N 
agents exploiting a resource: 
∑
=
+ −−=
N
i
ttitittt BEqKBrBB
1
,,1 )/1(              {eq.2.44} 
 The stock externality is observed on the previous equation, i.e. the actions of an 
agent in a time interval will have their consequences on the available biomass to other 
agents at the next time step.  
 We can write such a dependency in terms of: 
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)......,.......,,,( 1,1,1,11,1,1,11 −−−−−−− tNtittNtittt EEEqqqKrBB           {eq.2.45} 
 As stated earlier catchability dynamics are related to time and if we consider 
intrinsic growth rate r and carrying catchability K as constants, we can reduce the 
dependency to: 
)......,( 1,1,1,11 −−−− tNtittt EEEBB                        {eq.2.45.b} 
 We can thus apply that dependency to the production function: 
 )......,( 1,1,1,11,,, −−−−= tNtittttititi EEEBBEqC             {eq.2.46} 
 Price externality can also be time dependent. The total yearly landings will 
determine yearly average price. Using a linear price model: 
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Continuing with the description of the model, once having described the yearly 
price, landings and effort, yearly profits for each player can be modelled. Note that costs 
of effort are assumed to be constant in time: 
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 Once described the yearly profits it is possible to construct an evaluation 
function. The function to maximize is the profit in a time interval . For non cooperation 
solution, each player will maximize its net present value (NPV) and for cooperation, 
both Nashs bargain and global maximization solution are searched for the total net 
present value of the exploitation. Net present value is obtained through a discount factor 
 described in equation 1.23. 
 For each player thus, its NPV in a time interval is: 
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 For the sake of convenience, the system is simplified considering that players 
design an effort strategy for the entire time interval, i.e. the effort they choose will be 
the same for the projected period iti EE =, . Due to this constraint we name the proposed 
system as quasi-static (MESTERTON-GIBBONS 1993). 
A quasi static N asymmetric players game 
Non Cooperation
 The players are supposed to maximize their NPV in a time interval choosing an 
effort strategy. Finding a Nashs solution means finding a set of effort 
strategies )......( ***1 Ni EEE that satisfies: 
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 The number of possible strategies is finite, i.e. the possible strategies evaluated 
by each agent must be inside a range, 0  E  Emax. This condition is assumed to be the 
same for all the players and makes the previous system not always possible to solve in 
the same way that was made in previous sections. The derivatives of the evaluation 
functions may not have any zeros on the effort range provided and in those cases all the 
possible combinations must be solved numerically. 
 The solution of this system is performed using a discrete equation of the 
Schaefers model as it was commented in chapter I. 
Simulation techniques for the bioeconomic analysis of Mediterranean fisheries Game Theory and Effort Dynamics
80 
Cooperation
 Finding a global maximization (optimization) solution means finding a set of 
effort strategies ),...,...( 1
+++
Ni EEE that satisfies: 
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 This ignores if some agents may be at maximum effort levels and others out of 
the activity. As explained for equilibrium non symmetric games, the agents that produce 
more with less cost would be the ones to operate in order to maximize global profits. 
Moreover the solution may not be unique. 
 For Nashs bargaining solution an effort set ),...,...( ººº1 Ni EEE  has to be found that 
satisfies: 
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 with Nashs bargaining constraint that ºº ji EE = . 
 Effort solution for Nashs bargaining is unique and a numerical solution is 
provided for the case study. 
 A realistic model is performed in chapter IV for Mediterranean fisheries 
economic model (including a more complex cost structure) for the simulation. The 
results of this analysis will be discussed, now that some idealized systems have been 
explained in order to observe the effects of price and stock externality on the 
exploitation of a shared living renewable resource.  
B. Informational considerations 
At the time of decision making, players need some information. For dynamic 
games agents predict the evolution of the stock after having chosen their strategy and 
knowing the others strategy. This requires some residual cooperation, i.e. each player 
evaluates its function knowing the effect of others strategy. Although Mesterton-
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Gibbons (1993) affirms that this residual cooperation is not needed, for the numeric 
resolution made here we suppose that each fisherman maximizes its NPV knowing the 
others effort strategy, predicting that they will behave non cooperatively and the effects 
it will produce on the evolution of the system. This assumption is perfectly reasonable 
given the process of information exchange that takes place daily during the fishing 
operations and the sale of the catch, at least for Mediterranean fisheries. 
Open loop information in dynamic games indicates that agents do not observe 
the evolution of the system after they have decided an effort strategy. A slightly 
modified version of the open loop solution allows players to observe the state of the 
system after time equals to zero, but the players are not able to change strategies 
(MESTERTON-GIBBONS 1993). The latter is the solution concept used in our analysis. 
 In closed loop games players have full information about the development of the 
game and are allowed to change their strategy (GRØNBÆK 2000). The feedback structure 
allows to introduce more players rationality but due to the difficulty of computing these 
solutions, there has been a tendency in the literature to use open solution concepts 
(SUMAILA 1999). 
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 RATIONAL BEHAVIOUR AND BOUNDED RATIONALITY 
 In a Nashs non cooperation equilibrium model the following assumptions are 
satisfied (FUDENBERG and TIROLE 1991; LUCE and RAIFFA 1989; MESTERTON-GIBBONS
1993; NASH 1951): 
1) There is a pool of agents that strive to maximize their own benefit, rational 
behaviour and know other agents strategies. 
2) This knowledge allows the iterative method to approach Nash equilibrium 
solution for all the agents. 
3) Some possible behaviours such as joint strategies between agents or 
imitation behaviours that may deviate the equilibrium solution concept from 
Nash equilibrium are avoided. The agents are supposed to be self-
regarding and no reciprocators (CAMERER and FEHR 2006), that may 
expect any ethical behaviour from their competitors. As a consequence, the 
behaviour of every agent is exclusively motivated by an increase in its own 
profit expectancy. 
4) Any influence in other agents behaviour through complaints, ethical 
arguments or threats is considered to be marginal for the dynamics of the non 
cooperative game and consequently of the realistic dynamics of the fishing 
effort.  
 In a good review of rational behaviour and bounded rationality Camerer and 
Fehr (2006) have shown that in many situations people violate the self-regarding 
behaviour preference and rationality that are routinely assumed in economics. Among 
other things, people do not form rational beliefs, objectively irrelevant contextual details 
affect their behaviour in systematic ways, they prefer to be treated fairly and resist 
unfair outcomes, and they not always choose what seems to be in their best interest. If 
individuals exhibit systematically biased beliefs about external events or other peoples 
behaviour or if they systematically deviate from the action that best satisfies their 
preferences, we speak about bounded rationality.  
 This is in part due to the fact that social groups are more realistically described 
as a mixture of self-regarding individuals and strong-reciprocators. The latter show 
a combination of altruistic rewarding, which is a predisposition to reward others for 
cooperative, normabiding behaviours, and altruistic punishment, which is a propensity 
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to impose sanctions on others for norm violations, even if they obtain no individual 
economic gains from their acts. 
 In this context, and following Camerer and Fehrs review (2006) a useful pair of 
concepts for understanding when aggregate behaviour is, or is not, consistent with full 
economic rationality are strategic substitutability and strategic complementarities 
(BULOW et al. 1985; FUDENBERG and TIROLE 1984). Strategies are complemented if 
agents have an incentive to match the strategies of other players. Strategies are 
substitutes if agents have an incentive to do the opposite of what the other players are 
doing. 
 When economic choices are substitutes, then rational agents have an incentive to 
behave in the opposite way to that of less-rational agents. Therefore, the rational agents 
behaviour will counter-act the impact of less-rational agents on aggregate behaviour. 
However, when choices are complements, then it pays for rational agents to mimic the 
behaviour of the less-rational agents which is amplified. 
 There is, in fact, evidence indicating that under strategic substitutability, a 
minority of rational individuals may suffice to generate aggregate outcomes that are 
predicted by a fully rational model whereas under strategic complementarity, a small 
minority of irrational individuals may cause outcomes that are completely at odds with 
the rational model.  
 When neither strategic substitutability nor strategic complementarity are present 
we can define the situation as strategic neutrality. In strategic neutrality the a priori 
expectations on the behaviour of other agents has no strong influence in the behaviour 
of the agent. 
 Strategic neutrality is apparently the case in the fisheries analyzed in this work, 
since the agents have no a priori profit in imitating the behaviour of other agents except 
if it increases its own economic reward, which is something that is not clear from the 
very beginning. In addition, even strong-reciprocator agents have no way to penalize 
unmoral behaviour of agents, as e.g. excessive overfishing made by large vessels. In 
fact, this kind of penalization is implemented from time to time by the regulator in the 
form of laws and periods of close seasons or any other control on effort. 
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 In this situation, where the agents behaviour is mainly a function of the 
perceived own profit and where strong-reciprocators have no way to behave 
differently to completely self-regarding agents, Nash equilibrium is expected to be a 
good model of the aggregate behaviour in this effort dynamics context. 
 This expectation has been confirmed by the validation implemented in chapter V 
by comparing the effort values obtained by Nash equilibrium with the effort observed 
since 1997 to 2004. In other words, Nash equilibrium computed for effort dynamics in 
1997 compares favourably to the observed.  
As it is conveniently demonstrated in chapter V and discussed in chapter VI, 
Nash equilibrium for non cooperative agents is considered to be a good tool to simulate 
effort dynamics in a Mediterranean context and jointly with some theoretical scenarios 
such as alternative management actions and cooperation behaviour solutions is 
implemented in the GAMEFISTO simulation models decision box presented in chapter 
IV.


Chapter III 
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III. PARAMETER ESTIMATION TECHNIQUES 
 The models presented in previous chapters are theoretical exercises about how a 
fishery may work. However, models are a necessary tool for making predictions on how 
a fishery will respond to management actions (in spite of being abstractions of reality). 
To be useful, models must simulate a real system to some degree of precision and after 
selecting a model structure discussed in chapters I and II, the user must select an 
appropriate set of parameters (HILBORN and WALTERS 1992). The type of models to use 
will be constrained by several factors, among which we may cite type of data available 
and management structure (i.e. management based on input or output controls).  
 The process of estimating parameters is divided in two main tasks here: First, 
population dynamics parameters are estimated following different classical methods and 
introducing genetic algorithms as the main novelty. Second, as justified previously, as 
the analysis is made at vessel level, each of them needs to be characterized according to 
its catchability parameter and to its costs of fishing. The individual catchability 
parameter is estimated following a simple method relying on the observed differences in 
catch per unit of effort data. Costs of fishing as well as the rest of the economic 
parameters are taken from available published data and are estimated with simple 
regressions that are not explained in the present chapter. 
A. Biomass dynamics parameters 
 The parameter selection is performed under a criterion of goodness of fit, the 
sum of squares (SS) that compares the observed catch with the estimated catch based on 
the chosen model and parameter sets. 
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                {eq.3.1} 
The ability of the models chosen as simulation procedures needs to be tested 
confronting them to real fisheries data and for that purpose a set of parameter values 
needs to be estimated. 
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 The parameter set to choose is the one that minimizes the sum of squares in a 
time interval (T) with the selected model. Some techniques to find parameters of 
biomass dynamic models frequently used in fisheries science are presented and tested 
here.  
1) Linear regression. Schnute (1977) described a method to transform the Schaefer 
equation into a linear dynamic equation (HILBORN and WALTERS 1992; SCHNUTE 1977; 
SCHNUTE and RICHARDS 2004), and fitting by linear regression the annual catch per unit 
of effort (cpue) and effort series: 
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 The dependent variable of the regression is an index of relative population 
change and the independent variables represent catch per unit of effort (cpue) as an 
average relative abundance and fishing effort (E) over each year.  
 This method is based on the assumption that the observations are made without 
error and that all of the error occurs in the process of change of population size 
(POLACHECK et al. 1993). 
 Walters and Hilborn (1976) constructed another linear regression based on 
Schaefers model expressed in difference equations. Using annual catch and effort data: 
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cpue −−=−+ 11                 {eq.3.3} 
 As was discussed in Hilborn and Walters (1992), these estimation methods 
provided negative parameters in some cases, which is biologically impossible. Hilborn 
and Walters suggest that the most apparent model failures are derived from observation 
errors. 
2) Maximum likelihood. The basic idea behind this technique relies on searching the 
parameter set for which the observed data are most likely. Likelihood methods allow to 
calculate confidence bounds on parameters and to test hypotheses in the traditional 
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manner. Different possible parameter sets are the hypotheses to test and the maximum 
likelihood estimate will be the parameter set that makes the likelihood of the observed to 
estimated data as large as possible. The key distinction between likelihood and 
probability is that with probability the hypothesis is known and the data are unknown, 
whereas with likelihood the data are known and the hypotheses unknown. In general, 
the likelihood of the data, given an hypothesis, is proportional to the probability of 
observing data with the selected model (HILBORN and MANGEL 1997). The process of 
estimating parameters is straightforward following some steps: First, some set of 
possible values for the parameters to estimate is proposed. Second, estimations for the 
observed variable are calculated for each year and for every parameter set. Third, the set 
of parameters that make the observed variable most likely is chosen as the valid 
hypothesis.  
This method has been used in some fisheries analysis (DE LA MARE 1986) but it 
is not used in the present work.  
3) Bayesian approach. Based on Bayes theorem (BAYES 1764) and in maximum 
likelihood techniques, it introduces a prior or a probability function of the parameters to 
estimate. The Bayesian approach to stock assessment determines the probabilities of 
alternative hypotheses using information for the stock in question and from inferences 
for other stocks/species. This method allows using a full range of uncertainty and using 
the collective historical experience of fisheries science when analysing a fishing system. 
For the performance of a Bayesian analysis a range of hypotheses needs to be proposed 
with different probabilities associated. Once tested the outcome with the chosen model, 
a probability distribution is assigned to each hypothesis. Two sources of information are 
used in Bayesian stock assessment methods: One consists of observations on catch and 
effort and the second is based on inferences for other stocks/species. The first one is 
represented in the form of a likelihood function and the second through prior probability 
distributions. Bayes theorem is used to combine both information sources (PUNT and 
HILBORN 1997). The Bayesian approach thus, can be used to account for and convey the 
full range of uncertainties related to the models and parameters used (BERGER 1985; 
HAMMOND and O'BRIEN 2001; MCALLISTER and KIRKWOOD 1998; PUNT and 
BUTTERWORTH 1996). Moreover, Bayesian methods can be used to implement a 
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precautionary approach to fishery management (FAO 1995; MCALLISTER and 
KIRKWOOD 1998). 
The major inconvenience of using Bayesian approach, not only for parameter 
estimation but also for decision analysis and assessment, comes from the difficulties in 
choosing prior distributions (BERGER 1985; BUTTERWORTH 1995; BUTTERWORTH and 
PUNT 1995; MCALLISTER and KIRKWOOD 1998; PUNT and BUTTERWORTH 1996). One 
of the main advantages of Bayesian approach over maximum likelihood methods is the 
avoidance of convergence problems (RAFTERY et al. 1992). For biomass model 
estimation a procedure has been recently tested  (MCALLISTER and KIRKWOOD 1998; 
MEYER and MILLAR 1999). The application of Bayesian techniques for parameter 
estimation was attempted in the present study, but did not provide satisfactory results as 
will be shown in chapter V, probably due to the problems derived from the election of 
priors, but it is suggested to be a powerful method for parameter estimation and 
uncertainty analysis.  
4) Fitting data series. What are now considered to be the best methods for estimating 
production model parameters are called observation error time-series fitting methods, 
which were firstly proposed and used by Pella and Tomlinson (1969). Observations are 
time series that are distinguished from standard data in that in time series there is no 
functional independence of one observation from previous observations (HILBORN and 
WALTERS 1992). Different forms of the Schaefers model are used to fit catch and effort 
data series. Prager (1994) proposed a method using the solution of the differential 
equation (Pellas solution) for biomass at any time t+, after applying ( tt Eqr ⋅−=α ) 
explained in chapter I.
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 Modelling the catch during the period (t, t+):  
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 Starting from initial biomass (t=0) the population is projected in time following 
equation 1.9 and its corresponding yield is calculated with equations 1.9 and 1.10.
 A multiplicative error structure on yield is proposed by Prager and minimization 
of that error is the objective function to construct using catch and effort data. The main 
assumption in this method is that the equation of population dynamics is deterministic 
and that all the error occurs in the observation. 
 The objective function to minimize is: 
2))ln()(ln(min∑ − tt YC                 {eq.3.4} 
 where the sum applies to a discrete set of  periods. 
 4.1. ASPIC (PRAGER 2005) program estimates the parameter set with some 
accuracy, once given some approximate starting guesses using a lognormal error 
structure. The results obtained with the mentioned software were compared to an 
alternative error minimization method, the genetic algorithm gafortran (CARROLL
2001) for parameter estimation.  
4.2. Genetic algorithm as a tool for parameter estimation was proposed in order 
to avoid convergence to spurious local minima in the error function which was observed 
to be a problem with the ASPIC software. Traditional optimization techniques such as 
the gradient method and local variations are essentially local methods (CHERRUAULT
1999). These methods present some problems of convergence when the amount of local 
minima in the evaluation function is large and when the starting guesses for the 
parameters to be estimated is poor. In these situations, a global minimization technique 
is much more indicated (CHERRUAULT 1999). 
 Two main kinds of global optimization methods can be distinguished: space 
filling curves based methods and iterated hill climbing. The first method is based on 
deterministically exploring the parameters space with curves that fill the space with a 
certain density. If the distance between maxima is known to be larger than a given 
quantity, this method can be preferred to the iterated hill climbing since it is more 
exhaustive in the space exploration.   
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 However, the most frequently used global method is the iterated hill climbing 
which essentially consists in using iteratively a local optimization method across the 
whole parameter space. The iterated simplex method is a good example of this kind of 
methods. The main problem with iterated simplex is that it is very demanding in 
function evaluations and it does not scale well as dimensionality (number of parameters) 
is increased. The challenge in developing a global method able to outperform the 
iterated hill climbing consists in introducing in the method some kind of transfer of 
information between trial solutions. A well-known method that often achieves this 
reliably is simulated annealing (METROPOLIS et al. 1953; PRESS et al. 1986). The 
problem with this method is that it requires the specification of a cooling schedule 
which is far from trivial in order to grant the convergence. The genetic algorithms 
achieve the same goal but are inspired by the exchange of (genetic) information 
occurring in a breeding population subjected to natural selection. 
  The genetic algorithm-based optimizers, are a class of search techniques that 
use simplified forms of the biological processes of selection/inheritance/variation that 
were found to be appropriate for biomass dynamic models parameter estimation with no 
approximated knowledge about them (CHARBONNEAU 2002).  
 In the genetic algorithm a population consists of a large set (typically 100 to 
1000 members) of different combinations of values for the N parameters to be fitted 
(N=4 in our case and N=5 for a special case explained later). A top-level view of the 
basic genetic algorithm is as follows: 
(1) Randomly initialize population and evaluate fitness of its members. 
(2) Breed selected members of current population to produce offspring population 
(selection based on fitness). Here is where information is passed across population 
members. 
(3) Replace current population by offspring population. Some degree of crossover 
between the traits (parameter values) of the selected population is allowed. 
(4) Evaluate fitness of new population members. 
(5) Repeat steps (2) through (4) until the fittest member of the current population 
is deemed fit enough. 
 The application of genetic algorithms for fisheries analysis is related to 
optimization procedures, for parameter estimation purposes (GOLIKOV et al. 1995), for 
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multivariate analysis (D'ANGELO et al. 1995) and bioeconomic analysis of fisheries 
(MARDLE et al. 1998). 
 Two genetic algorithm software were tested: pikaia (CHARBONNEAU 2002) 
and gafortran (CARROLL 2001) with different results. Both provided us with valid 
parameters but gafortran was the one that provided some stability on the estimations. 
As a consequence, gafortran genetic algorithm was used for biomass dynamic models 
parameter estimation.
The application of such a technique was performed in two different manners. For 
the first one, Prager (1994) method was used for the four parameters of Schaefers 
model and after obtaining them, temporal variability in the catchability coefficient was 
tested. Empirical literature cites some acceptable increase from 1 to 3 % of annual 
increase in catchability (LINDEBO 1999; VIGNAUX 1996) and some tests were tried in 
order to improve the estimates obtained. The best fit was obtained with an annual 
increase of 3%. 
 For the second application of the technique, five parameters were searched, the 
classic four parameters mentioned earlier and an annual increase in catchability . A 
new projection of biomass and catch was performed under the assumption that an 
annual catchability increase took place in the fishery. Equation 2.5 related to 
catchability increase at vessel level was applied for the entire fleet. 
t
t Qq τ0=                {eq.2.5.b} 
 Note that for this new projection, )( ttt Eqr −=α  in equation 1.10. 
 As it is discussed later, the first method was considered to be the best parameter 
estimation method for the available catch and effort data.  
B. Vessels characterization 
 The present analysis is performed under the assumption that Mediterranean 
fisheries studies need some analysis at vessel level (as justified in Chapter II). The fleet 
heterogeneity is assumed to be reflected by the vessels fishing capacity or catchability 
parameter and some particular costs of fishing. These two factors are relevant for the 
simulation of the landings and cost/benefit balance of each vessel and moreover are the 
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quid of the hypothesis done for the simulation of the effort dynamics through game 
theory.  
 As was previously explained, the fishing mortality applied to a population by a 
N vessel fleet, is the sum of the mortalities applied by each vessel i (eq.2.0). 
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The population dynamics parameter estimation is performed with total catch and 
effort data series, and as a result, equation 2.0 can be transformed into equation 3.5.
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 Taking into account that the parameter estimation is performed with the sum of 
efforts, it is straightforward that the catchability parameter obtained (qm) is the 
catchability coefficient of an average vessel of the fleet. Consequently it can be 
formulated that for a N vessel fleet: 
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 The estimation of individual catchability is thus related to the previously 
estimated average catchability parameter. On the other hand, the differences between 
vessels are derived from individual catch and effort data series by means of the 
following procedure: (Note that qBcpue =  from eq.1.2). 
 1) First, each vessels catch per unit of effort (cpuev) is calculated: 
vvv ECcpue /=                  {eq.3.7}  
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 2) Second, each vessels cpue is referred to a particular one, that may be the 
vessel with highest cpue or to any other one. In our case, we refer all the vessels to 
vessel 1. As a consequence: 
BqcpueECcpue vvvvv 11/ ηη ===                {eq.3.7} 
 As the cpuev and cpue1 are known, we obtain, the relative v values that allow 
the comparison between vessels cpue that is used to obtain each particular catchability 
parameter. For that purpose, we demonstrate that the relative v values between cpues
are also relative values between catchability coefficients. 
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 The only unknown in equation 3.9 is the reference catchability parameter q1.  
 After that, easily we obtain the vessel catchabilities: 
1qq vv η= , for every v from 1 to N.  
 A similar method of vessel description or characterization was performed in the 
BEAM 4 model (SPARRE and WILLMAN 1993a), in spite of relating the standardization 
of fishing effort at vessel level through differences in fishing power. 

Chapter IV 
The Simulation 
Introducing GAMEFISTO
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IV. THE SIMULATION. INTRODUCING GAMEFISTO 
 Natural resources management implies the confrontation of multiple 
sensitivities. The different perspectives concerning a resource need to be analyzed in 
order that the administrations involved can make appropriate decisions. A fishery 
system includes ecological, socio-cultural, economic and politic aspects among others 
that need to be explored so that the consequences of any management action can be 
foreseen.  
 The fishing activity can be considered as an economic activity relying on a 
natural living resource, and the simulation techniques all along the present work are 
related to its bioeconomics. However, socio-cultural aspects have been suggested as an 
important aspect of fisheries in many parts of the world (IRAZOLA et al. 1996; 
KRAUTHAMMER et al. 1987; MAYNOU et al. 2003; MERINO 1997) and to be related to 
some variables usually concerning to bioeconomics. Moreover, politic perspectives are 
frequently another factor determining managers decisions (EU 1995-2006; FROST and 
KJÆRSGAARD 2003).  
 Bioeconomic models attempt to establish functional relationships between 
exploited natural resources and the Mans activities to obtain optimum use of them. 
Bioeconomic models must address three basic questions (SPARRE and WILLMAN
1993a): 
1) To explain quantitatively the evolution patterns of a fishery. 
2) To help to identify and select policy measures to achieve social an economic 
objectives. 
3) Determining the optimum application manner of the selected management 
measures. 
 The use of biological and economic models jointly in bioeconomic simulation 
procedures promotes the collaboration between two important fields involved in natural 
A bioeconomic simulation model can be understood as a set of tools designed to 
make projections of a set of biological and economic variables into the future (at 
specified time intervals t) (MAYNOU 2005)
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resource management and improves the quality of policies. Moreover it allows a better 
design of data collection programmes needed for the administrations rational decision 
making (SPARRE and WILLMAN 1993a).  
 Some simulation tools have been developed recently (GRANT et al. 1981; 
ISAKSON et al. 1982; LLEONART et al. 2003; MARDLE and PASCOE 2002; SPARRE and 
WILLMAN 1993a; ULRICH et al. 1999). The purpose of these tools is to facilitate the 
analysis of the consequences and risks of different management measures (LLEONART et 
al. 2003). Each of these models emerges as adaptations of simulation techniques to the 
particularities of different fishing systems, to available data and to the contemporary 
computer technology available.  
 The first idea of a general bioeconomic fisheries simulation model was 
conceived with the aim of evaluating the management policies proposed by the Gulf of 
Mexico Fishery Management Council. Griffin and Grant developed the GBFSM model 
and applied it to some fisheries during the early eighties (GRANT and GRIFFIN 1979; 
GRANT et al. 1981; ISAKSON et al. 1982; KRAUTHAMMER et al. 1987) and more recently 
(GRIFFIN 2003; GRIFFIN et al. 1999; GRIFFIN et al. 1997) with considerable 
improvements. The GBFSM is a multi-species, multiple length-based model using 
cohort analysis and instantaneous mortality. The biological submodel represents the 
movement of fish between the various compartments of a given fishery and the 
economic submodel represents the flow of information between the harvesting and 
policy sectors. In this model, nominal fishing effort and vessel characteristics are 
exogenous for the initialization and become real fishing effort and vessels catchability 
coefficients. The model includes some price dynamics through an elasticity parameter 
equal to the used in the present work. The cost of fishing depends on the unit cost of 
effort and crew shares that are basically similar to our model. The model accounts also 
for the fixed costs of the activity.  
 The GBFSM model allows testing different policies such as closures to fishing 
by area, species, depth and season; limits on effort and Total Allowable Catch (TAC); 
allocation control on markets and policies directed to reduce by-catch and selectivity 
patterns. The analysis is performed at the lowest level of vessel class, a partition of a 
fishing fleet depending in some characteristic vessel sizes.   
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 The BEAM 4 bioeconomic simulation model (SPARRE and WILLMAN 1993a; 
SPARRE and WILLMAN 1993b) allows the assessment of the biological end economic 
consequences of different management measures including effort control, gear 
regulations, closing areas and seasons and economic incentives/disincentives. The 
biologic submodel of BEAM 4 is a multi-stock, age structured algorithm that includes 
growth, recruitment and natural and fishing mortality processes. The smallest time step 
considered is one month but the model allows using other time steps, such as two, three, 
four, six months or a year. The economic analysis is performed at fleet level, assuming a 
fleet as a group of uniform boats (the same size and using the same gears). The link 
between these submodels is fishing mortality and it is introduced in the biological 
submodel as the sum of the mortalities generated by each fleet. Fishing mortality is 
assumed to be proportional to the fishing effort through a fleet level constant 
catchability parameter. Within a fleet, boats are considered to be identical. Effort units 
are boats-day expressed in standard boat units in order to avoid the possible 
distortion adding two vessels fishing days if their technical differences are significant. 
Effort in the BEAM 4 simulation model is a decision variable and is exogenous to the 
model contrary to what happens with the effort dynamics submodel present in this work.  
 BEAM 4 was primarily designed for tropical fisheries, mainly composed of 
different species of shrimps (WILLMAN and GARCIA 1985). The model can account with 
migration of the species as well as seasonality of recruitment. The landings become 
profits immediately with a constant price model, based on the fact that this fishery is 
directed towards international markets and the amount of suppliers and buyers avoid 
significant impacts on price derived from the increase or decrease of the landings of the 
studied fleet (FROST and KJÆRSGAARD 2003).  
 The economics of the model are based on the difference between the revenues 
and the costs generated by the activity. The costs are separated in costs of fish 
harvesting, processing costs, foreign exchange costs and opportunity costs. The effect of 
taxes and subsidies is also considered. 
 These two earlier models dealt with high levels of complexity regarding the 
structure of the models. Both deal with spatial distributions of the exploited populations 
and the description of different habitats where processes like recruitment, nursery or 
fishing occur. Working with such models requires a considerable amount of information 
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(data) so that a complete description of the fishery is performed both with initialization 
and validation purposes. Most of the fisheries of EU countries present alarming lack of 
data to tackle the high complexity of the mentioned models, especially in the 
Mediterranean region. On the other hand, some of the models adapted to the local 
realities started their development under the financial support of the EU.  
 Frost and Kjærsgaard in 2003 reviewed the bioeconomic simulation models 
applied in different EU countries. The economic impacts of management policies are 
the focus in the simulation model for the Measurement of Economic Impacts in Specific 
Fleet Sectors (KLEPPER and LASCH 1998) for homogeneous fleet segments regarding 
fishing areas, effort time and species. The model is non-parametric and contains an 
optimization algorithm for the economic output while the role of biological variables is 
to provide some constraint to the activity. An optimization model for costs minimization 
and profit and employment maximization was performed in Germany (BRODERSEN et 
al. 1998) with fleet size and configuration as control variables, constrained by a quotas 
management regime. Plaice and sole fisheries in the North Sea were modelled with the 
FLATFISH spatial simulation model (PASTOORS et al. 1997) with two objectives: First, 
investigating the relationship between the biology of the fish stocks and the economy 
and second, using the FLATFISH model as a decision support to analyse the effects of 
different management actions. The biological submodel includes growth, migration and 
mortality while the economics are analyzed through catch, fleets capacity and price. The 
EIAA model (SALZ and FROST 2000) takes into consideration the consequences of 
quota advices for the fleet segment and EMMFID, also produced in Denmark, (FROST
and KJÆRSGAARD 2003), aims to describe and model fishing activities in such a way 
that economic consequences due to interaction of industry activities and regulation of 
fishing resources considering sustainability of stocks can be clarified. 
 The impact of the fishing activity and regulation can be modelled with a more 
ecological perspective. ECOSIM-ECOPATH simulation models (CHRISTENSEN and 
WALTERS 2004; PAULY et al. 2000; POLOVINA 1984; SUMAILA 2004; WALTERS et al.
1997) take into account the trophic interactions when considering the consequences of 
the fishing activity and the different management policies in an ecosystem. The policies 
that have been simulated with these models are related to fishing pressure regulations 
(CHRISTENSEN 1995; COLL 2006) and to the creation of Marine Protected Areas (MPA) 
Chapter IV   The simulation: Introducing GAMEFISTO
105 
in many parts of the world (BEATTIE et al. 2002; SUMAILA 1998). These models do not 
consider single species but exploited ecosystems and they need large amounts of 
information about the species involved in order to fill the complete trophic matrix that 
describes all the inter-specific interactions between the populations.  
 A fishery is composed of various components, i.e. different resources, different 
fleets or gears. The BECHAMEL bioeconomic simulation model (ULRICH et al. 1999; 
ULRICH et al. 2002a) analyzes the technical interactions between these components 
related to the presence of a fishing unit on the ground where another fishes or different 
fishing units exploiting the same stock. Technical interactions are measured through the 
variation of biological or economic outputs of fleets of interest. The aim of this model is 
the analysis of the long term consequences of various management alternatives in the 
economic situation of the English and French fleets fishing in the English Channel and 
in the exploited resources. The model deals with equilibrium solutions for the biological 
and the economic submodels, related to long-term production and profit estimations. 
The biological submodel does not take into account biological interactions, but focuses 
on competition among fleets. The simulation model is a static, multi-species, multi-fleet 
equilibrium model composed of three main components: The fishing effort, the 
populations and the economic component.  
 The model was designed to solve some specific problems derived from the 
particular characteristics of the English Channel, such as being a small scale fishery 
where conflicts between countries, between fishing gears and metiers arise and where 
the amount of target species recommends the avoidance of single species models.  
 The fishing effort is used in its nominal form so that costs derived by the activity 
may be calculated and on the other hand, it is standardized across length classes within a 
fleet using fishing powers derived from observations of catch per unit of effort (cpue), 
to convert it into fishing mortality through a constant catchability parameter.  
 The management actions to be tackled with this model are related to effort 
reductions in a fleet segment, reducing the number of boats or the number of days 
fishing.  
 The BECHAMEL simulation model at the scale of whole fishery scale leads to 
define classifications of fleets and metiers, based on their level of interactions (ULRICH
et al. 1999; ULRICH et al. 2002a; ULRICH et al. 2002b).  
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 The main improvements of the BECHAMEL model compared to the previous 
ones are: It models a fishery including many fleets, gears, species and life history 
characteristics with low available data and it highlights the potential benefits of a multi-
disciplinary and international collaborative work (ULRICH et al. 2002a). The model does 
not attempt to model fleet behaviour and endogenous allocation of effort.  
The simulation models presented previously were conceived to solve specific 
problems of some fisheries in different parts of the world depending on some 
particularities that make each model appropriate for a specific fishery. Mediterranean 
fisheries present also some particular characteristics which have been studied during the 
late nineties and the first years of the present century with the purpose of fisheries 
bioeconomic modelling (LLEONART et al. 2003; MAYNOU et al. 2006). 
 European Mediterranean fisheries present some differences with other fisheries 
which justify building specific models for bioeconomic analysis. Management of 
Mediterranean fisheries is based on input management, in contrast to most of the 
Atlantic fisheries that are managed through output measures such as Total Allowable 
Catch (TAC). Input management means regulating the fishing mortality applied to a 
population through some control on one or both of its two main components: fishing 
effort and catchability. Fishing effort can be limited by means of restrictions on the 
number of boats and the number of fishing days and catchability can be regulated 
through limitations on engine powers and fishing gears.  
 MOSES bioeconomic simulation and optimization model (PLACENTI et al. 1992; 
PLACENTI et al. 1995) aims to the maximization of the value added from the activity. 
Particularly, the objective is to determine the optimal distribution of fishing effort that 
fulfils the maximum economic result compatible with the need of species preservation 
(biological constraint) and the optimization of socio-economic aspects, such as a 
realistic redistribution of the productive structure (COPPOLA and PLACENTI 2002). 
MOSES model is composed of a multi-species biologic submodel with biomass 
dynamic and partially age-structured populations and the economic analysis is 
concerned with fleet segments with some exogenous economic variables: unit cost for 
fishing activity, average price for species in a given area and effort allocation through 
the optimization procedure. The MOSES model refers to the whole fishery and all 
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stocks in Italian fishery. To sum up, it may be said that the model suggests the best 
effort allocation (and optimal size of the fleet) for management policy purposes when 
prices, unit costs and effort dynamics are given.   
 The strengths and weaknesses of the MOSES model are described by Frost and 
Kjærsgaard (2003) in the following way:  
a. Strengths: 1) It allows drawing up of a management scheme analysing fleet 
segments for administrative areas. 2) It allows to build the model with the 
possible lack of biological data. 3) It considers different non-equilibrium 
effort allocation by gear and area considering the population constraints and 
the economic structure. 4) It considers explicitly biological, social and 
economic constraints. 5) It allows for evaluation of impacts emerging from 
the different management schemes particularly different allocation and effort 
variation. 
b. Weaknesses: 1) It does not consider functioning of market (price formation, 
cost of factors). 2) It does not consider species interactions and migrations 
over fishing areas. 3) Objective functions of individual vessels in a fleet  are 
considered as given and constant. 4) The biological parameters are estimated 
from single species/areas catch and effort time series. 5) It optimizes fishing 
effort distribution and is not intended to offer solutions for the management 
of the whole industry. 
 Mediterranean fleets are very heterogeneous, small vessels share stocks with 
larger ones (see Figure IV.1) and old wooden boats share market with modern fibre 
ones. Such heterogeneity implies some technical interaction at vessel level that should 
be accounted and suggests that Mediterranean fisheries bioeconomic analysis should be 
Figure IV.1. Vessels heterogeneity in Mediterranean fleets. Trawlers in Blanes.
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performed at vessel level (LLEONART et al. 1999; LLEONART et al. 2003; MAYNOU et al.
2003; MAYNOU et al. 2006). The MEFISTO bioeconomic simulation model 
characterizes a fishery through the description of each of its vessels in order to perform 
the economic analysis and the decision of each vessel and conforms another fleet level 
in order to describe its interaction with the exploited populations. It is a multi-species, 
multi-fleet and vessel level simulation model with different layers. MEFISTO allows 
testing different management actions at each of these layers, i.e., changing the fuel price 
for the fleets operating in a country that shares a fishery with others, reducing the annual 
fishing effort of a fleet of a given country, deactivating vessels, increasing the 
decommission price for a given fleet or changing the selectivity of a given gear, for 
instance, increasing the mesh size of the trawlers of a given country. The selected 
measures are input as initializing conditions or as events in a selected time of the 
simulation. The biological submodel (Stock Box) is age structured and not only the 
dynamics of target species are modelled but the secondary or by-catch species landings 
are simulated with linear or exponential relations. Price dynamics (Market Box) are also 
considered with optional models accounting for the effects of offer-demand, imports-
exports and size of the product.  
 The output of the MEFISTO simulation model allows forecasting the effects of 
the selected measures at different levels and for different purposes: conservationist, 
predicting the populations behaviour; vessel level economics, modelling the revenues 
and profits of a single vessel and fleet or country level economics, modelling the 
number of boats, revenues, profits and some economic indicators.  
 The MEFISTO model introduces a decision scheme for the effort dynamics of 
the fishery. This endogenous dynamics is related to a set of decision rules conforming 
the Fishermen Box, which after making individual economic balance permits the 
fisherman increasing its fishing effort, investing in technology (which may increase 
catchability), asking for a credit or leaving the fishery.  
 The model allows the introduction of uncertainty in the recruitment process. As 
a consequence, the outputs are provided with different confidence intervals.  
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THE GAMEFISTO MODEL 
 The theoretical methodology investigated in the previous chapters is applied on 
the construction of a technical simulation tool for the analysis of the Mediterranean 
fisheries. The main assumption in the simulation model is that a fishery is an economic 
activity based on the exploitation of marine renewable resources that are shared by 
many agents (fishermen).  
 The independent simulation model for the bioeconomic analysis of 
Mediterranean fisheries (GAMEs in MEditerranean FIsheries Simulation TOols) 
introduces an effort dynamics submodel based on game theory as its main novelty. The 
exploited resource is described with classical biomass surplus models and the economic 
submodel is based on the cost structure adopted to produce the Annual Economic 
Report of European Union Fisheries (2000), applied to the specific conditions of the 
Mediterranean (EU 2000). 
 The simulation is structured in three well differentiated frames: the resource box, 
the economic submodel and the decision box (Figure IV.2).  
The main objective of the simulation model presented here is the description of 
the processes that direct the evolution of the fishing mortality in Mediterranean 
fisheries and its consequences on the exploited resources and on its economic 
indicators.  
Figure IV.2. Basic flowchart of GAMEFISTO model. 
Resource Box Economic submodel
Decision Box 
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The interaction between the resource and the economic outcome of the activity 
is the main characteristic of bioeconomic simulation models (ISAKSON et al. 1982; 
LLEONART et al. 1999; SPARRE and WILLMAN 1993a; ULRICH et al. 1999) and it is 
modelled by means of the fishing mortality term. As it has been explained in earlier 
chapters, the fishing mortality is dependent on a catchability term and on the fishing 
effort. These two factors are usually introduced into the bioeconomic models as possible 
management actions and the consequences of such management actions (effort 
reductions, changes in catchability patterns, investments in technology) are analyzed on 
the exploited populations and on the economic output. 
The GAMEFISTO simulation model tackles the fishing mortality as an 
endogenous variable. The decision submodel simulates the effort strategy adopted by a 
single fisherman with a game theoretic approach and the average catchability coefficient 
is introduced as a parameter in the simulation and recalculated for each vessel with 
some catch per unit of effort data and allowed to evolve in time.  
 Similarly to other simulation models (ISAKSON et al. 1982; LLEONART et al.
1999; SPARRE and WILLMAN 1993a; ULRICH et al. 1999), another objective of the 
GAMEFISTO model is providing a tool for the analysis of the consequences of some 
management measures on the fishing system. It accommodates to Mediterranean 
regulation with some effort dynamics presented in chapter II, and the bioeconomic 
analysis is performed at vessel level. The management actions to be tested with the 
GAMEFISTO model are: the reduction or enlargement of the period allowed for 
fishing; the reduction or increase of the costs of effort derived from the removal of 
subsidies or changes in fuel price; the proposition of increasing the decommission prices 
to motivate a reduction of effort among others. These management actions are 
performed in realistic scenarios and compared to some theoretical optimization and 
cooperation exercises.  
 A more detailed explanation of the three parts of the model is presented in 
Figure IV.3: 
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A. The resource box 
 The model considers the resource as a pool of marine species that can be 
commercialized. Some of these species are formulated as renewable resources, i.e., 
some explicit population dynamics determine its abundance in the exploited ecosystem. 
The species that are explicitly modelled by population dynamics are the ones that the 
user considers target species, which can be chosen based on different arguments: it can 
be considered a target species the one that brings higher revenues, the species that 
conforms the main part of the landings or the species whose conservation the user is 
interested in.  
 The target species are modelled with a biomass surplus production model 
presented in chapter I (eq.1.1) (SCHAEFER 1954; SCHAEFER 1957) and Pellas solution 
concept (eq.1.9) (PELLA 1967).  
.
Target
Populations
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Economic submodel
(Expected net profits & scenarios) 
- Nash equilibrium (Non Cooperation )
- Nash bargaining solution (Cooperation )
- Optimization
varis
Price dynamics: f(landings)
Revenues  Cost structure
NET PROFITS
FISHING 
MORTALITY
Effort Strategy
&
Dynamic catchability
LANDINGS
Resource Box
Decision Box
Figure IV.3. Complete flowchart of GAMEFISTO simulation model. 
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where t=r-Ft and =r/K.  
 The catches of the selected species s of a v vessel are modelled from eq.1.10.  
 For a N vessel system, the result for each vessel v is the following (eq.10.a): 
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 Equation 1.10.a is equation 1.10 adapted to each fishermans catches Cs,v,t.. 
Apart from a pool of target species, the income from what we name secondary 
species needs to be accounted (LLEONART and MAYNOU 2003; LLEONART et al. 1999). 
The secondary species are those that observations show that are present in the fishing 
gears mixed with the target species. Neither their population dynamics nor the 
ecological interactions between species are explicitly modelled, but their landings are 
related to the catch of target species of each vessel through a linear relation adapted 
from equation 1.27 (eq.1.27.a). 
tvssstvs CC ,,,,sec ⋅+= υμ                       {eq.1.27.a} 
 The parameters  and  are empirically estimated for each target species. 
 Observations of market statistics suggest that there is a pool of landings that 
provide considerable revenues to the fleets operating in the Mediterranean and that are 
not directly associated to landings of target and secondary species. The revenues 
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coming from these species (YVaris) are modelled as an economic input (Varis) 
associated to an effort unit of each vessel in the simulation through a previously non 
presented equation: (eq.1.29). 
tvvtv EVarisYVaris ,, ⋅=                         {eq.1.29} 
B. The economic submodel. 
The economic submodel describes the transformation of landings into net profits 
for each fisherman. The landings of each fisherman, become revenues through some 
market rules related to the dynamics of the price of the product, formulated as the 
previously explained equation 1.26.a, adapted to the vessel level analysis. Note that total 
landings are the sum of the catches of each fisherman v, and the number of fishermen is 
N:  
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 The simulation is performed with the selected price dynamics. 
 The income from the secondary species is calculated through an empirically 
observed constant price for each vessel (eq.1.28.a). 
tvsstvs CpsY ,,,, secsec ⋅=             {eq.1.28.a} 
 The income from a mixture of species related to an effort unit is presented in 
equation 1.29. 
 To sum up, the revenues from the total landings of the S species of a vessel are: 
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 All the variables at vessel level are also computed at total level: 
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 Continuing with the economic submodel, and after computing the total revenues 
perceived by each fisherman, the economic balance needs to be done in order to 
compute the net benefits at vessel level. The cost structure used is similar to the applied 
in MEFISTO simulation model (EU 2000; LLEONART and MAYNOU 2003; LLEONART et 
al. 1999). 
 The costs that GAMEFISTO accounts for are divided in four groups: 
1) Trade costs (C1). All the costs that can be expressed as a percentage of the 
Total Revenues of each vessel. It includes fishermen association taxes and 
sale process or commercialization taxes. The trade costs are expressed as a 
percentage of the total revenues and this percentage is considered to be the 
same for the whole fleet (c1).  
100/11 ,, tvtv YcC ⋅= {eq.4.5} 
2) Daily costs (C2). These costs are directly caused by the activity of fishing. 
Include fuel costs, net mending, daily food expenses, ice and other daily 
costs excluding labour costs. They are a function of fishing effort (E, the 
number of days fishing) and include maintenance costs such as net mending. 
The cost of one day fishing (c2) is different for each vessel and is a key 
parameter to reflect differences in economic efficiency between vessels that 
results in Decision Box explained the later on.   
tvvtv EcC ,, 22 = {eq.4.6} 
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3) Labour costs (C3). These are composed by the share (c3) corresponding to 
the crew in function of the remaining money after discounting Trade and 
Daily costs, i.e., what in Spain is known as Monte Menor (MM). The share 
is considered to be the same for every vessel. 
tvtvtvtv CCYMM ,,,, 21 −−= {eq.4.7} 
tvtv MMcC ,, 33 ⋅=                {eq.4.8} 
4) Compulsory costs (C4). Harbour costs, license, insurance and yearly costs 
supposed to be constant and expressed at vessel level so that they can also 
reflect the heterogeneity of Mediterranean fleets. 
GAMEFISTO model does not compute opportunity or financial costs nor credit 
applications or another economic strategy computed by a fisherman, out of the 
mentioned effort and catchability dynamics.  
C. The decision box 
The output of the economic submodel is the net profits, both total (T) and at 
vessel level (v). Individual net profits are supposed to be the evaluation function of a 
fisherman at the time of designing an effort strategy when considering a non 
cooperative game (chapter II) and total net profits considering an effort strategy for the 
fleet in a cooperative game. More specifically, as the future net profits are expected, the 
evaluation functions are the individual and total Net Present Values (eq.2.49.a and 
2.49.b), adapted from equation 2.49. 
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 Considering all the principles explained in chapter II, the decision is performed 
under two main perspectives: non cooperation and cooperation between fishermen. The 
first is proposed as a realistic method to explain the trends of fishing effort in 
Mediterranean fisheries and moreover a tool to predict the evolution of the system after 
some management actions and scenarios proposed.  The second are theoretical exercises 
about what the outcome of the exploitation of a renewable living marine resource would 
be under some agreement or a centralized decision scheme.  
 The heterogeneity observed in Mediterranean fisheries is reflected in the 
catchability coefficients (qv) and the costs, both daily (C2v) and compulsory (C3v), of 
the analyzed vessels. The fishery is supposed to be a finite renewable resource shared 
by the N asymmetric vessels exploiting a shared resource (see chapter II).  
 The model considers the fishing system as a N-asymmetrical players game 
sharing a dynamic multispecific resource with a dynamic market, which needs to be 
solved following some considerations. 
 The solution concepts searched in the decision box are of two types: 
1) Solutions under Non Cooperation. 
 Each fisherman strives to maximize its own NPV in a time interval that in the 
current version of the simulator is ten years. The solution we are searching is Nash
equilibrium solution (NASH 1951) for an N-asymmetrical players game sharing a 
dynamic resource with a dynamic market, i.e., solving equation 2.50 is finding a set 
of effort strategies ( ***1 ,...,... Ni EEE ) that satisfies the following condition: 
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 with the condition that 0  Ei  Emax. The most realistic approach is when 
Emax=240 days; fishing is allowed from Monday to Friday except festivities. The effort 
strategy is constant during the simulation time, i.e. the game is quasi-static (see chapter 
II). 
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 Some different assumptions to the system to be solved allow us simulating some 
management actions. Solving eq.2.50 is what is supposed to simulate real conditions at 
the time of designing an effort strategy by each fisherman. Two more cases of non 
cooperation are proposed simulating two possible management actions: First, Nash 
equilibrium is computed when a decommission price is introduced, i.e., when a 
fisherman computes the money it would receive for each ton of vessel decommissioned 
in contrast with its expected profits and decides leaving or continuing the activity. The 
second is changing the number of days allowed to fish in the studied fishery. In its 
current version, it simulates the effect of permitting fishing the 365 days of the year. 
This scenario will help us answering the hypothesis that states that if completely 
liberalizing the number of fishing days (effort) would direct the recovery of the 
populations and a correct exploitation of the resource as the less competitive vessels can 
not afford such an increase of costs to fish every day. The solution of non cooperative 
systems is performed with the discrete equation of Schaefers model (eq.1.6 and eq.1.7). 
2) Solutions under Cooperation.
 The two solution concepts explained for cooperation behaviour in chapter II are 
used here: Global maximization (optimization) and Nashs bargaining solution (NASH
1950). Cooperation behaviour means maximizing the total net present value from the 
fishery in a ten years time interval. Optimization solution is the set of effort strategies 
(E+) that allows obtaining the maximum outcome from the activity even if some agents 
(vessels) are not allowed to fish (eq.2.51). The second solution (NASH 1950) is used to 
simulate the optimization of the net present value of the exploitation after some 
bargaining between the fishermen. The result of that bargaining in the reviewed 
literature is related to the distribution of the expected profits between the agents, but in 
the present work it is associated to some condition that the net present value is 
maximized, i.e., with the constraint that all the fishermen apply the same effort strategy 
Eº (eq.2.52). 
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The five solution concepts presented are the output of the Decision Box and 
jointly with the vessels dynamic catchability coefficients form the fishing mortality 
applied to the target populations. It will determine the populations dynamics and 
landings that later on are transformed into revenues and net profits. As a result, the 
consequences of the conditions to decide an effort strategy are investigated with the 
GAMEFISTO model. 
The time scale 
The complete process of the simulation is separated in two steps. First, decision 
making is performed for a ten year expectative and it is calculated once for each 
scenario. Once the effort sets are defined, the bioeconomic loop is completed in a year 
time step. The output variables, both biological and economic are displayed in a yearly 
scale.  
The initial conditions and data requirements 
The model input is related to population and different level economic 
characteristics. It will be exhaustively explained for the case study in chapter V. 
 Uncertainty 
The stochastic simulation seeks to analyze the effects of uncertainty of one or 
several parameters (LLEONART et al. 1999; LLEONART et al. 2003). The GAMEFISTO 
model assumes uncertainty on two processes, population dynamics and decision 
making.  
 The uncertainty on the surplus production models has widely been studied 
(HADDON 2001; POLACHECK et al. 1993). The uncertainty observed on biomass models 
parameter estimation is focused on two aspects: a process error related to the population 
model and an observation error derived from the uncertainty of the available data that 
most of the times represents the main source of error in fishery science (HILBORN and 
WALTERS 1992). The process error is considered with a lognormal error structure at the 
moment of calculating catches, while the observation uncertainty is tackled with a 
normal distribution of observed error in the same catch equation (eq.4.9). The first is 
multiplicative, i.e., a lognormal random variable is multiplied by the calculated catch 
value to avoid negative values. The parameter m1 is the median slope relating predicted 
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to observed catch, and n1, is the standard deviation of the slopes. Both parameters can 
be calculated by means of their corresponding maximum likelihood estimators. The 
observation error is considered additive and normally distributed, with a mean error (1) 
and a standard deviation ( 1σ ). A random normal distributed value is added to the 
calculated value. The mean and the variance of both errors are calculated by the user 
after the parameter estimation process as it will be done for the case study. 
 ),()ln,(ln 1111 σλNnmLCCsim +⋅=                                     {eq.4.9} 
 The uncertainty on the decision making simulates the non controllable processes 
for the application of effort, i.e., environmental conditions that make impossible the 
activity or another exogenous variable that is not described by the model. Each value of 
temporal effort at vessel level is calculated assigning a lognormal multiplicative error 
and a normally distributed additive error (eq.4.10). The parameter m2 is the median 
slope relating predicted to observed effort, and n2 its standard deviation. The 
observation error again is considered additive and normally distributed, with a mean 
error (2) and a standard deviation ( 2σ ). These two errors are calculated after validating 
the first non cooperation solution with the observed effort trends (see chapter V).
 ),()ln,(ln 2222 σλNnmLEEsim +⋅=                                   {eq.4.10} 
 The simulation presented is performed attending to this uncertainty with a pool 
of iterations that are aggregated in mean and 5 and 95 % quantile iterations. 

Chapter V 
Case study 
GAMEFISTO in Blanes 
Photo: Sardá 
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V. CASE STUDY. GAMEFISTO IN BLANES 
Introduction 
 The first part of the present chapter is dedicated to the validation of the 
methodology investigated in chapters II and III and to some discussion on the general 
hypothesis related to them proposed in the introduction. For the validation of game 
theory as a valid tool to predict effort dynamics, a Mediterranean fishery is described as 
a non cooperative game where each fisherman strives to maximize its own profits which 
are formulated with a bioeconomic fisheries model and the solution concept of Nash 
equilibrium (NASH 1951). Nash equilibrium solution of such a system is compared to 
the observed individual vessels fishing effort.  
 For the validation of some modern techniques on parameter estimation of 
Mediterranean exploited populations that are not usually well reported and that are 
analyzed through very small data series and low previous knowledge, the observed and 
the estimated landings during the period from 1997 to 2004 will be compared with 
several methods. As it will be discussed, genetic algorithms appear to be a powerful tool 
to tackle the limitations of Mediterranean data series.  
 The second part of the present chapter is a complete simulation of realistic and 
some theoretical scenarios of the fishery analyzed for 10 years, from 2004 to 2014. The 
output variables and the discussion on the case study and on the simulation model will 
be related to economic and biological indicators and they will be adequately explained. 
The simulation is performed with the presented GAMEFISTO model that incorporates 
the previously validated methodology and that will be used for the analysis of the 
consequences of some proposed management actions. 
The theoretical methodology and the technical tools presented need to be confronted 
to reality. For such a purpose the analysis proposed in the present chapter is divided 
in two main parts: Validation of the proposed methodology and its implementation in 
the GAMEFISTO simulation model using data series from 1997 to 2004 and on the 
other side, a complete simulation exercise from 2004 to 2014 under different 
scenarios. 
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Justification of the use of the described methodology 
1) Mediterranean management scheme
 The Blanes harbour in the Northwestern Mediterranean is regulated through an 
input management scheme, common to Mediterranean fisheries (EU 2000) that allows 
fishermen to decide a fishing strategy based on two main aspects: First, fishermen can 
improve their vessels with a limit on their engine power and second, fishermen are 
allowed to fish twelve hours per day and five days per week except festivities. The 
decision of a fisherman thus, is related to invest on technical improvements and to 
decide an effort strategy, understood as the decision of practicing a given fishery or not. 
The first possibility is assumed to result in a constant increase of the catchability 
coefficient of each vessel explained in chapter I and the second decision is proposed to 
follow a game theoretic non cooperation scheme (chapter II).  
2) Vessel level analysis
 The need of vessel level analysis in Mediterranean fisheries was explained by 
Lleonart et al. (2003), and this need suggests fishermen to be the players (the decision 
agents) in a game theoretic analysis. 
 Similarly to what happens in most of the Mediterranean fisheries, the trawling 
fleet in Blanes port presents some vessel heterogeneity where modern and powerful 
vessels share their activity with smaller and older vessels. This heterogeneity makes in 
principle this fishery an adequate case study for the use of game theoretic analysis. As it 
was explained in chapter II, different strategies arise due to the differences in vessels 
technical characteristics and costs and to the fact that fishermen share the exploitation of 
a population (red shrimp, Aristeus antennatus) and a local market; stock and market 
externalities are thus the quid of the proposed analysis.  
3) Stock and market externalities
The Blanes trawling fleet shares a red shrimp stock and the local market. A 
single fisherman perceives that what one user appropriates is unavailable for other 
users (OAKERSON 1992), and moreover, the price of the product landed will vary as a 
function of the landings of other users. As a consequence, the stock and market 
externalities need to be described in the analysis (see chapter I).  
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Description of the case study 
 Located in northern Catalonia (see Figure V.1), on the north-western 
Mediterranean, Blanes harbour was in 2004 the sixth port in term of revenue of 
Catalonia. The main target species of the local trawling fleet is the red shrimp (Aristeus 
antennatus, Risso, 1816) that represents almost the 50 % of its total income. The red 
shrimp (Figure V.2) is one of the most important resources for the bottom trawl fleets in 
the Northwestern Mediterranean, both in terms of catch and economic value (SARDÁ et 
al. 2004). Recent studies on population dynamics and assessments of Spanish 
Mediterranean stocks of A. antennatus  showed that this species is slightly 
overexploited. The data series of catches at the Blanes port report landings around 60 
tonnes annually from 1997 to 2004.  
 The bottom-trawl fleet of Blanes is 
composed by twelve vessels that operate near 
the Blanes submarine canyon from 400 to 800 
m depths (BAS et al. 2003; DEMESTRE and 
LLEONART 1993; DEMESTRE and MARTIN
1993; SARDÁ 1993; SARDÁ et al. 2003) 
targeting red shrimp and some accessory 
species.  Figure V.2. Aristeus antennatus
Figure V.1. Map locating Blanes port in the Mediterranean. (source: ArcGIS (ESRI 2004), Google Earth 
http://earth.google.es and Toni Cruz). 
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The accessory species caught jointly with the red shrimp (see Figure V.3) are 
mainly composed by Norway lobster (Nephrops norvegicus), blue whiting 
(Micromesistius poutassou), hake (Merluccius merluccius), squid (Loligo vulgaris), 
greater forkbeard (Phycis blennoides) and angler (Lophius piscatorius), that represent 
almost 36 % of the total revenues of the trawling fleet, and some other species.  
 The vessels operate with crews of four or five people, in addition to the owner 
who usually is also the skipper and who makes any decision in terms of fishing 
strategies.  
Figure V.3. The crew of Marroi classifying the multispecific 
landings. 
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VALIDATION OF THE PRESENTED METHODOLOGY 
The data series 
The statistical analysis is performed based on the daily landings and sales time 
series of the Blanes fishermen association aggregated in a yearly scale for the estimation 
of the biological parameters, for the relation between the target and the secondary 
species and for the vessels characterization, that as it was explained in chapter III, is 
based on individual vessels catch per unit of effort data. Price dynamics parameters 
were also estimated from these data series. 
 On the other side, vessel level economic data were obtained from the COCTEL 
project (SARDÁ 2000) and were used to calculate the cost of unit of effort and fixed 
costs for every vessel.  
 The remaining macroeconomic parameters such as fuel price or the 
commercialization taxes were obtained from the Catalan Government web page 
(www.gencat.es). 
A. Parameter estimation 
Based on yearly total catch and effort data, the techniques explained in chapter 
III were used for the estimation of biological parameters, first with a constant 
catchability coefficient and later on with some constant increase of catchability. 
Biomass dynamic parameters 
The population dynamics of the red shrimp are described with Schaefers model 
explained in chapter I. This model requires four parameters when a constant catchability 
coefficient is used and five when catchability is considered to evolve with time. The 
methodologies investigated for the parameter estimation are explained in chapter III and 
the results obtained for the case study and some discussion about the utility of the ones 
that provided us with better estimates are commented here. 
 The biomass dynamic parameters are the intrinsic growth coefficient r, the 
carrying capacity K, the average catchability coefficient of the fleet q, the annual 
catchability increase q, and the initial biomass at the first year of the data series, B0.  
 The methods tested for the estimation of the biomass dynamic parameters that 
are highlighted here were five: Linear regression, ASPIC software by Prager (2005), 
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two applications with the genetic algorithm gafortran (CARROLL 2001) and a 
Bayesian approach with the WinBUGS 1.4 software (SPIEGELHALTER et al. 2003). 
 The linear regression method by Schnute (1977), the Bayesian approach and the 
ASPIC software assume a constant catchability coefficient. The gafortran genetic 
algorithm was used in two manners. First, based on empirical catchability increases on 
the literature (LINDEBO 1999; VIGNAUX 1996), the best fit was selected for an annual 
catchability increase of 3 %. After selecting the most appropriate annual increase, the 
other four parameters were estimated. Second, the genetic algorithm was used for the 
estimation of the five parameters that allowed the best fit observed but that was rejected 
due to realistic considerations argued later. The parameters obtained with the four 
methods are shown in Table V.1. The fits obtained with each method are shown in 
Figure V.4. The fits obtained are compared with their average percentage of error as it is 
observed in Table V.2. The fits are shown in Figure V.4. 
method r(year-1) K (kg) B0 (kg) q (10-4)day-1 q (%) 
Linear regression 1.7572 146437.7 41257.22 8.148 0 
ASPIC 1.4180 270600.0 51481.65 8.147 0 
gafortran 3% 0.9626 327700.0 75200.00 4.805 3 
gafortran non restricted 0.6202 267300.0 184360.00 1.776 20 
WinBUGS 0.8721 467000.0 94987.80 4.335 0 
Method Av. % of error 
Linear regression 10.812 
ASPIC 10.536 
gafortran 3% 9.916 
gafortran non restricted 8.559 
WinBUGS 26.400 
Table V.2. Average percentage of error of the four methods tested. 
Table V.1. The five parameters of Schaefers model with the tested methods
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 The set of parameters that allows a better fit (lowest average percentage of error) 
with the adjusted data series is the unrestricted gafortran genetic algorithm. However, 
the catchability coefficient increase that allows this fit (20%) is absolutely unrealistic 
according to the observed evolution of the fishing fleet and the values reported in the 
literature. As a consequence, the set of parameters selected for the simulation analysis 
and for the effort dynamics calculations was the obtained with the gafortran with a 
realistic annual catchability increase of 3%. The method has been found very powerful 
both due to the fit obtained and to the very low previous information requirements for 
its use. The use of ASPIC software that in this case was successfully applied only after 
the results of the linear regression provided with some approximated values of the 
parameters used as prior information. As it will be conveniently argued in the 
discussion, one of the Mediterranean fisheries problems is the lack of previous 
knowledge about many exploited species which makes it difficult to provide any 
method that needs approximated values for the parameters. 
 The validation of gafortran as valid tool for Mediterranean population 
parameter estimation is finished with the Pearsons correlation between the observed 
and the predicted landings that is shown in Figure V.5 and with some statistical 
parameters in Table V.3. 
Figure V.4. Fits obtained with the methods tested and the 
observed landings.
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Av. % error slope 2 St. error R2 cor p() 10-8 
9.916 1.0131 6209.147 0.04204 0.9864 0.87 5.387 
 The linear regression relating the predicted and the observed values is actually 
the model to simulate landings in the GAMEFISTO model. It was chosen to cross the 
point (0,0) to avoid some undesirable result as positive catches (intercept) when a 
fisherman is not fishing. The predicted values are projected into the linear regression 
and some uncertainty, based on the standard error and the statistical parameters of the 
regression, is added for simulation procedures. 
Table V.3. Statistical parameters to validate the genetic algorithms as a powerful method for Schaefers 
model parameter estimation. 
Figure V.5. Estimated and observed catch. The slope of the linear regression is 1.0131. 
The statistical parameters are shown in Table V.3. 
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As a conclusion, we can state that the genetic algorithm gafortran (CARROLL 2001)
is a useful tool for parameter estimation of Mediterranean fisheries. 
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 Vessels characterization 
Following the methodology explained in chapter III and starting from the 
average catchability coefficient of the fleet and the individual data of catch per unit of 
effort, the total fleet is characterized (equations 3.6 to 3.9). Vessels technical 
characteristics such as catchability coefficient (q), gross tonnage (gt), daily (c2) and 
fixed costs are also shown in Table V.4. 
vessel q (10-4) day-1 c2(/day) fixed (/year) gt (tons) 
Bahia de Blanes 0.97 211 51860 54.40 
Blanda II 5.53 565 75080 106.90 
Blanda III 5.13 374 66815 99.18 
Es Niell 6.78 384 75080 143.74 
Mariner 2.38 324 50335 93.08 
Marroi 7.39 511 69487 126.79 
Montse III 4.37 385 75080 143.74 
Nova Rosa Mari 5.88 276 50900 24.00 
Nuria 2.03 115 67571 21.24 
Peret 7.65 493 51137 145.37 
Punta Santa Ana 2.39 286 64719 76.05 
Verge del Vilar 7.16 433 75080 97.58 
Table V.4. Each vessels technical charcteristics.
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 Price dynamics 
The price dynamics is expressed in terms of a supply-demand function (eq.5.3), 
where some effects, such as the size of the product or the effect of imports are ignored. 
The only factor to determine the price of the red shrimp is its landings at the local port. 
As it will be conveniently discussed, this assumption is not as realistic as it should be. 
The observed price of the red shrimp was related to the landings in a yearly scale so that 
the price dynamics parameters were obtained. The shadow value () and the price 
elasticity () for a power price dynamic model (see chapter I) for the red shrimp are 
shown in Table V.5. 
Species  Shadow price ()  Elasticity 
Red shrimp 2973.8 -0.4198 
Secondary species 
The landings of red shrimp were associated to the landings of secondary species 
with the equations presented in chapter IV and that need to be parameterised (eq.1.27). 
It is renamed for the case study as eq.5.4. The secondary species parameters are  and 
that are respectively, the landings units caught when no target species is fished and the 
number of weight units caught per target species unit caught by a vessel. The secondary 
species equations are related to each target species, in this case only red shrimp and to 
the whole fleet. The data series of Blanes was also used to the estimation of the 
averaged price of a secondary species landings unit, ps. The parameters related to 
secondary species are shown in Table V.6. The species defined as varis in the 
simulation (chapter IV) are ignored in the present case study. 
ps (s/kg)  (kg of sel)  (kg of sec/kg of target) 
5.091 24732.0 2.9632 
Table V.5. Power price dynamics models parameters for the red shrimp. 
Table V.6. Secondary species equations parameters.
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B. Effort dynamics 
The main novelty presented in this work and included in the GAMEFISTO 
simulation model as the Decision Box (chapter IV) is related to a game theoretic 
approach for the simulation of effort dynamics at vessel level. The next paragraphs are 
dedicated to the validation of this technique with the case study of Blanes trawling fleet.  
The decision model 
The introductory concepts related to a game theoretic approach have been 
extensively explained in chapter II. As a consequence, the model described here is 
nothing but the application of those concepts in a case study.  
 The individual effort trends observed are compared with the effort sets resulting 
from the next models application. The bioeconomic model is the same used for the 
GAMEFISTO projections but only the decision scheme is validated here. 
 In the Blanes trawl fleet fishery, a single stock (red shrimp) is exploited by 
twelve vessels that are characterized by their catchability coefficient, calculated earlier 
following the method explained in chapter III and by their variable and fixed costs. The 
stock is modelled with the Schaefers model (1954, 1957), where the parameters, 
variables and solution concepts have been explained in chapter I.  
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 The solution of this equation at annual scale is performed with the difference 
equation shown in chapter I (eq.1.6) for all the vessels that are supposed to fish at the 
same time. Every time unit (year) is divided in 10000 steps in order to avoid 
discretization errors as it was explained in chapter I. Finally: 
ttvtv BFC ,, =                                                  {eq.5.2} 
 where, Fv,t is the fishing mortality applied by each fisherman at time t, and Ft is 
the total fishing mortality suffered by the population at time t. Note that ∑=
=
=
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1
,
v
v
tvt FF .  
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 The economic submodel starts when individual landings become individual 
revenues through some price dynamics depending on total landings. The price dynamics 
used here is the power model (eq.5.3) with the parameters shown in Table V.5.  
ωλ ttt CCp ⋅=)(                     {eq.5.3} 
 The price of the product at time t, depends on the shadow price () and the 
elasticity parameter (). 
 The GAMEFISTO model is multispecific and as a consequence, it allows 
modelling the dynamics of more than one species s. However, in this case, as it will be 
conveniently discussed, the most reliable results were obtained with an algorithm for a 
single species joint with some secondary species associated to it. Apart from the 
revenues coming from the commercialization of the target species s, fishermen perceive 
some revenues from secondary species associated to target populations and some 
revenues not directly related to any target species but to some revenues associated to a 
fishing effort unit, equations 1.27, 1.28.a and 1.29, renamed here as 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6. 
tvssstvs CC ,,,,sec ⋅+= υμ                 {eq.5.4} 
tvsstvs CpsY ,,,, secsec ⋅=                {eq.5.5} 
tvvtv EVarisYVaris ,, ⋅=                {eq.5.6} 
 The revenues obtained by each vessel at time t are thus: 
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 The economic balance made by each fisherman turns the revenues into profits 
after the cost structure explained in chapter IV (Equations 4.5 to 4.8).  
 The total profits after the costs structure shown in chapter IV are: 
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vtvtvtvtvtv CCCCY 4321 ,,,,, −−−−=π              {eq.5.8} 
 The stock and market externalities are reflected in equations 5.2 and 5.3 and 
these equations let us consider the red shrimp fishery in Blanes as a fishery with 12 
asymmetric vessels sharing the same stock and the same local market. Each of these 
vessels will strive to maximize its profits in a medium time interval, what is called the 
Net Present Value (NPV), that in our case are the discounted profits in a ten year time 
horizon. The discount rate is 4%, i.e. =0.04. 
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 These previous considerations are reflected on the next formulation, called Nash 
equilibrium and that has been conveniently explained in chapter II. Some constraints are 
introduced, such as that effort is supposed to be constant in the studied period and the 
existence of minimum and maximum effort levels. Finding a Nash equilibrium means 
finding a set of effort strategies ),...,...( ***1 Ni EEE that satisfies: 
⎪⎪
⎪
⎭
⎪⎪
⎪
⎬
⎫
⎪⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪⎪
⎪
⎨
⎧
≥
≥
≥
),...,...(),...,...(
...................................................................
),...,...(),...,...(
....................................................................
),...,...(),...,...(
**
1
***
1
**
1
***
1
**
11
***
11
NvNNvN
NvvNvv
NvNv
EEENPVEEENPV
EEENPVEEENPV
EEENPVEEENPV
           {eq.5.10} 
 The numeric solution of such a system with some constraints of minimum and 
maximum effort levels (0 and 240 days, permitted by the authorities) and the condition 
that effort is measured by integer numbers do not allow us to analytically assure that 
Nash equilibrium solution exists nor that it is unique. 
 Nashs non cooperative solutions were obtained with a successive approximation 
method to iteratively approximate solutions for the twelve equilibrium equations. 
 The numeric results obtained were unique for the different algorithms to solve it. 
As a consequence the robustness of the solution is validated. The numeric results 
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obtained with this methodology are assumed to be a valid tool to predict the effort level 
applied by each fisherman. As a consequence, the methodology is validated comparing 
the effort solutions from the formulated Nash equilibrium and the observed average 
effort applied by each fisherman during the period between 1997 and 2004. The relation 
between the estimated and observed relative effort strategies can be observed in Figure 
V.6. Note that the linear regression between the predicted and observed relative effort 
values is forced to start at point (0,0). The intention of this is to simulate null effort 
values when the non cooperative decision submodel produces null values. As a 
consequence three main conceptual effort strategies can be observed: Vessels that leave 
the activity (effort=0); those that find an average effort strategy and those vessels that 
will fish intensively. 
 Some statistical parameters between the observed and the estimated relative 
effort values to support this validation are shown in Table V.7. 
linear reg. slope St. error R2 cor p() 
Eest vs Eobs 0.662 0.1120 0.739 0.56 0.000101 
Table V.7. Statistics to support that estimated Nash equilibrium describes the selected case studies 
effort dynamics. 
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 The linear regression presented is the model that is used for simulation purposes 
later on. It is a linear regression that crosses the point (0,0) to allow the model to 
simulate vessels that leave the activity. On the other hand, the uncertainty added to the 
predictions of effort for the projections into the future may lead to simulate negative 
values of effort. In that case, the computational algorithm recalculates any negative 
value of effort. As a consequence, the observed linear model crossing the point (0,0) 
will be slightly modified to generate positive but presumably low values of effort to 
those vessels initially predicted to choose a null effort strategy in the decision submodel. 
It is the best solution to allow the null effort strategy to be modelled and when it 
happened, to assign some probability to a low level effort instead of the withdrawal that 
in our case study it is not observed. The vessels predicted to fish a low number of days 
are currently exploiting another species. 
 The R2 parameter estimation has been observed to be controversial for the 
regressions crossing the point (0,0) (CADE and TERRELL 1997). The method used to 
calculate it is based on the algorithm used by the R statistical computing software (R-
PROJECT.ORG 2006), as well as the significance parameter. The correlation between 
Nash equilibrium and observed effort levels presented is Pearsons coefficient.   
The values obtained for the R2 and for the correlation coefficient, jointly with 
the rest of statistical parameters, indicate that the process of choosing an effort 
strategy by a fisherman can be described considering Mediterranean fishermen as 
Non Cooperative players sharing some resource and market. This allowed us to 
validate this methodology for the effort dynamics used for simulation purposes in the 
GAMEFISTO simulation model. 
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SIMULATION WITH THE GAMEFISTO MODEL 
A. Initialization 
Some changes on the fleet in 2004. 
 For the simulation to be constructed in the time interval from 2004 to 2014 some 
changes in state variables such as the incorporation of new vessels to the fishery or 
changes on fuel price need to be accounted for a correct projection of the biological and 
economic variables into the future.  
 The new available data are related to the economic parameters of two vessels 
introduced recently. The owners of the Peret and Montse III , decommissioned them 
and constructed the new vessels Peret II and Marroi II. The catchability coefficients do 
not need to be estimated again knowing that average catchability increased constantly 
since 1997, i.e., Peret II enters the fishery with catchability of Peret increased annually 
in a 3 % rate. The same occurs with the catchability of Marroi II and Montse III. The 
economic data for these vessels were obtained directly from personal communication 
with the Blanes Fishermen Associations president. The two vessels were operative 
since 2005 but are included in the simulation as they were in 2004. 
 Another significant parameter that changed the last years is the increase of fuel 
price that in 2005 brought some controversy to Mediterranean fisheries that was well 
reported by daily press (El País, 24-X-2005). The fuel price has been almost duplicated 
and increased the daily costs of fishing of each vessel in 170 %. The fishing sector 
affirms that the activity is becoming non profitable and the GAMEFISTO simulation 
model is used to support or reject these claim. Moreover, a scenario will be tested to 
hypothesize about the future perspective of the activity if subsidies would be removed. 
Currently, fuel is subsidized amounting to 50 % of the price for the fishermen. This 
removal of subsidies may turn in an increase of daily costs of 150 %.  
 The validation of effort dynamics was done considering a Mediterranean fishery 
as a non cooperatively exploited resource shared by N fishermen. Some scenarios were 
also performed to test some changes on the Mediterranean regimes that may increase 
the profitability of the activity. These scenarios will be adequately explained later.  
Chapter V               Case study: GAMEFISTO in Blanes
139 
New vessels 
The economic data of the new vessels incorporated to the fishery were provided 
by Mr. Eusebi Esgleas, president of the Fishermen Association of Blanes. The two new 
vessels catchability coefficients do not need to be calculated again, because the annual 
increase in catchability is supposed to include the technical improvements that take 
place in the moment of incorporating a new vessel in a continuous manner. The data 
needed are related to its gross tonnage (gt) and its costs of fishing. Its fixed costs are 
supposed to keep constant. The variable costs were found to be the same, probably due 
to their similar engine power, as suggested by personal communication by Mr. Eusebi 
Esgleas. 
 The tonnage and daily costs of the new two vessels are shown in Table V.8. 
 gt (tonnes) Variable cost (/day) 
Marroi II 138.5 950 
Peret II 169.3 950 
The increase of fuel price and its effects on the daily costs 
As has been previously explained, one of the main differences with the 1997 
fishery is the increase of fuel price due to external macroeconomic factors. The increase 
of fuel price has approximately increased the costs of fishing of a vessel in 170 % and 
has become a very important factor at the time of designing an effort strategy. The stock 
in 2004 is at lower levels and the increase of costs may induce some fishermen to leave 
the activity. From a mathematical point of view, Nash equilibrium should be reached to 
be a null effort level for some vessels, which may not necessarily be a negative 
consequence for the regulation of the fishery. It may be hypothesized that as the 
profitability of some vessels decreases, they may leave the activity and the stocks may 
recover and increase the economic balance of the remaining vessels.  
 This hypothesis is also tested for the case that costs increase even more in the 
absence of subsidies, with some economic motivation to dismiss a vessel or with some 
change in the management regimes that may permit fishing the 365 days of the year.  
Table V.8. Two new vessels technical characteristics.
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The biological parameters 
The catch and effort projections with the selected parameters in the previous 
section are used to estimate the stock level for 2004. The intrinsic growth rate r and the 
carrying capacity K are considered to be constant and the catchability coefficients of the 
vessels are described by the temporal dynamics started from their values in 1997 (Table 
V.9). 
r (year-1) K (kg) q2004 10-4 (day-1) q (%) B2004 (kg) 
0.9626 327700.0 5.909 3 47846.2 
Scenarios 
 The evolution of the fishery with the current conditions is not the only 
possibility with the GAMEFISTO simulation model. Actually, ten different scenarios 
will be tested. The most realistic non cooperation effort solution concept was searched 
not only for the current economic scenario but for two hypothetical ones. The first is 
finding a Nash equilibrium solution and its effects on the economic and biologic 
parameters for the case that there exists some motivation for the decommission of 
vessels, i.e., some money related to each ton dismissed that may induce a fisherman to 
invest in another activity (in our case, it was 7,000  for ton). The second non 
cooperation solution is less realistic and it is related to decreasing the control on effort. 
Operationally, is nothing but finding a less constrained Nash equilibrium permitting 
fishermen fish 365 days per year.  
 Apart from the non cooperation solution concepts, the effects of cooperation and 
completely centralized decision scheme are also tested to compare the potential 
profitability of the fishery with the current one. The first solution is Nashs bargaining 
solution concept (NASH 1950) explained in chapter II, where the bargain is related to the 
fact that the fisheries profits will be maximized (NPVT) with the condition that every 
fisherman will apply the same effort level (Equation 5.11). The other is maximizing the 
total profits (NPVT) from the activity even if some vessels activity may be forbidden 
(Equation 5.12).  
Table V.9. Biologic parameters for the simulation from 2004 to 2014. 
Chapter V               Case study: GAMEFISTO in Blanes
141 
 These five scenarios were tested for the actual fuel price and for the hypothetical 
daily costs when no subsidies were allowed.  
 A summary of the scenarios is provided in Table V.10. 
1.a. Current regime simulation.  
Non Cooperation in a subsidized system. 
1.b. Non Cooperation in a non subsidized 
system. 
2.a. Non Cooperation in a subsidized system 
with decommission price. 
2.b. Non Cooperation in a non subsidized 
system with decommission price. 
3.a. Non Cooperation in a subsidized system 
with effort constraint of 365 days.  
3.b. Non Cooperation in a non subsidized 
system with effort constraint of 365  days. 
4.a. Cooperation in a subsidized system. 4.b. Cooperation in a non subsidized system. 
5.a. Optimization of the actually subsidized 
system. 
5.b. Optimization of a non subsidized system. 
The mathematical systems to solve are three with some variants. The non 
cooperation solution concepts of Nash equilibrium are three sets of efforts 
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 With the effort constraints of Emax=240 for the scenarios 1.a, 1.b, 2.a, 2.b, and 
with Emax=365 for the scenarios 3.a and 3.b. 
Table V.10. List of the scenarios performed with the GAMEFISTO model for the period 2004 to 2014. 
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 The bargaining cooperation effort solution concept is an effort set 
),...,...( ººº1 Nv EEE that satisfies (4.a and 4.b): 
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 with the constraint that ºº ji EE =
 And the completely centralized agent solution concept is the effort set 
),...,...( 1
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 As it is straightforward, the ten scenarios will have ten different effort solution 
concepts and its biologic and economic variables projections will be shown, compared 
and discussed.  
 Nashs bargaining cooperation and optimization solutions were obtained with 
the genetic algorithm pikaia (Charbonneau, 2002) for global maximization. Nashs 
non cooperative solutions were obtained with a successive approximation method to 
iteratively approximate solutions for the twelve equilibrium equations and the discrete 
solution of Schaefers model which was demonstrated to lead to almost identical results 
as the more complex Pellas solution (see chapter I).  
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The uncertainty 
Two sources of uncertainty are considered: Uncertainty on the parameter 
estimation and uncertainty on effort prediction. Both are tackled with some stochastic 
variables on the calculations. For the first, catch equations generated simulations were 
performed adding noise to the predicted catch at vessel level using a normal (N) and a 
lognormal (L) distribution of error. The first is supposed to be additive and as a 
consequence is added to the estimated catch and the second is supposed to be 
multiplicative and multiplies the model predicted catch. It is important to remark that in 
our analysis, the process error is considered constant, i.e., the model predicted catch 
value is multiplied by logarithm of the slope of the linear regression between observed 
and estimated landings and a normal error is added. As a consequence, n1 is 1. 
 ),()ln,(ln 1111 σλNnmLCCsim +⋅=                             {eq.5.13} 
 where m1 is the slope of the linear regression that relates estimated to observed 
landings (Fig V.5),  is the mean error observed and  is the standard deviation (Table 
V.11) obtained after the mentioned regression.    
 The uncertainty on effort prediction may be related to several factors, such as the 
impossibility of modelling all the factors in fishermens decisions, the environmental 
factors that may make temporarily impossible the activity and other external factors. 
The uncertainty is tackled similarly to the case of catch equation. Again, the process 
error is considered constant, i.e., the model predicted effort values are multiplied by 
logarithm of the slope of the linear regression between observed and estimated effort 
levels and a normal error is added. As a consequence, n2 is 1. 
  ),()ln,(ln 2222 σλNnmLEEsim +⋅=                       {eq.5.14} 
 It is important to remark that uncertainty is given to effort dynamics when the 
objective is to simulate fishermens decision under the three assumptions of non 
cooperation. The cooperation and optimization scenarios (Scenarios 4.a, 5.a, 4.b and 
5.b) are simulated with a symbolic uncertainty related to the impossibility of assuring 
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that fishermen will fish the indicated number of days. Uncertainty on effort in the cited 
scenarios was approached with an additive variability of 5 % of the days imposed, 
which is considered to be caused by implementation uncertainty (HAUGE 2002). The 
major part of the uncertainty in these scenarios is related to catch equations.  
 The calculations of the two variables are made for several iterations and 
simulation results are provided in terms of mean and 5 and 95 % probabilities.  
 The parameters for the calculations were extracted from the validations and are 
shown in Table V.11: 
m1 n1 1 1 m2 n1 2 2 
1.03131 1 -605.6562 6209.147 0.6622 1 15.24 35.05 
Table V.11. Statistical parameters to simulate uncertainty in effort dynamics and catch equations. 
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B. Simulation output and results 
 The results of the simulations performed with the GAMEFISTO simulation 
model for the presented case study start with a description of the vessels in terms of 
economic efficiency parameter () and technical efficiency (catchability, q). Table V.12 
shows its absolute and relative values in 2004 that will be determinant for the discussion 
of the individual level behaviour for the different scenarios. As it will be adequately 
discussed, these parameters will determine the Decision box that will direct the 
evolution of the biological and economic indicators of the analyzed fishery.  
 The Decision box was simulated with Fortran 7.0 with a method to iteratively 
approximate solutions for the non cooperative solutions and the pikaia genetic 
algorithm (CHARBONNEAU 2002) for the bargaining cooperation and optimization 
solutions.  
 The projection into the future of the bioeconomic variables for the different 
scenarios was programmed with the R language from the R Foundation for Statistical 
Computing (R-PROJECT.ORG 2006).  
 The most illustrative results will be commented in order to validate or reject 
some hypothesis about the adequacy of the management actions tested.  
 In chapter VI, some discussion about the future outcome of the Blanes red 
shrimp fishery under difference scenarios will be presented jointly with a general 
discussion about the usefulness of the methodologies investigated and the 
GAMEFISTO model.  
 It is important to remark that the annual average sum of the individual vessels 
effort from 1997 to 2004 was 1597 days. 
Vessels competitiveness 
 The first result obtained is the term that defines the fishing mortality generated 
by an investment unit (efficiency parameter). It is calculated dividing the mortality 
generated by an effort unit (catchability) by the costs of a unit of effort (c2v) for each 
vessel in the year 2004. Vessels are described by means of their economic efficiency and 
catchability parameters.     
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vessel =(q/c2)10-7 Relative  Catchability (q)10-4 Relative q 
Bahia de Blanes 0.3335 0.2164 1.1957 0.1270 
Blanda II 0.7085 0.4597 6.8052 0.7230 
Blanda III 0.9918 0.6435 6.3094 0.6703 
Es Niell 1.2750 0.8273 8.3354 0.8856 
Mariner 0.5301 0.3439 2.9222 0.3105 
Marroi 1.0468 0.6792 9.0866 0.9654 
Marroi II 0.5652 0.3667 5.3689 0.5704 
Nova Rosa Mari 1.5412 1.000 7.2289 0.7680 
Nuria 1.2775 0.8289 2.4977 0.2354 
Peret II 0.9908 0.6429 9.4126 1 
Punta Santa Ana 0.6054 0.3928 2.9460 0.3130 
Verge del Vilar 1.1955 0.7757 8.8060 0.9356 
Table V.12. Vessels catchability and economic efficiency parameter absolute and relative values in 2004. 
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Figure V. 8. Relative economic efficiency and catchability parameters for each vessel.
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Projections into the future 
 The scenarios presented in Table V.10 provided ten projections for several 
bioeconomic indicators based on 1000 iterations. The large amount of results production 
led us to decide a uniform scheme of results for every scenario and to consider three 
levels of analysis. First, the individual decision of effort strategy and the total efforts are 
provided in a table. Second, biomass, catch, fishing mortality and total profits trends are 
displayed for all the scenarios. Third, for the scenarios that are considered useful for the 
ongoing discussion, vessels profits and price trends are also shown.  
Scenario 1.a. Non cooperation in a subsidized system 
 This scenario is considered to simulate the expected outcome of the Blanes red 
shrimp fishery if no management action is taken. The individual effort estimated with 
Nash equilibrium solution showed that five vessels should tend to leave the activity as 
their costs of fishing exceed their expected profits. Two vessels should tend to fish the 
most intensively (note that these two vessels are the ones with the highest economic 
efficiency parameter, Table V.12). 
Vessel Effort (days fishing)
Bahia de Blanes 0 
Blanda II 0 
Blanda III 155 
Es Niell 196 
Mariner 0 
Marroi 124 
Marroi II 0 
Nova Rosa Mari 240 
Nuria 240 
Peret II 103 
Punta Santa Ana 0 
Verge del Vilar 168 
Total Effort 1226 
Table V.13. Yearly vessels and total effort (days fishing) for scenario 1.a. 
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 The first result to be highlighted is the effort reduction expected due to the 
decision of five of the vessels to withdraw from the fishery. As a consequence, a 
reduction of fishing mortality and a slight recovery of the red shrimp population is 
expected as it is shown in Output 1.a. 
 The slight recovery of the population should bring a slight increase of catch in 
the middle term. The recovery of the population is stopped as the catchability increase 
replaces the effect of effort reduction and in the middle and long terms no recovery is 
appreciated. The profitability of the activity is shown to be decreasing constantly in 
spite of the effort reduction. The discount rate that penalizes the future profits also tends 
to reduce the expected slight increase in fisheries profitability. 
Scenario 1.a
Year
0
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0
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0
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0
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0
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5
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-0
.5
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0
0.
5
1.
0
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
discounted profits (M euros)
Output 1.a. Bioeconomics of scenario 1.a. 
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 The vessels in this scenario are: 
 As it is easily observed, looking to the vessels that should remain active, Nova 
Rosa Mari, the vessel with the highest efficiency parameter is the one that obtains 
constant and high profits. Note that the uncertainty considered in effort dynamics led to 
assign some activity to the vessels that were supposed to be dismissed. The vessels that 
remain active are benefited by the withdrawal or effort reduction of the vessels 
supposed to remain inactive. 
 Catch trends do not show any important variation and no important effect on red 
shrimp price is deduced. Price trends have no interest for the following discussion and 
will not be displayed.  
Output 1.a.v. Vessels economic outcome in scenario 1.a.
vessels profits Scenario 1.a
Year
P
ro
fit
s 
(th
. e
ur
os
)
-5
0
0
50
10
0
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0
20
0
Bahia de Blanes
-5
0
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
Blanda II
-5
0
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
Blanda III
-5
0
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
Es Niell
-5
0
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
Mariner
-5
0
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
Marroi
-5
0
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
Marroi II
-5
0
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
Nova Rosa Mari
-5
0
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
Nuria
-5
0
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Peret II
-5
0
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Punta Santa Ana
-5
0
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Verge del Vilar
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Scenario 2.a. Non cooperation in a subsidized system with some decommission price 
Looking at the resulting effort vector supposed to simulate fishermens decision 
when a decommission price of 7,000  was offered, it can be observed that eight from 
the twelve vessels decide to leave the activity. It is important to remark that the effort 
dynamics for the present scenario were not as stable as others, i.e. depending on the 
individual initial effort level there was some variability and vessel four (Es Niell, the 
one with the second efficiency parameter) stayed fishing while vessel ten and twelve 
(Peret II and Verge del Vilar) were dismissed. However, the solution that was more 
frequently found is shown in Table V.14. The fishery should tend to a significant effort 
reduction due to the facilities to dismiss vessels. The total effort reduction is 
compensated with an increase of individual effort of the remaining vessels and specially 
Peret II and Verge del Vilar whose catchability is relatively high (see Table V.4.). As a 
consequence, the expected reduction of fishing mortality is limited.  
Vessel Effort (days fishing)
Bahia de Blanes 0 
Blanda II 0 
Blanda III 0 
Es Niell 0 
Mariner 0 
Marroi 0 
Marroi II 0 
Nova Rosa Mari 240 
Nuria 240 
Peret II 230 
Punta Santa Ana 0 
Verge del Vilar 240 
Total Effort 950 
Moreover, the uncertainty assumed by the decision model for Nash equilibrium 
solutions gives some probability to the activity of a vessel when the deterministic 
decision model states that a vessel should be dismissed. This fact needs to be considered 
at the discussion of the results and is the main cause that mortality does not decrease as 
Table V.14. Yearly vessels and total effort (days fishing) for scenario 2.a. 
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much as it would be expected looking to the effort decision outputs. In spite of this, the 
reduction in fishing mortality brings some slight recovery of the population and some 
constant landings. The effort reduction is thus followed by an increase of biomass. This 
landings constancy brings positive economic effects that appear to be equilibrated until 
the effect of the discount rate seems to devaluate the expected profits.   
Vessel level and price analysis are not shown for the present case study. The 
total profits are received by only four vessels that are the exclusive owners of the 
exploitation. In competitive terms, it may be suggested that the competition is reduced 
as eight vessels are dismissed. The four vessels remaining active are the most benefited 
by this management action. At present, European Commission plans (IFOP) have been 
Scenario 2.a
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0
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5
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0
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5
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.5
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
discounted profits (M euros)
Output 2.a. Bioeconomics of scenario 2.a. 
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implemented to promote the decommission of some vessels, but there are some social 
factors that lead them to remain in the fishery (personal communication by Mr. 
Esgleas). 
Scenario 3.a. Non cooperation in a subsidized system with no effort constraint 
 The most liberal management proposals tested here (scenarios 3.a and 3.b) 
hypothesizes that allowing fishermen to fish the whole year should make the most 
competitive vessels increase their effort while the less efficient would leave the activity. 
It is suggested that the resource should act as a self regulating system that would remain 
exploited by the most efficient ones. Moreover, as the number of agents should tend to 
decrease, the system would be more efficiently managed. This hypothesis can be 
rejected with the results obtained in our analysis. The effort set is shown in Table V.15. 
Vessel Effort (days fishing)
Bahia de Blanes 0 
Blanda II 0 
Blanda III 139 
Es Niell 187 
Mariner 0 
Marroi 114 
Marroi II 0 
Nova Rosa Mari 274 
Nuria 365 
Peret II 94 
Punta Santa Ana 0 
Verge del Vilar 160 
Total Effort 1332 
 Although the management measure proposed in scenario 3.a brings a reduction 
of more that 200 boat days, the fishing mortality is very slightly reduced as it is 
observed in output 3.a. The initial slight fishing mortality reduction is compensated due 
to the constant increase in catchability. The stock does not stop its continuous reduction 
until an expected average population biomass of 11 tonnes, which is 3.5% of its 
Table V.15. Yearly vessels and total effort (days fishing) for scenario 3.a. 
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carrying capacity (K). It is not necessary to address that from a conservationist 
perspective this management action is far from being adequate, with a high risk of stock 
collapse. Moreover, as the stock is approaching extinction, the landings are also 
decreasing and the profitability of the activity is considerably reduced.   
Scenario 3.a
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Output 3.a. Bioeconomics of scenario 3.a. 
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Vessels and price dynamics are not interesting for the present scenario, and 
although the landings decrease should bring some increase in prices that may 
compensate the economic looses, output 3.a shows that it has no significant effect.  
Scenario 4.a. Bargaining cooperation in a subsidized system 
The cooperation scenario with Nashs bargaining solution should lead a manager 
to optimize the expected discounted profits from the activity in a ten year horizon with 
the condition of equal effort for each fisherman. As it is observed in Table V.16, the 
system is improved with a significant effort reduction. Each vessel should fish 49 days. 
It brings a reduction to 37 % of the previous total effort and brings obvious positive 
effects for conservationist purposes.  
Vessel Effort (days fishing)
Homogeneous effort 49 
Total Effort 588 
 Conservationist objectives are fully satisfied with the present scenario. In the 
long run 175 tonnes of average estimated biomass are predicted, which is 53% of its 
carrying capacity (K). The decrease in landings in a very short run are rapidly 
compensated due to the biological characteristics of red shrimp, which can be 
considered a fast growing species considering its intrinsic growth rate (r, see Table 
V.9). The lower fishing mortality brings an increase of catches due to the significant 
recovery of the population. The adequacy of this scenario both for collective 
conservationist and economic outcome is out of question but it must be observed in the 
short, mid and long runs for each vessel. Collective social objectives as it is deduced 
should also be positive. 
Table V.16. Yearly vessels and total effort (days fishing) for scenario 4.a. 
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  It may be argued that the economic positive effects should only be perceived in 
the long term but as can be observed in price dynamics (output 4.a.p), the initial 
reduction of landings is compensated with a considerable increase of the price of the 
product that brings positive economic outcome in a short-mid term. Long term profits 
tend to stabilize and even decrease due to the effect of discounting.  
Scenario 4.a
Year
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0
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0
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0
catch (tonnes)
0.
0
0.
5
1.
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5
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.5
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
discounted profits (M euros)
Output 4.a. Bioeconomics for scenario 4.a. 
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 The vessel level analysis provides us with an interesting result for the ongoing 
discussion in chapter VI when dealing with the adequacy of collective decision making 
within the fishermen of a single port. As it is observed in Output 4.a.v, all the vessels 
perceive positive effects from cooperative behaviour. On the other hand, the most 
competitive vessels (Nova Rosa Mari, Verge del Vilar and Es Niell) are initially the 
ones to avoid any cooperation, at least on the short run (see Output 1.a.v). We exclude 
the very efficient vessel from this appreciation; Nuria is a very competitive vessel in 
terms of economic efficiency but has a very low catchability coefficient. It also suggests 
some discussion about competitiveness not only in terms of economic efficiency but 
also in terms of technological efficiency (catchability). On the long run, all the vessels 
price dynamics in Scenario 4.a
Year
30
40
50
60
70
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
price (euros/kg)
Output 4.a.p Price dynamics for scenario 4.a. 
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are benefited and the sum of the annual profits for all of them is better than the obtained 
in scenario 1.a except for Nova Rosa Mari. 
Output 4.a.v. Vessels economic outcome in scenario 4.a. 
vessels profits Scenario 4.a
Year
P
ro
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s 
(th
. e
ur
os
)
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
Bahia de Blanes
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
Blanda II
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
Blanda III
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
Es Niell
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
Mariner
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
Marroi
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
Marroi II
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
Nova Rosa Mari
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
Nuria
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Peret II
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Punta Santa Ana
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Verge del Vilar
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Scenario 5.a. Optimization of a subsidized system 
The theoretical exercise presented here proposes an effort reduction to 33 % of 
the current fishing activity level. Effort and fishing mortality should be reduced and 
applied by two vessels, Nova Rosa Mari and Es Niell. Note that the vessel with the 
second largest relative economic efficiency parameter is Nuria, but in contrast, it is a 
vessel with very low catchability coefficient. It may take us to some discussion about 
the efficiency in terms of catchability and economic efficiency parameter. The 
remaining ten vessels should be dismissed. Social objectives suggest the rejection of 
this management action but it illustrates the inadequate exploitation pattern of the 
Blanes red shrimp fishery where too much is fished and it is done by the wrong vessels.  
vessel Effort (days fishing)
Bahia de Blanes 0 
Blanda II 0 
Blanda III 0 
Es Niell 229 
Mariner 0 
Marroi 0 
Marroi II 0 
Nova Rosa Mari 240 
Nuria 0 
Peret II 0 
Punta Santa Ana 0 
Verge del Vilar 0 
Total Effort 469 
 The fishing mortality reduction brings obvious positive effects into the 
population that reaches 168 tonnes which is 51 % of its carrying capacity. Profits are 
increased in a similar manner to scenario 4.a but in this case they are shared by the 
selected two single vessels. As a consequence, vessel level analysis is ignored here. The 
effect of price dynamics is to that of scenario 4.a and it will not be explained again. 
Output 5.a shows the optimal economic exploitation trend. The decommission of ten 
vessels brings a considerable cost reduction and jointly with the initial increase in red 
Table V.17. Yearly vessels and total effort (days fishing) for scenario 5.a. 
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shrimps price due to the landings decrease, no negative economic result is observed in 
the short run, contrarily to what may be expected. 
Scenario 5.a
Year
0
50
10
0
15
0
biomass (tonnes)
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
catch (tonnes)
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
1.
5
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Fishing mortality
-0
.5
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
discounted profits (M euros)
Output 5.a. Bioeconomics for scenario 5.a. 
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Scenario 1.b. Non cooperation in a non subsidized system 
This is the most realistic scenario if the current subsidies to fuel were removed. 
This management action is supposed to increase each vessels cost of effort (c2) in 150 
%. The increase in the costs of fishing should lead to most of the vessels to reduce its 
effort level comparing to the election in scenario 1.a. Nova Rosa Mari and Nuria are the 
only two vessels that maintain their effort level (see Table V. 13). The effort strategies 
in the case of the removal of the subsidies is shown in Table V. 18.  
vessel Effort (days fishing)
Bahia de Blanes 0 
Blanda II 0 
Blanda III 110 
Es Niell 171 
Mariner 0 
Marroi 96 
Marroi II 0 
Nova Rosa Mari 240 
Nuria 240 
Peret II 74 
Punta Santa Ana 0 
Verge del Vilar 143 
Total Effort 1074 
 Focusing on the global system, the first consequence of the removal of the 
subsidies is a total effort reduction to the 67 % of the average effort observed during 
1997 to 2004. This effort reduction should lead to a slight recovery of the population. 
On the contrary, the catchability increase should limit this increase. The initial decrease 
in catches due to the effort reduction is compensated in the short-mid run with the 
biomass recovery and the increase in catchability. The profitability of the activity is 
observed to be stabilized in the middle term, but no significant improvement seems to 
be obtained with the proposed management measure. Discount rate devaluates profits in 
the long run.  
Table V.18. Yearly vessels and total effort (days fishing) for scenario 1.b. 
Chapter V               Case study: GAMEFISTO in Blanes
161 
 The vessel level analysis is interesting to observe if the decommission of some 
vessels brings positive effects to the ones remaining in spite of the absence of subsidies. 
Comparing vessels profits with scenario 1.a and 1.b it is not observed a remarkable 
decrease in vessels profitability. The reduction of effort produces a recovery in the 
population and, as a consequence, the recovery of the population compensates their 
costs increase due to the removal of subsidies. This observation will lead to some 
discussion when analysing the adequacy of this management action in chapter VI.  
Scenario 1.b
Year
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0
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0
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5
1.
0
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discounted profits (M euros)
Output 1.b. Bioeconomics for scenario 1.b. 
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Total landings are maintained at almost constant levels and no effect in price 
dynamics is suggested. The price dynamics for the present scenario does not bring any 
remarkable discussion and will not be displayed. 
vessels profits Scenario 1.b
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0
Bahia de Blanes
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0
0
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0
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0
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0
Blanda II
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0
0
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0
15
0
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0
Blanda III
-5
0
0
50
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0
15
0
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0
Es Niell
-5
0
0
50
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0
15
0
20
0
Mariner
-5
0
0
50
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0
15
0
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0
Marroi
-5
0
0
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0
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0
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0
Marroi II
-5
0
0
50
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0
15
0
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0
Nova Rosa Mari
-5
0
0
50
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0
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0
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0
Nuria
-5
0
0
50
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0
15
0
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0
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Peret II
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0
0
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0
15
0
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0
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Punta Santa Ana
-5
0
0
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0
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0
20
0
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Verge del Vilar
Output 1.b.v. Vessels economic outcome in scenario 1.b. 
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Scenario 2.b. Non cooperation, non subsidized system and some decommission price
The combined effect of removing subsidies and offering a decommission price 
can be observed in Table V.19. As it was explained for the scenario 2.a, the resulting 
effort set in this scenario is the result that presents more uncertainty. The effort solution 
sets vary when changing the initial effort levels of the fishermen. 
vessel Effort (days fishing)
Bahia de Blanes 0 
Blanda II 0 
Blanda III 0 
Es Niell 0 
Mariner 0 
Marroi 0 
Marroi II 0 
Nova Rosa Mari 240 
Nuria 0 
Peret II 196 
Punta Santa Ana 0 
Verge del Vilar 240 
Total Effort 676 
 The fishery should tend to a significant effort reduction due to the facilities to 
dismiss vessels and the increase of costs. The effort reduction brings a slight recovery of 
the population and some positive increase of landings in the middle and long terms, also 
due to the increase in catchability. On the contrary, in the short term, the time spent by 
the population to recover and by the catches to increase may be four to five years. As a 
consequence, the profitability of the activity is not improved in the middle run. When 
the positive effect of the increase in expected landings is expected, the discount rate 
limits the profitability of the exploitation. It may be suggested that the positive effects 
of these combined management actions will be observed in the long term. As it is 
modelled with the discount rate, the short and middle term outcomes are more reliable 
than the long runs. Moreover, on the long run, the increase in catchability returns 
Table V.19. Yearly vessels and total effort (days fishing) for scenario 2.b. 
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fishing mortality to the levels in 2004 and population is suggested to start a slight 
decrease.  
 The uncertainty assumed by the decision model for this scenario gives some 
probability to the activity of a vessel even when the deterministic decision model states 
that a vessel should be dismissed. This fact needs to be considered at the discussion of 
the results and is the main cause that mortality does not decrease as much as it would be 
expected if we observe the effort decision outputs.
Three vessels remain in the activity with the effort prediction results. In spite of 
this, the increase in costs does not improve exploitations profitability. The vessels that 
remain active are benefited with this management action but no global economic and 
biological indicators are improved. 
Scenario 2.b
Year
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0
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0
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0
catch (tonnes)
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
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5
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-0
.5
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
discounted profits (M euros)
Output 2.b. Bioeconomics for scenario 2.b.
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Scenario 3.b. Non cooperation, non subsidized system with no effort constraint  
The combined effect of opening the fishery to 365 days and removing subsidies 
can be observed as a scenario where the administrators play no role. The increase in 
costs and the competition among fishermen should lead the less competitive ones to 
leave the activity and it will be tested if it would bring positive effects both from 
conservationist and economic views. The effort sets obtained are shown in Table V.20.  
vessel Effort (days fishing)
Bahia de Blanes 0 
Blanda II 0 
Blanda III 99 
Es Niell 164 
Mariner 0 
Marroi 88 
Marroi II 0 
Nova Rosa Mari 253 
Nuria 365 
Peret II 67 
Punta Santa Ana 0 
Verge del Vilar 137 
Total Effort 1173 
 The combined management actions in scenario 3.b bring a reduction to the 83 % 
of the total average effort from 1997 to 2004. The reduction predicted is larger than the 
predicted with the scenario 3.a but the fishing mortality is not considerably reduced (see 
output 3.b). The output does not show positive effects neither in a conservationist nor in 
an economic perspective. Vessels and price dynamics are not interesting for the present 
scenario. 
Table V.20. Yearly vessels and total effort (days fishing) for scenario 3.b. 
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Scenario 3.b
Year
0
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0
15
0
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0
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10
0
catch (tonnes)
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
1.
5
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
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-0
.5
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
discounted profits (M euros)
Output 3.b. Bioeconomics for scenario 3.b.
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Scenario 4.b. Bargaining cooperation in a non subsidized system 
 The cooperation scenario is tested here with no subsidies to observe if a 
cooperative management of the Blanes red shrimp fishery could save large amounts of 
money to the administration and moreover bring positive results for conservationist 
objectives. The homogeneous effort level is shown in Table V.21. 
vessel Effort (days fishing)
Homogeneous effort 45 
Total Effort 540 
Table V.21. Yearly vessels and total effort (days fishing) for scenario 4.b. 
Scenario 4.b
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Output 4.b. Bioeconomics for scenario 4.b.
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 The increase in costs will recommend a homogeneous effort strategy just four 
days lower than cooperation in the subsidized system. The conservationist and 
economic analysis (Output 4.a) show the convenience of this management measures and 
suggests that no significant negative effect would be appreciated if fishermen acted 
cooperatively (compare discount profits in scenarios 4.a and 4.b). The removal of 
subsidies for cooperative scenarios would decrease profits from scenario 4.a in a 12 %. 
Looking at the population, it will constantly increase until the long term estimation of 
57 % of its carrying capacity. Profits are increased and stabilized in the middle term in 
spite of being devaluated by the discount rate in the long run. However, the health of the 
fishery is suggested to be assured, especially after the recovery of the population.  
vessels profits Scenario 4.b
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0
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0
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0
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0
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Verge del Vilar
Output 4.b.v. Vessels economic outcome in scenario 4.b. 
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 In summary, this scenario is predicted to be very satisfactory from social, global 
and individual economic and conservationist purposes. Moreover, the savings of the 
subsidies (that are not explicitly computed) should be accounted for ongoing discussion. 
All the vessels are benefited from this management action except Nova Rosa Mari and 
Nuria on the short run (see Output 4.b.v). 
Scenario 5.b. Optimization of a non subsidized system 
The theoretical exercise presented here proposes an effort reduction to 27% of 
the average effort level observed from 1997 to 2004. Effort and fishing mortality are 
significantly reduced and again applied by two vessels, Nova Rosa Mari and Es Niell. 
The effort change from scenario 5.a is simply a reduction of 30 days by the vessel Es 
Niell (see Table V.22). As it is deduced again, subsidies removal has always a positive 
effect for conservationist purposes.  
vessel Effort (days fishing)
Bahia de Blanes 0 
Blanda II 0 
Blanda III 0 
Es Niell 199 
Mariner 0 
Marroi 0 
Marroi II 0 
Nova Rosa Mari 240 
Nuria 0 
Peret II 0 
Punta Santa Ana 0 
Verge del Vilar 0 
Total Effort 439 
 The fishing mortality reduction brings obvious positive effects into the 
population, that reaches 180 tonnes which is 55 % of its carrying capacity. Catches are 
also increased similarly to what happened in scenarios 4.a., 4,b. and 5.a. The global 
economic effect of removing subsidies from scenario 5.a is a reduction of profits of 
Table V.2. Yearly vessels and total effort (days fishing) for scenario 5.b. 
Simulation techniques for the bioeconomic analysis of Mediterranean fisheries Game Theory and Effort Dynamics
170 
10%. As it happened in scenario 4.a, no administrations subsidies savings are computed 
but in contrast, no management costs that may be accounted are computed in the 
subsidized scenarios. It is also suggested that social objectives tend to reject this 
optimization but it is also suggested that a large amount of money could be saved  by 
avoiding subsidies. The large increase in profits is modelled to be obtained by two 
fishermen that are obviously the most benefited by this management action and no side 
payments are calculated. Side payments may be an adequate form to share the 
profitability of this scenario.  
 No vessels profits and price dynamics are shown for this scenario. 
Scenario 5.b
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Output 5.b. Bioeconomics for scenario 5.b.
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Equilibrium solutions 
The Gordon Schaefers model (1954-1957) is used here (Figure V.9) to illustrate 
the equilibrium situations in the ten scenarios simulated and the equilibrium reached if 
the average effort level from 1997 to 2004 (y04) was maintained and the average 
catchability coefficient was constant.  
 Figure V. 9. Equilibrium solutions for the proposed scenarios (see Table V.10).  
        Blue line =Subsidized  systems costs, Red line=Non subsidized systems costs. 
 This model at equilibrium is far from being as realistic as a model out of the 
equilibrium but it may be illustrative to understand the outcome of the Blanes red 
shrimp fishery under the different management actions tested. 
 It is straightforward that subsidies removal provokes an effort reduction in any 
scenario and moreover, that the observed effort trends until 2004 were directing red 
shrimp to an alarming overexploitation level. Moreover, recent observations of fishing 
effort in 2005 show a total effort level of 1065 days (unpublished data). It may be 
suggested with these last data that the system tends to an effort reduction with no 
management actions, result that agree with scenario 1.a but with a larger reduction of 
effort.  
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 On the other hand, it suggests that scenario 3.a may be close to the bioeconomic 
equilibrium (BEE) in an open access fishery as it was modelled by Gordon in 1954. The 
cooperation scenarios should tend the exploitation to levels near the maximum economic 
yield (MEY). These two reference points were explained in chapter I (see Figure I.4). 
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VI. DISCUSSION: CASE STUDY AND METHODOLOGY 
 The first section in chapter V is dedicated to the validation of two parts of the 
presented model to be incorporated to the current simulation techniques of 
Mediterranean fisheries. The first validation held is the genetic algorithm gafortran 
(CARROLL 2001) and later on, the effort strategies resulting from the description of the 
Blanes red shrimp fishery as a non cooperative game (NASH 1951), where players tend 
to maximize their profits knowing that they share a finite resource, are compared to the 
observed effort from 1997 to 2004.  
The parameter estimation process for the case study analyzed faced us with a 
common problem in Mediterranean fisheries: the lack of reliable and long enough data 
series (CADDY 1993; LLEONART and MAYNOU 2003). These are the only sources of 
information about the exploited species. The information available needs to be used in 
the most efficient manner so that the biomass dynamic models can be applied 
successfully. The methods investigated in chapter III were tested with different results. 
The parameters obtained with the genetic algorithm gafortran were the ones that best 
fitted the observed data and the inclusion of this technique when dealing with biomass 
dynamic models is suggested. 
Game theory as a valid tool to describe the mechanisms directing and describing 
the evolution of Mediterranean fishing systems is one of the main challenges and 
matters of discussion of the present work. As it is derived from validation of effort 
dynamics in chapter V, it is accepted as a valid methodology to incorporate in 
Mediterranean simulation systems. A wider discussion for that validation is given in the 
next paragraphs.  
These two validations lead us to the implementation of such techniques in the 
GAMEFISTO simulation model. This simulation model resulting from the 
The present chapter deals with the discussion about the tools presented in this
work and their utility for the analysis of a Mediterranean case study based on 
the results of the Blanes red shrimp fishery in chapter V. Some background about the 
problems with the available methodology and the aspects that this work may tackle is 
given.  
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investigations during the present study is used for the bioeconomic analysis of the 
Blanes red shrimp fishery with the data and assumptions widely explained in chapter V. 
The results of the simulations presented in the second section of chapter V start 
with the effort solutions found for each scenario. The effort strategies will be 
determined by some competitiveness concept between the vessels. The competitiveness 
may be related to their catchability coefficient (mortality generated by unit of effort) or 
to their economic efficiency parameter (mortality generated by  invested). These effort 
solutions direct the evolution of the biological indicators such as biomass, catch and 
profits shown in the output graphs. 
These output graphs make possible some qualitative analysis and discussion 
about the competitiveness of different agents sharing a Mediterranean fishery. First, the 
effort strategies adopted by each fisherman will be analyzed for the most realistic 
Scenario 1.a jointly with the expected future outcome of the Blanes red shrimp fishery. 
Vessels strategies and profits are analyzed with regard to their characteristics, which is a 
straightforward consequence derived from the theoretical demonstrations showed in 
chapter II and will lead to some foregoing conceptual discussion about the observed and 
expected effort trends and moreover it will be a valid result to understand the 
overcapitalization of fishing fleets which has been considered an alarming problem in 
Mediterranean fisheries (BAS et al. 2003; LLEONART and MAYNOU 2003). The 
consequences of the heterogeneity of Mediterranean fishing fleets will also be 
discussed. 
On the other hand, the different scenarios give us some perspective about the 
profitability of Mediterranean fisheries under different management actions. The 
simulations performed with the GAMEFISTO model represent the evolution of the 
bioeconomic and biological indicators after some decision resulting from the 
background described by each scenario. The effort solution concepts for each scenario 
will also be discussed both from a mathematical (attending to their uniqueness and 
robustness) and a conceptual perspective (qualitative analysis of individual behaviour, 
rationality etc.).  
The biological and economic variables are determined by the management 
actions and by fishermens response to them. In other words, the user designs the field 
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where the game is played and players take their own decisions, except for the case of 
global maximization of the fishery where players are forced to an effort strategy (see 
chapter V, scenarios 5.a and 5.b). The scenarios include two main groups, cooperation 
and non cooperation. The differences and the adequacy of both may lead to a deeper 
discussion about the management regimes in Mediterranean fisheries. 
Some other factors, such as price dynamics, the observed overcapitalization of 
the fishing fleets, the effect of subsidies, multi-specificity and particular questions such 
as the effect of the increase of fuel price are also discussed in the next lines.  
Finally, some brief paragraphs around the rational behaviour jointly with some 
notes about the interview with Mr. Eusebi Esgleas, President of the Blanes fishermens 
association will be commented as the last perspective about the present work with the 
objective of, later on, tackle its final conclusions. 
METHODOLOGY 
The need of new perspectives 
 The classic Gordon Schaeffer (1954) bioeconomic model and the ones derived 
from it, Smith (1969), Clark (1976), Hannesson (1993), etc. describe the evolution of 
the bioeconomic indicators of a whole fishery. The main novelty present in this work 
states that the evolution of such indicators will be the result of the sum of a number of 
willingness.  
The different agents involved in the management of a fishery may be classified 
at different levels: At the lowest level of this description we find fishermen, which in a 
Mediterranean fishing system are the ones who fix the amount of fishing mortality 
introduced in the exploited populations under a pool of restrictions. These restrictions 
are related to the next level of agents involved in a fishery, the managers. The 
authorities regulating the Mediterranean fisheries are the European Commission, 
national and regional administrations that interact among them. As their decisions may 
be probably related to political motivations between countries and governments, we will 
not discuss them. On the contrary, the decision making of these authorities affects 
fishermen and usually is assessed by another level of implication in fisheries, science. 
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The scientists working in fisheries may be classified as experimental or theoretical, 
independent or involved, economists, biologists or a mix of them.  
The agents interact at different levels in a determinant manner that directs the 
outcome of the biological and economic indicators of a fishery. The interaction referred 
to is between levels but, also between the agents at the same level. The uncertainty 
generated between the agents involved and the ignorance about their motivations may 
lead to a bioeconomic collapse of a whole fishery.  
A detailed analysis of these interactions and the problems related to them was 
made by A.C. Finlayson (1994) in a book named Fishing for truth. The book refers to 
the interaction between the agents involved in the Northern cod stock collapse in the 
early 1990s through a detailed description of the decisions taken since the 200 mile law 
was introduced in the Newfoundland region (Canada). A chapter of this book is related 
to the interaction between science and fishermen. Under the question Is there a place 
for fishermen in Fisheries Science? some words about this challenge are introduced: 
The objective is to understand whats going on and try to explain whats going 
on. It is to relate. It is to go out there and say What do you see? Whats your 
explanation of whats going on? Well go and check it out. And we must go and check 
it out.  J.J. Maguire in Fishing for truth (FINLAYSON 1994).
 The presented simulation model is an attempt to simulate fishermens behaviour 
as a result of the reality they perceive. 
The effort dynamics, what does it explain? A game theoretic approach
Game theory is a tool used here for the analysis of the strategic interaction 
between the agents sharing a finite resource (MESTERTON-GIBBONS 1993). The game 
theoretic approach is made in a mathematical language that is used to formulate what 
fishermen perceive (essentially the named stock externality but also the market and 
technological externalities widely explained in chapters I and II). The present game 
theoretic model tackles with the interactions between two main levels of a fishery: 
Managers that fix the limits to fishing effort and fishermen that find a fishing strategy 
within these limits. Science is thus used to analyze the evolution of a fishery shared by a 
finite number of fishermen (which take their own decisions) that also interact with 
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managers. More explicitly, game theoretic algorithms are used to make predictions 
about single fishermens actions under the rules that managers make. The result of both 
levels of interactions is the matter of this approach. The science is thus involved in the 
outcome of the fishery as a single observateur, descriptor and predictor.  
 the language of science is mathematics. Even if there is willingness on the 
part of science to incorporate this knowledge [fishermens], it would be very difficult. 
Its like speaking Mandarin Chinese and English. They are two different systems of 
knowing. Different evaluative traditions that seem almost mutually exclusive.
(FINLAYSON 1994). 
The challenge was to express in mathematical language the perception of 
fishermen and their consequent actions in response to the constraints imposed by the 
administrations. 
The incorporation of these perceptions into the mathematical analysis is made by 
means of Nashs solutions (1951) for non cooperative games. The model assumes that 
fishermen are interested in the maximization of their own profits and this motivation 
will lead to the election of a fishing strategy. The numeric solutions were used to predict 
fishing strategies in terms of fishing days but as it will be widely discussed, this game 
theoretic approach will also lead us to qualitatively discuss the observed 
overcapitalization of the Mediterranean fishing fleets. 
 After all the conceptual justification of the game theoretic approach in 
Mediterranean fisheries, a numerical result needed to be provided as a demonstration of 
its adequacy. This was shown in chapter V and as a result, game theory is accepted as a 
valid effort dynamics predictor and incorporated to the GAMEFISTO simulation model.  
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Parameter estimation techniques 
The models chosen to describe any system need to be confronted to reality 
through a set of numeric parameters. These parameters incorporate the available 
knowledge about the mechanisms involved in the dynamics of the predicted variable 
and the manner they are related.  
 In Mediterranean fisheries, as it has been explained repeatedly, the available 
information of the exploited species to parameterize their dynamics is very scarce and 
new methodologies are urgently needed.  
 A pool of techniques was tested for the case study, some classic such as linear 
regressions and ASPIC software (PRAGER 2005) and some modern, such as genetic 
algorithms and a Bayesian approach. The results were not definitive but for the case 
study, the method that best fit the models predictions to the available information from 
catch and effort data series was the algorithm constructed with the gafortran 
(CARROLL 2001) genetic algorithm. Its validation in chapter V seems enough to 
recommend its incorporation to the available estimation techniques in 
Mediterranean fisheries.
About the complexity  
Looking to the three frames that compose the GAMEFISTO simulation model, 
some discussion about the distribution of complexity can be done. The biological 
growth models are the simplest in fishery science and were chosen precisely for that 
simplicity and the data needed for its parameterization, which are catch and effort 
series. In the future, more complex biological models could be included, such as age-
structured models (see chapter I). On the other hand, the economic model that 
transforms landings into net profits is well known and does not include new knowledge. 
In contrast, the main novelty of GAMEFISTO simulation model is the decision 
algorithm to simulate the fishing effort. When dealing with the distribution of 
complexity we can state that the simulation model aggregates complexity in the 
decision submodel.  
 Complexity may not only be discussed in terms of its distribution but also 
attending to a qualitative amount of complexity included in any mathematical model. 
From our perspective, the level of complexity in any simulation model must be chosen 
attending to two aspects. The first is the knowledge of the factors affecting the variable 
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intended to simulate, which will provide us with information about the analyzed 
systems and the mechanisms determining them. The increase in the number of equations 
and independent variables in a given system is supposed to approach us to the real 
behaviour of the analyzed phenomenon. This is true when the available information is 
enough for a correct parameterization of the mechanisms described by the equations. On 
the contrary, modelling real systems demonstrates that the increase in structural 
complexity usually brings an increase of uncertain parameters. The available 
quantitative information that makes the parameterization of the models possible needs 
to be evaluated. As a result, sometimes it is more appropriate to use simpler models 
with less variables (and consequently, less parameters) than to use complex models. 
This is usually the case for those systems that are difficult to measure, such as the 
fishing activity. Moreover, Mediterranean fisheries are characterized by an alarming 
lack of reliable data series. As a consequence, some equilibrium between models 
complexity and available data needs to be reached in order to optimize the quality of the 
predictions done with such models.  
 The equilibrium we are talking about is described by Figure VI.1 (SUGIHARA et 
al. 1984): 
Figure VI.1. Models inaccuracy as a sum of observation (measurement) and process errors 
(systematic bias) as a function of models complexity (SUGIHARA et al. 1984). 
MODEL COMPLEXITY
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 This paragraph may be finished stating that a Mediterranean simulation models 
optimum level of complexity would probably be situated at low levels of complexity, 
maximizing the predictability of a fishing system and minimizing the sum of the process 
error, related to complexity, and observation error, related to the available information.  
GAMEFISTO: Why does it improve current simulation knowledge? 
The main product of the present work is its simulation model. It presents some 
properties that make it useful for Mediterranean fisheries.  
1) It is an autonomous simulation model, i.e., it calculates its own effort 
dynamics and the scenarios design is only related to some background of 
the fishery.  
2) It includes fishermens perception and may be a good tool to understand as 
rational some observed dynamics in Mediterranean fisheries, such as 
observed effort trends and overcapitalization. 
3) It is based on Schaefers biomass dynamic model for the target species, 
which allows to be initialized out of the equilibrium and moreover its 
parameterization is possible based on global catch and effort data sets. 
4) It is multispecific, i.e., a finite number of target species can be described. 
Moreover, a pool of secondary species related to its landings is considered 
and also some revenues not directly related to any target species. 
5) It is designed at vessel level, it simulates fishermens behaviour at its 
lowest scale and the consequences of these micro scale behaviours in the 
outcome of the whole fishery at macro scale are predicted. 
6) It is adequate to Mediterranean fisheries cost structure. 
7) It includes some scenarios which enables us to evaluate the effects of some 
management actions such as effort regulations in a single fishery. 
8) It is stochastic. It allows the inclusion of some uncertainty in the catch 
equation and effort decision algorithm. As a consequence, simulations can 
be run with the desired number of iterations and thus, an uncertainty 
distribution of the results can be obtained. 
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CASE STUDY. THE SCENARIOS 
The scenarios proposed in the GAMEFISTO simulation model are ten. Some are 
related to the realistic situation of the Blanes red shrimp fishery and some are nothing 
but theoretical exercises about the potential profitability of the fishery under alterbative 
management strategies. Each scenario starts with a set of individual effort strategies that 
will direct the bioeconomic indicators outcome. The first three scenarios are described 
by Nashs solutions for a non cooperative game with N non symmetrical players. The 
fourth and the fifth scenarios are aimed to test the effect of a cooperative strategy in the 
fishery. The fourth starts with Nashs bargaining solution accepting that fishermen 
maximize the total profits from the fishery under the bargain consisting in an agreement 
to choose the same fishing strategy. The fifth is a global optimization exercise where 
profits are maximized regardless whether some vessels are prohibited to fish and others 
to maximize the allowed fishing effort.  
 The five scenarios are tested for the current subsidies system and with the 
hypothetical situation removing subsidies to fuel consumption. The simulations for each 
scenario for the Blanes red shrimp fishery jointly with the equilibrium solutions (Figure 
V.9) suggest some considerations for the case study but also to similar Mediterranean 
fisheries that are explained in the next paragraphs. These results will lead to some 
general conclusions as the last task of the present work. 
Scenario 1.a and 1.b. Non cooperation 
The effort solutions predicted a slight decrease in the total effort observed from 
1997 to 2004. On the contrary, the uncertainty algorithm in the effort solution equation 
for the non cooperative game assigns some positive effort to the vessels initially 
predicted to choose the null effort strategy. The present scenario is supposed to be the 
most realistic projection of the bioeconomic indicators. It simulates the projection of 
biomass, fishing mortality, catch and profits with the current management scheme.  
 The bioeconomic indicators suggest a slight effort reduction that is in agreement 
with recent observations and a consequent slight recovery of the red shrimp population. 
On the contrary, the constant increase of catchability stops stock recovery and increases 
catches in the middle term. The profitability of the fishery is maintained both by the 
recovery of the population and the increase of catchability. In the long run, the 
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profitability is expected to decay as the fishing mortality is increased by the mentioned 
technological improvement.   
 The vessel level analysis of this scenario (Output 1.a.v) shows the expected 
profits for the individual vessels sharing the red shrimp fishery. The analysis of their 
profits, jointly with their effort solutions will lead us to a discussion about the decisions 
by each fisherman depending on their technical characteristics. As it is observed, vessels 
heterogeneity leads to different strategies that was indicated as a key factor for the 
profitability of the activity by the president of the Blanes Fishermens Association 
(personal communication).  
 Plotting the effort level against vessels catchability (q) and against their 
economic efficiency parameter () in Figure VI.2, it can be observed that the intensity 
of the individual effort level is well correlated to the vessels economic efficiency 
parameter and no so well to their catchability coefficient. In other words, the ones that 
fish the most for  invested will be the ones to fish more days and probably will be the 
last ones to leave the activity. On the other side, according to Figure VI.3, the vessels 
profits expectation is similarly related both to their catchability parameter and to 
their economic efficiency. 
It is nothing new to say that fishermen go fishing for money and not to fish more 
days, i.e., fishermen become more competitive (higher profits) when their catchability 
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coefficients and their economic efficiency are higher than the others. On the contrary, as 
stated earlier, the vessels with the highest economic efficiency parameters will be the 
ones remaining in the fishery when its profitability decreases.   
 Observations of Mediterranean fisheries state that larger and more powerful 
vessels have been observed since recent years (BAS 2006; CADDY 1993; LLEONART and 
MAYNOU 2003). Catchability coefficient is defined as the fishing mortality generated 
per unit of effort. It is straightforward that it is related to the amount of catch produced 
in a day, and according to observations it is related to size and to investments in 
technology. Many fisheries scientists wonder why fishermen invest in higher engine 
powers, modern technology and gears when the perspectives for the activities 
profitability seem negative. This result may help us to understand this phenomenon: for 
competitive purposes investments both in increasing catchability and in reducing 
costs seem rational. Investments in fishing power and increase of catchability are 
the cause of the observed overcapitalization of Mediterranean fishing fleets.  
 Recently, the fishing sector has requested an increase in the subsidies from the 
administration arguing that the increase in fuel price derived from the international 
bargains during the last decade are making their activity non profitable. The effort 
solution for this scenario accepts partially these complaints but suggests that 
administrations could make good use of this fact and promote an effort reduction. If 
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fishing is not profitable for some vessels, they should be motivated to leave the activity 
which would lead the exploitation to a more sustainable effort level (see Figure V.9).  
 On the other side, scenario 1.b represents the same situation but with an increase 
of the costs of the activity. The vessels that have the highest catchability coefficients are 
usually the largest, and as a consequence, they also are the ones with the highest costs. 
It may be hypothesized that they would be the most affected ones if a sudden increase of 
costs (derived for example from the increase in fuel price) or the removal of subsidies to 
fuel consumption occurred. The costs increase in the GAMEFISTO model represents 
the removal of the subsidies to fuel consumption.  
 The same figures showed for scenario 1.a are used to reject this hypothesis. 
Output 1.b.v shows that vessels with the highest catchability coefficient continue being 
the ones with the highest profits. Moreover, the removal of subsidies does not have the 
expected impact in fishermen economic outcome and it may be taken to account by the 
administration to tackle the expected complaints from the sector that this measure (fuel 
price increase) would probably bring. 
Scenarios 2.a and 2.b. Non cooperation with decommission price 
The effort solutions for these cases are not as robust as the other ones. The 
numeric solution varied when the players to play first in the approximate iteration 
model varied. Nashs solution for this non cooperative case where fishermen are forced 
to leave the fishery when their expected profits are less than the money for the 
withdrawal, suggests that a large part of the fleet should leave the activity. Scenario 2.a 
is actually the most realistic scenario. There are some incentives for fishermen to leave 
the activity but actually it rarely happens. This may be a result of two different factors: 
First, empirical observations state that a part of their revenues are not accounted by the 
model. Fishermen sell the biggest red shrimps to restaurants in order to avoid the 
commercialization taxes and consequently, when the model calculates lower profits than 
the received from the withdrawal, it is underestimating profits. On the other hand, 
Mediterranean fisheries can be considered small scale fisheries that must not only be 
observed as an economic activity but also as a traditional and social activity. Fishermen 
prefer maintaining their activity even if it is not the best investment for their capital so 
that they can assure their employment and a way of life for their descendents.   
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Scenarios 3.a and 3.b. Non cooperation and no effort constraint 
 These may be named as the most liberal scenarios. It may be hypothesized that 
removing the limits to fishing effort could make the most efficient vessels (in terms of 
catchability and economic efficiency) to out compete the least efficient ones which 
would promote an overall decrease in the effort applied to the population and a recovery 
of red shrimp. As a consequence, an increase in the profitability might be reached. 
Actually, this theoretic scenario is the contrary to what the hypothesis predicts. 
According to our simulation, only five vessels choose the null effort. A low level of 
effort is assigned to these vessels with the uncertainty model and moreover, the other 
vessels increase their effort levels or decrease them very slightly. As a consequence, the 
fishing mortality applied practically does not decrease and, with the temporal technical 
improvements, it would increase to very dangerous levels. The population level and 
catches show a decreasing trend that may lead to collapse. The profitability of the 
activity is suggested to follow the same negative tendency. As a consequence, this 
management action cannot be recommended. 
  The removal of subsidies does not seem to motivate fishermen to reduce their 
efforts and the same tendency observed for scenario 3.a is followed in scenario 3.b.  
Scenarios 4.a and 4.b. Bargaining cooperation 
Nashs solution for a bargaining cooperative game suggests that a homogeneous 
effort reduction would lead the exploitation to a more sustainable and profitable level. 
Population recovery and catches increase indicate the convenience of cooperation from 
a conservationist perspective. Moreover, the total profits from the activity should reach 
a clearly more profitable sustained level. This profitable level is not higher due to price 
dynamics. The increase in the total landings should make the prices to decay. Fishermen 
state (see conversation with E. Esgleas) that price is not a result of an offer demand 
function but it is determined by larger scale market bargains. Assuming that price would 
not decrease, the expected profits with this management action would be even higher. 
 The individual vessels analysis (Output 4.a.v) shows that this cooperation 
behaviour is not only profitable according to the total profitability but also in most of 
the cases to the individual profitability too. Note that Nova Rosa Mari vessel is the only 
one damaged by the cooperation scenario. This vessel is the one with the highest 
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economic efficiency parameter (see Table V.8) and it is expected to be the only one not 
interested in cooperation. 
 As a consequence, cooperation is observed as a valid management action for 
stock recovery purposes and also for economic purposes except for one vessel. 
 Scenario 4.b shows similar results. The homogeneous effort solution is slightly 
lower than 4.a but the bioeconomic indicators and vessel level analysis are very similar. 
Thus it may be stated that the removal of the subsidies to fuel consumption would not 
cause a significant damage to the trawling fleet and on the contrary it would save 
significant amount of money to the administrations under a cooperation scheme. 
Scenario 5.a. and 5.b. Optimization 
The global optimization exercise through the management of individual effort 
strategies is nothing but a theoretical approach to investigate the potential profitability 
of the analyzed fishery. The vessels eto remain in the fishery are Es Niell and Rosa 
Mari. Nova Rosa Mari is the one with the highest economic efficiency parameter (see 
Table V.8) but the second in terms of economic efficiency is Nuria that has a very low 
catchability coefficient. Es Niell has the third economic efficiency parameter (almost 
identical to Nuria) but a catchability coefficient significantly higher. It can be concluded 
that the profitability of a fishery is maximized not only by the most economically 
efficient vessels but that it is a more important factor than the highest catchability 
parameter. This may be a significant result for the management of the 
administrations subsidies for technical improvements. It seems more appropriate 
to subsidy vessels investments in reducing costs than investments in improving 
their fishing power. The most illustrative of these last investments are the 
investments in engines with high horsepower observed in Mediterranean ports. 
 From a social perspective, the global optimization scenario seems obviously 
inappropriate since it suggests ten of the twelve vessels to be removed from the fishery. 
On the contrary, scenario 4.a shows similar global results and seems much more 
acceptable by the fishing sector. 
 Scenario 5.b does not present impressive results, but it confirms that any 
removal of subsidies should promote a slight effort reduction.    
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Effects of multispecificity 
Red shrimp catch generates the 50% of the Blanes trawler fleet total income. 
The activity of this fleet is basically based on shrimps exploitation and thus it is very 
dependent on this species population evolution. The collapse of red shrimp would 
probably turn trawlers activity unprofitable. The population in 2004 was about 14.7% of 
its virgin biomass level, which can be stated as moderately overexploited. On the 
contrary, one of the secondary species, hake, has been reported to be in alarming levels 
of overexploitation. A single species assessment of hake population indicates that its 
exploitation is not profitable. It is profitable actually, only because it comes as bycatch 
with the red shrimp. In other words, hake will be overexploited while the global 
trawling fishery is profitable. It can be stated that the profitability of red shrimp pays the 
extreme overexploitation of hake and other continental shelf stocks. 
 This case is mentioned here as a consequence of the multispecific characteristic 
of Mediterranean fisheries that demonstrates the need of multispecific analysis of 
Mediterranean fisheries and the construction of tools that tackle this particularity. 
The complexity when tackling our case study  
The use of the GAMEFISTO simulation model enables the user to decide in the 
level of complexity to be assumed for the analyzed case study. The different trials done 
with the Blanes red shrimp fishery are discussed as an example.  
 The Blanes trawling fleet does not only fish red shrimp. As it has been described 
in the first section in chapter V, Norway lobster (Nephrops norvegicus) and hake 
(Merluccius merluccius) are part of their landings. Thus the Blanes red shrimp fishery 
may be proposed as a case study with more than one target species. However, when we 
first tried to classify this fishery as a two, three and eight target species exploitation we 
faced the problem of the parameterization of these species.  
 The parameter estimation methods tested for red shrimp were also tested for the 
rest of the species with worse results. Moreover, the solutions for Nash equilibria were 
not as comparable to the observed ones as they were when only red shrimp was 
considered. Following with the brief discussion about the complexity some pages 
above, we can state that we searched for the optimum level of complexity also in the 
case study, i.e., we chose a complexity level for our case study based on the available 
previous information (observations, data series) that led us to the less uncertain 
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description of the bioeconomic indicators, which in our case are the catch and effort 
time series.   
FISHERMENS PERSPECTIVE AND RATIONALITY 
Due to the described stock and market externalities, fishermen may be the 
victims of their own positive management action, i.e., individual fishermen perceive 
that the fish that they do not fish -for its conservation- is caught by other fishermen. 
This perception has been heard to the fishing sector and the presented GAMEFISTO 
model intends to incorporate it in mathematical language through Nash equilibria 
(chapter II). Moreover, the model assumes that fishermen decide their individual effort 
strategies determined by these perceptions. After these words and according to the 
solution concepts shown in chapter II and the results in chapter V, we can understand as 
rational the behaviour of a single fisherman in spite of being directing the stocks that 
feed itself and its family towards the ruin predicted by Hardin in his Tragedy of the 
commons (1968). Obviously, this analysis requires the removal of any moral 
judgement into fishermens decision, which according to my own experience is not an 
easy thing for fisheries scientists.  
In contrast, a more liberal perspective may state that fishermens perceptions 
should determine some fishermen to leave their exploitation according to the 
profitability of the fishery compared to any other economic activity to invest in. The 
projected scenarios 2.a and 2.b can be used to discuss those liberal thoughts. Actually, 
scenario 2.a is the most realistic description of the present reality, i.e., currently there is 
some money for the withdrawal of vessels that could be used by fishermen in order to 
invest in another activity. However, the observations demonstrate that this decision is 
not adopted by fishermen. Again, some investigation on fishermens perception should 
be done to understand this behaviour. In words of the Blanes fishermens association 
president, Mr. Esgleas, social factors such as tradition and personal knowledge make the 
withdrawal to be the last option to be chosen by a fisherman. It can be stated that 
fishermen do not act as a mere economic rational agent (CAMERER and FEHR 2006), and 
that some other factors drive their decision.  
As a conclusion about this reference to fishermens rational behaviour, we may 
conclude that scenarios 1.a and 2.a are the most representative of the current situation. 
In the first one, fishermen regulate their effort level in order to maximize their profits. 
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The null effort strategy would be adopted by five vessels, without receiving any reward 
for it. However, the five vessels choosing effort zero are not leaving the activity 
according to the simulation model, because the uncertainty added into the model make 
these vessels to choose a low effort strategy. In reality, this means that they concentrate 
their effort on other fisheries. The validation in Figure V.6 shows that the vessels 
predicted to choose the null effort decision do not really stop their activity but in general 
they are the vessels with the lowest effort strategies. This validation allows to conclude 
that fishermen act in an economic rational behaviour when determining their effort 
level. However, when comparing the really observed behaviour with the results of 
scenario 2.a it may be stated that fishermen do not act in such an economic rational 
way. In scenario 2.a, players are forced to act rationally, i.e., to leave the activity if the 
amount received for the withdrawal is more than their profit expectation in the fishing 
activity but real fishermen maintain a low level of apparently not profitable activity. The 
explanations for this are two: The first is that they earn much more money than they 
declare and even if they regulate their effort level to maximize their profits following 
some non cooperative scheme, they do not leave the activity. The second may be related 
to social factors such as tradition. The words by Dr. Ragnar Arnason summarize this last 
argument (ARNASON and KOHOLKA 2003): There are indications that certain group of 
fishers may be motivated more by tradition or the desire of minimum income than strict 
profit maximization.     
One of the motivations of the present work was to translate to scientific language 
some perceptions of the fishing sector. The ideas behind the construction of the 
presented model were discussed with a member of the fishing sector, the President of 
the Blanes Fishermens Association Mr. Eusebi Esgleas. As a result of that conversation 
that took place the 6th of July of 2006 onboard of the Marroi trawler, some notes are 
highlighted as the final outlook to the present work. 
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Ideas from the interview with the President of the Blanes Fishermen Association  
The discussion that took place onboard the Marroi trawler the 6th of July of 2006 
with the President of the Blanes fishermen association was a good opportunity to 
contrast the ideas introduced in the GAMEFISTO model. The conclusions were diverse; 
the idea of fishermen sharing a resource and the perception that the fish not caught by a 
vessel would be caught by the others was accepted. Moreover, this aspect was suggested 
to be a key factor to understand the observed evolution of fishing mortality. 
The heterogeneity of the fishing fleets was mentioned by Mr. Esgleas as another 
important factor for the conservation of the fishing activity. The roles in the Blanes 
fishery seemed to be well delimited. Some vessels fished almost every day in a well 
identified area while some others fished in those grounds only in some cases. In words 
by Mr. Eusebi Esgleas, the homogenization of the fleet would lead the system to a 
collapse. This idea was straightforward associated to Hardins Tragedy of the 
Commons.  
Fishermen stay at the harbour when the previous days they have observed that 
the landings of red shrimp were not large enough to compensate the daily investment in 
fuel. The fuel price increase makes that fishermen need some certainty about the 
expected revenues to go fishing. 
The dynamics of the price of red shrimp are probably the least realistic 
assumption in the presented model. Mr. Eusebi Esgleas stated that the price of the 
product is exogenous and fixed by economic agents before the arrival to the harbour. 
The investments are directed both to more powerful vessels but also to more 
efficient ones. Investments in materials to reduce the resistance of the sea water that will 
reduce fuel consumption are observed jointly with equipments to increase their fishing 
mortality by effort unit (catchability) and high engine powers. 
Some interaction between fishing fleets was also detected. Some complaints 
about the fishing mortality applied by the beach trawlers and another factors such as 
pollution effects were reported.  
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VII. CONCLUSIONS 
1) The strategic interactions within a fishery suggest the need of a micro-
level analysis to understand the observed macro-reality of Mediterranean 
fisheries. 
2) The description of a fishery by means of the strategic interactions 
derived from being a shared resource allows us to construct a game 
theoretic model where fishermen are considered to be a finite number of 
asymmetric non cooperative players that strive to maximize their own 
profits sharing a finite population. 
3) The Mediterranean input management scheme has been justified to be a 
determinant factor to suggest the adequacy of a game theoretic analysis 
in Mediterranean fisheries. 
4) Game theory has been shown to be a valid tool to describe and predict 
temporal trends of fishing effort in Mediterranean fisheries. 
5) The Mediterranean fleets heterogeneity has been demonstrated to be an 
important but not sufficient factor for the conservation of the fishing 
resources and the increase of the profitability of the activity in a 
Mediterranean context. 
6) The genetic algorithm gafortran (CARROLL 2001) has been verified to 
be a useful tool to improve the current parameter estimation techniques 
for the Mediterranean exploited species. 
7) The GAMEFISTO simulation model is presented as a result of the 
investigations on the simulation techniques for the bioeconomic analysis 
of Mediterranean fisheries and it has been used to test some management 
actions in the Blanes red shrimp fishery. 
8) The presented simulation model and the parameter estimation techniques 
are an attempt to optimize the predictability of the Mediterranean 
fisheries taking into account the minimization of the observation and 
process error in the current bioeconomic simulation techniques. 
9) The GAMEFISTO simulation model predicts an effort reduction for the 
Blanes red shrimp fishery that will lead some slight recovery of the 
population in the short run but due to the continuous improvement of 
vessels technology the population will decrease in the long run. 
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10) The GAMEFISTO simulation model predicts the effort dynamics to be 
related to the described economic efficiency parameter defined here as 
=q/c2. On the contrary the fishermens expected profits are related both 
to the economic efficiency parameter and to the catchability coefficient 
(q). This result has been concluded to be a key factor to understand and 
explain the observed overcapitalization of the Mediterranean fishing 
fleets. 
11) The best management action for the conservation and optimization of the 
Blanes red shrimp fishery appears to be Nashs bargaining solution with 
an homogeneous effort reduction that should direct the population to a 
significant recovery and to the increase of the activities profitability on 
the middle and long term. Moreover, it would be a positive management 
scenario for all the vessels except one that should be interested in a non 
cooperation scenario.  
12) The collective decision making has been demonstrated to be more 
appropriate for all the management objectives than a self-regarding 
strategy. 
13) The results obtained for the scenarios run in absence of subsidies to fuel 
price show that the effort strategies are designed according to the costs of 
individual vessels but rejects the complains of the fishing sector. The 
economic outcome of the fishery is predicted to be similar to the one in a 
subsidized system. This result is suggested to be very useful for the 
administrations. 
14) The red shrimp is fished jointly with an extremely overexploited species 
such as hake. The profitability of red shrimp supports the trawling 
activity and the overexploitation of hake and it may be stated to be 
maintained with the profits from red shrimp and its secondary species. 
15) The future improvement of the current simulation techniques of 
Mediterranean fisheries is related both to the increase of the complexity 
in the simulation models and the experimental knowledge of the 
exploited populations. This argument should be taken into account by the 
pertinent administrations at the time of designing plans for the 
development of such a techniques. 
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